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THE POLITICAL CAR2EE OF HEHHY GOULBURH 
(a) Introduction 
The f i r s t task of the u n i v e r s i t i e s , i t has "been said, i s t o 
make the students forget what they have learned at school. 
As f a r as the study of history i s concerned, i t i s undoubtedly 
true that the profundity of h i s t o r i c a l ideas and the amount 
of f a c t u a l d e t a i l s , which a pu p i l of 16 can he reasonably 
expected,to assimilate, are so l i m i t e d that the resultant 
conception of h i s t o r i c a l t r u t h must at best he such.as would 
appear a gravely distorted one to the Professor of History, 
Thug - though i n many ways most understandable and commendable 
the development, by which the 19th century has become the 
period most commonly studied by pupils i n t h e i r l a s t years at 
grammar schools, has had the unexpected and undesired e f f e c t 
that much of the h i s t o r i c a l perspective of that popularly 
acclaimed, though somewhat mythical personality, the average 
i n t e l l i g e n t o i t i z e n , i s more obstinately d i s t o r t e d as regards 
the 19th century than i n respect of any other. 
An excellent example of t h i s tendency i s to be found i n 
the ideas1 prevalent about the Peelite group. An apparently 
i n c o r r i g i b l e impression.persists, even among people whose 
h i s t o r i c a l education has been continued beyond the school-room 
that t h i s nag a group -which suddenly formed i t s e l f when peel 
proposed to repeal the Corn Laws, that i t immediately acquired 
both d i r e o t i o n and cohesion, that u n t i l his death i t was 
dominated "by him, and that (perhaps "because Gladstone was 
among i t s members) i t consisted of men who were Liberals i n 
a l l but name. Yet, to anyone acquainted more intimately w i t h 
the features of p o l i t i c s i n the f i r s t h a l f of the 19th century, 
i t must be at once apparent that such an estimate i s a mere 
caricature of the r e a l s i t u a t i o n ; however, much even experts 
may d i f f e r on shades of opinion. 
This thesis may,' perhaps, help i n making possible an 
even more accurate assessment of some of these features of 
p o l i t i c s i n the 19th century, and especially of the r e a l nature 
of the Peelites. The early part of Henry Goulburn's p o l i t i c a l 
career, his election to the House of Commons for a "close" 
borough, and his p o l i t i c a l apprenticeship as Under-Secretary, 
f i r s t to Ur* Byder and then to Lord Bathurst, serve as a useful 
i l l u s t r a t i o n of many of the principal, trends of English p o l i t i c s 
at that time. Later, he was not only one of Sir Robert Peel's 
closest personal friends i n the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d , but when he 
held o f f i c e s of importance, they always necessitated close 
contact and co-operation w i t h Peel, and when out of o f f i c e he 
appears.to have been one of the most active and i n s i s t e n t i n 
seeking to keep i n being a group of Peel's friends i n Parliament. 
A study of the work of one of Peel's most f a i t h f u l lieutenants 
a. 
oaa, th©refore* hardly f a i l to throty some, l i g h t on the greater 
man under whom he served and on the party of wialeh. both of them 
were convinced members. 
Uorji i n 1784, Henry Ooulburn had a career which mey be 
regarded as t y p i c a l for the. p d l i t i o i a n of his tdme.^ 
He was educated at T r i n i t y College, Cambridge, and entered 
parliament as member, for Horehajpi at Ijhe age of 23. ' ' 
subsequently represented St, Qermains, \7est Looe and Armagh, 
and finally,* after a previous unsuccessful attempt, he was 
returned for his u n i v e r s i t y in. .1831. . He retained t h i s seat 
u n t i l h i s death, and there i s ample evidence> both In h i s 
pri v a t e correspondence and. i n h i s public, flork inparilament^ 
that he served his constituents w i t h devotion. He was 
appointed to hi s f i r s t public o f f i o e i n 18l6, when he became 
Under-Secretary at the Home Office*-.'. Two years l # e r he "• 
exchanged t h i s under-seoretaryship w i t h that .to the 'Jar and 
Colonial Office, and, i t was i n that capacity t h a t he served 
as one of the negotiators of the Peace Treaty w i t h the U.S.A.; 
in. 1814. I n 18gl he was promoted to the post of Chief. 
Secretary f o r Ireland and simultaneously was m^de.a fPrivy 
Councillor. After a b r i e f period i n the p o l i t i c a l Wilderness 
during the.confusion of parties attendant on the shor t - l i v e d 
m i n i s t r i e s of Canning, and Goderioh, he .beeame a member of the 
Wellington Cabinet i n 1888, and served as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer u n t i l the government f e l l * Buring Peel's hundred 
days he was Home Secretary, and i n 1841 ho returned to hia 
previous poat at the Exchequer, which he retained throughout 
the second Peel administration. He remained.an organiser and 
adviser of Peel's friends and an active parliamentarian 
u n t i l the end of h i s l i f e , hut he aooepted' no further Offices 
under the Grown, even though attempts were made to persuade 
him to j o i n Stanley's administration in»1851f^ 
I t i s quite clear from t h i s o u t l i n e t h a i toulfcurn'a 
career f a l l s i n t o easily definable phasea,' and i t w i l l j ; \ 
therefore, he.convenient to examine each of these separately 
i n order to be able to a r r i v e at a f i n a l assessment of his 
work* 
5. 
M Background. Childhood. Education • 
Henry Goulburn was "born i n London on 19th Maxoh1784* 
His father's ancestors originated from "the county of Chester," 
emigrated t o Jamaica and there acquired s u f f i c i e n t wealth to 
enable them to send Henry 'Goulburn1 s father to England to be 
educated at Eton and Oxford, A l l the same he encountered the 
"great prejudice" which at that period "existed against those 
who had made fortunes i n the East or west indies and t h e i r 
admission i n t o the higher class of Society." I t was only by 
means of acquaintances which he formed at Oxford and on account 
of "the reputation of a large fortune" t h a t he "obtained a 
q u a l i f i e d admission into the outer court of t h i s exclusive 
temple, and thus beoame acquainted with...the daughter of the 
Viscount Chetwynd who from the smallneas of h i s income had resided 
f o r many years i n the neighbourhood of Bruxelles." The 
r e s p i t i n g marriage, which took place i n 1783, was "more one o f 
convenience than a f f e c t i o n . " While the memoirs show some cool-
ness on the part of Henry Goulburn to h i s father, he says of 
his mother : "Of her i t i s impossible for me to speak wi t h o u t 
the deepest reverence and a f f e c t i o n , f o r t o her care and 
instruction,, and yet more to her example * am I humanly speaking 
indebted for.the advantages which I have enjoyed through l i f e . " 
V/e are also t o l d , w i t h a self-deprecating humour,* whioh 
often characterises h i s private correspondence, though i t never 
appears t o break through i n t o hia public pronouncements, what 
are the enly faota recorded of his e a r l i e r infancy* *2he GjLerk 
of the Parish got drunk at my christening, f e l l down and broke 
his thumb, a fa c t of which he reminded toe twenty-one years 
afterwards when I went t o the Church t o Obtain the c e r t i f i c a t e 
of my baptism. Another equally i n t e r e s t i n g fact i s that the 
nurse sat- down on me when l y i n g i n a chair and that I escaped 
without further l n ^ y ! t h ^ t t that i n c l i n a t i o n of my: head; to one 
side and that defective v i s i o n of my r i g h t eye which have 
adhered to me ever since*" "While i t i s tempting' t o deduce 
psychologioal consequence from these early accidents, the 
available evidence affords l i t t l e , m a t e r i a l for the obvious 
kind of speculation i n which we could indulge on the basis of 
these data. instead we are t o l d that he "did not submit to 
auth o r i t y w e l l , * of the punishments he received and rtof the 
ingenuity with which on various occasions (he) eluded them.? 
The f i r s t 2^ years of h i s l i f e were spent i n Eranoe, 
whence he returned t o t a l l y ignorant of his.own languaget 
Ha was educated at f i r s t by his father and wr i t e s of hia . . 
experience when f i r s t sent to school at the age of 7: " I found 
myself.. ..more than on a par w i t h the boys of my own age i n my 
knowledge of English and L a t i n and what was.mo?e remarkable i n 
my ignorance of French; so completely had an i n t e r v a l of a 
few years o b l i t e r a t e d a l l trace of my e a r l i e r proficiency.« 
He had spent two years at Dr. Moore's 8ohool at Suribury -
a period during which/he formed several l i f e - l o n g friendships 
when his. father died. * His mother, who had previously become 
7. 
an i n v a l i d , found that hex husband had died Intestate, that various 
creditors v?ere pressing f o r instantaneous payment, and that her 
marriage settlement "was altogether a n u l l i t y . " Thus, while a 
lengthy Chancery case was i n process, property was sold, servants 
were discarded, and a much reduced establishment set up, f i r s t i n 
Manchester Square and l a t e r i n East Acton. Throughout the next 
few years f i n a n c i a l anxiety was never absent, especially since his 
mother's expenditure was "moderate indeed, but beyond what the 
means u l t i m a t e l y a l l o t t e d to her were found to Justify. 1" The more 
distant f u t u r e , however, was secured by h i s own inheritance held 
i n t r u s t u n t i l he reached the age of 2X. While i t was impossible 
to touoh t h i s sum d i r e c t l y t several loans were taken on t h i s basis 
of security. A further move, f i n a n o i a l l y somewhat imprudent, t o . 
a larger house i n Cumberland Place, was of great importance i n 
(7) 
that i t roade the Goulburns' the neighbours of Mr. M. Montague. v ' 
This acquaintance l a i d the basis, not only of Henry Goulbura's 
( g l ' 
marriage but al30 of h i s p o l i t i c a l career, f o r i t was Mr. Montague 
who f i r s t introduced him to Mr. Perceval, the future'Prime Minister. 
Meanwhile a severe inflammation of h i s eyes compelled hia 
withdrawal from school. U n t i l he recovered h i s sight, his aunt 
continued his education by reading to him, and upon recovery he 
for some time undertook his own education by i n s t r u c t i n g h i s 
brothers. There followed a period of two years, during which 
a private t u t o r , "a worthy man, but with a l i m i t e d capacity and 
knowledge and not versed i n the a r t ojf communloatlng knowledge 
8. 
to others,* was employed. Another s p e l l of s e l f - t u i t i o n 
ensued, and when an application to Join the expedition to 
Copenhagen f a i l e d , i t was determined that Henry Goulburn should 
proceed to Cambridge. I n preparation he was given some 
excellent d a i l y t u i t i o n by Mr. Evans, a fellow of T r i n i t y 
College. This had an i n t e r e s t i n g by-product, for we are 
t o l d : "During the following summer of 1800 my mother took a 
small house on Ham Common. From thence I used to walk to 
town 3 day3 i n each week to attend on Mi". Evans, returning i n 
the evening by one of the coaches. These long walks occupied 
some time, but were not p r o f i t l e s s as to i n s t r u c t i o n . I used 
to s t a r t early so as to reach London by 10 o'clock, armed wi t h 
a pocket e d i t i o n of Horace, and my complete knowledge of that 
author was the r e s u l t , as I learnt by heart, while on fry road, 
the whole of him.™ 
I n 1800 he entered T r i n i t y College as a fellow commoner, 
which had the disadvantage that i t wa3 "a class which was i n 
those days one of rank and d i g n i t y and supposed to be more 
becoming those who had larger means." On the other hand i t 
was the passport to the highest society, and he thus made many 
acquaintances which proved Important to him i n l a t e r l i f e . 
There i s a s i g n i f i c a n t passage r e l a t i n g to his attendance at 
Chapel: " I d id not take advantage of the exemption from 
r e l i 0 i o u s duties then considered the p r i v i l e g e of Noblemen and 
Fellow Commoners. I t i s a remarkable f a c t that during the 
f i r s t two years of my residence I was never on any one occasion 
absent from morning chapel." His academic career was not 
without d i s t i n c t i o n . He Was i n the f i r s t class at each of the 
annual college examinations, and gained the second declamation 
prize* I n his t h i r d year, however, he dropped his mathemat i o a l 
studies, and followed his interests and pleasures rather than 
any prescribed course o f study. He "acquired a smattering of 
law f ! of Anatomy, of Chemistry and mechanics, but nothing more..., 
was passionately fond of sports and spent the best part ot term 
time i n shooting and rowing." This form of a c t i v i t y precluded 
him from competition f o r a fellowship and we are given an 
enlightening account of his f i n a l examinations: "Thus.....I 
went i n to the examination w i t h no other anxiety than that of 
keeping myself warm a t the then coldest period of the.year; 
for there were no stoves and very l i m i t e d means of e*oluding ; the 
outward a i r . . The Senate House was the place where winter 
reigned supreme. After 4 days of examination I oameout the 
f i r s t of the ol TCoK h ot , or as the kind hearted examiner 
Dr. Calvert,, subsequently Dean of Manchester, was ever a f t e r -
wards pleased t o c a l l me, his Senior Wrangler." This success 
shows that he must have been a man of very considerable a b i l i t y . 
His period at the University coincided w i t h the worst 
f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s of his family, aggravated because his brother 
had run int o oonsiderable debts and. was, moreover, involved i n 
a l i b e l case. These d i f f i c u l t i e s were resolved' on his coming 
of age i n 1805, but he was unpleasantly surprised to f i n d that 
such had been the expense of the Chancery proceedings and the 
administration of the estate by the Master that he found himself 
possessed "only of about £30,000," i n addition to a considerable 
annual p r o f i t from the Jamaican estate. 
. • • . . . • < . . p . , 
(o I ffiactibn to Parliament^* •••. „ J 
Goulburn now moved fr e e l y i n the highest society, since he 
was ftfeed from the r e s t r i c t i o n of comparative property and had 
already made the r i g h t type of contacts, l a r g e l y as a r e s u l t of 
his years at Cambridge* I t was only natural, therefore, that 
he. would soon he offered an opportunity o f e n t e r i n g p a r i lament • 
The f i r s t o f f e r was made to him i n 1806. I t was, however, 
coupled w i t h an understanding that he would support Lord 
Grenville's government. < . He con.sequently declined the o f f e r 
as inconsistent w i t h his views on public p o l i c y . 
; i n 1807, however, Lord Portland formed his administration 
w i t h P e r c e v a l ^ as Chancellor of the Exchequer* Parliament 
was dissolved, and Goulburn intimated to the Chancellor through 
I£r. Montagu his willingness to stand f pr any place where the 
ohanoe of success was reasonable. .The Treasury advised him to 
t r y Horsham. \7hat followed i s beat described by h i s own account 
of the proPeedingS, which are i n t e r e s t i n g not merely as an ••'/••"[ 
e lection i n a " r o t t e n " Borough,; but c h i e f l y because they show 
how d i f f i c u l t . i t could be- even i n that type. of constituency to 
be oertain/of the election p f s p e c i f i d candidates, and also 
because they i l i u s t r a t e ; t h e importance of lawyers.in determinlng 
the f i n a l r e s u l t of an elec t i o n . . ; 
Horsham was "a borough i n which the interest was divided 
between the Duke of Norfolk and Lady I r v i n g , and i n which, 
being a Burgage Tenure bprpugh, the question at issue was . not 
that which agitated the country at that time of Protestant or 
Roman Catholic ascendancy hut merely whether the r i g h t of 
voting was? -in those who under Lady I r v i n g held o r i g i n a l and 
entire Burgages or i n those who held the several portions 
into which the Burgages belonging to the Buka of Horfolk had 
f o r e l e c t i o n purposes been divided. I n the preceding 
parliament the Duke of Horfelk's cause had triumphed and 
Lords Palmerston and F i t a h a r r i s had been unseated on P e t i t i o n . 
But the soundness of that decision x?as ciUestioned by good * 
le g a l authority and t h i s Issue was again to be t r i e d . 1 
1 accordingly was associated w i t h He. Earryat and dispatched 
to the borpugh under the tutelage of Lord J. Gordon who 
occupied £a&7 loin's residence near the borough ahd to whom 
the management; of the Election was entrusted. We made a 
Canvassf that i s we c a l l e d upon four gentlemen who had 
independent votes, and made an appearance i n the Town g a l l 
on the following morning. -Mr. Marryat was w i t h d i f f i c u l t y 
restrained by Lord \1. Gordon from making a long speech and 
v i o l e n t attack ugon the Duke of ^ o r f o l k * s Soman Catholic 
opinions, and then the two Attpmles of the .real combatants 
appeared, each w i t h a Blue bag f u l l of deeds, which were 
handed over to 1 various i n d i v i d u a l s who a l t e r p o l l i n g returned 
them to t h e i r respective owners. Argument was had as t o 
the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of divided Burgages, which the returning 
Officers, acting on the l a s t decision of the House of commons, 
decided against us, and our opponents Sir G. Eomilly and 
13. 
He. Jones Barry vere returned. m?. Uarryat and myself, I n 
due course, "became Petitioners and a Committee wa3 appointed 
to t r y the merits of the caoe. I t was then the practice for 
each party to name one Member of the House especially to protect 
his i n t e r e s t though sworn equally w i t h the rest of the Committee. 
The person selected on our part was I2r. Geo. Ealford - on that 
of the s i t t i n g member Ur. Henry Hartin the steward of the 
Duke of Norfolk. I t met for business on the * 1 
and I attended i t s proceedings. But so soon as they decided 
by a majority of that the r i g h t of voting was not l i m i t e d 
to e n t i r e and o r i g i n a l burgages, thereby confirming the views of 
our opponents, I withdrew under the impression that my hope of 
coning into Parliament was for that time at an end* Judge, 
therefore, of ray surprise on the afternoon of the following day 
to hear that we had been reported to the House as e n t i t l e d to 
the seat. This r e s u l t was e n t i r e l y a t t r i b u t a b l e to Lir. Holford's 
a b i l i t y and judgement. So soon as the Committee had i n 
opposition to his view deoided that the Burgages were d i v i s i b l e 
he stated the necessity of adding to t h e i r resolution some 
provisions which should either place a l i m i t to the d i v i s i b i l i t y 
or attach some condition to i t as conferring the r i g h t o f voting. 
The proposition was reasonable i n i t s e l f and was adopted by the 
Committee and the te s t which they u l t i m a t e l y decided on applying 
to burgages so dividod was that they should have been for a 
cer t a i n time entered on the Rolls of the Manor. On applying 
t h i s rule to the P o l l as taken at Horsham i t was discovered that 
14. 
many of the voters f o r Sir G. Romilly and Mr. Jones Parry had 
not been so entered and we had consequently the majority of 
le g a l votes. i n e f f o r t was made "by Mr.- Martin to induce the 
Committee to rescind the Resolution, hut i t f a i l e d , the Committee 
by a majority of one refusing so to s t u l t i f y themselves.... 
" I was eager to take my seat and rode down to the House 
i n the following day f o r that purpose* But I found myself 
stopped at the door by the intimation that being i n boots and 
not a County member, I could not be sworn. Such was at that 
time the regard to form that the objection was insuperable. 
I was embarrassed and annoyed, but' Mr* Thornton, the Member for 
Surrey being at the door of the House.offered me h i s shoes, 
and having taken o f f my own boots and donned h i s shoes I was 
at once q u a l i f i e d , admitted andsvora, and returned to the door 
to resume my own and restore t o Mr. Thornton his habilements 
and my thanks. n 
There can be no doubt that Goulburn took his duties and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s as a member of Parliament seriously from the 
outset. He f i r a t recorded hia vote, i n support of the 
Government, on a motion censuring the Government for the 
Banish expedition. He made a w r i t t e n note of the reasons 
why he voted w i t h the "noes," a practice which he intended to 
follow on every occasion when he cast h i s vote* Finding, 
however, that the occasions f o r voting were too numerous and 
often complicated, he abandoned t h i s practice, not without 
a^aaiffiji of conscience though,;-^for heiremarksj ^1 am aware that 
the great defect of my character through l i f e has "been, an 
unwillingness otherwise than under the stimulus of public duty 
or p u b l i c observation to make any continuous exertion, and I , 
therefore easily s a t i s f i e d my conscience that my time might 
be much better employed than i n recording the reasons whioh 
i n each instance actuated my conduct." There l a l i t t l e doubt 
that t h i s s e l f - s t r i c t u r e i s unduly severe. 
Regular" .attendance at the^ ^^ H insight 
into the conduct of parliamentary bus iness• Koreover, he soon 
became a member of a c i r c l e of younge r members; of, Parliament,' 
some of them h i s college contemporaries, who dined together on 
Wednesdays, and "formed a Society, intimately .united i n p o l i t i c a l 
sentiment and l i t e r a r y t ast es." This group consisted of ' 
Lord Palmerston, MT. Mfcnnerq Sutton^),. Mr';: P. Robinson, M 
Mr. M i l n e s , M r / Vesey Fitzgerald, Mr. Uellesleyy-
Mr* H. Drummond and Mr. Crofter.^.. This group of people of 
future d i s t i n c t i o n was joined soon afterwards "by Mr. Robert peel 
Independent•of t h i s c i r c l e who dined at the A l f r e d , Goulburn 
also seoured the-friendship of S i r Arthur Wellesie^ ! Who at that 
time was Secretary f o r Ireland, w i t h whom he often dined i n 
the Kitchen, "then the usual place of refreshment." 
Thus he formed his intimate connection w i t h the Duke of Y/ellingt 
t»f which he could say that he always considered i t ' . as the most 
fortunate circumstance of hi s l i f e . '.•: . 1 
16, 
He made h i a maiden speech I n defence of the Government 
a f t e r the disaster of Coranna, and his experiences on that 
> harassing occasion are d e s e r ^ "After Mr. Turney 
had spoken, I rose simultaneously w i t h Mr. Canning who gave 
place to me as a new Member* v The c a l l upon' mo by the Speaker 
was alarming. I nearly f o r a moment l o s t my sight* My 
understanding seemed:tonfall hut I got through my f i r s t 
sentence i n t e l l i g i b l y and managed to get through a short 
speech very l i t t l e . t o my own s a t i s f a c t i o n as I found th a t I 
had i n my confusion omitted what I considered the best part of 
my argument. I t was, however, w e l l received, Mr. Canning 
who spoke afterwards complimented me, and my friends 
(especially he wnom I valued most, Mr. Montagu) were more than 
•' .-.'•V'-. no) s a t i s f i e d , " The maiden speech i s not reoorded i n Hansard, 
but Goulburn's consistent support of the administration was 
soon to a t t r a c t the benevolent a t t e n t i o n of the Ministers and 
to reap i t s natural reward. 
17, 
(30) 
(a) Junior Minister. 1810-21., 
At the end of the session during which Goulburn had made 
his maiden speech, he determined to undertake an extensive 
t o u r ^ of Spain, where h i s toother was serving with the Army* 
This i n t e r e s t i n g and adventurous journey was terminated, when, 
at Gibraltar, he received a l e t t e r from Mr# Perceval " s t a t i n g 
the unfortunate circumstances which had induced the secession 
of Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning from the Cabinet" s o l i c i t i n g 
h i s support, and expressing the wish to see him. These requests 
were immediately complied with, but i t took about a month before 
Go alburn reached London. The Government reconstruction, which 
had taken place i n the summer, had promoted several members of 
the v/ednesday dinner c i r c l e , but whether on account of h i s 
absence i n Spain or for other reasons, Goulburn had not been 
among those who had been invited to share the spo i l s of vaoant 
o f f i c e s . On h i s return to the House of Commons, however, the 
(a* 
new Home Secretary, Mr. Ryder, who waa not among his previous 
acquaintances, offered him the s t i l l vacant under-seoretaryship. 
This offer was rea d i l y accepted. 
The new Under-Secretary of state was warned that the 
p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n made i t possible and even probable that he 
would hold t h i s o f f i c e for no more than a few weeks, and not 
even the most sanguine would have prophesied that i n the 
following 20 years he would hold various positions i n the 
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Government almost without interruption. Tor the Perceval 
administration was indeed facing grave d i f f i c u l t i e s * Almost 
immediately after the reassembly of Parliament a motion for 
immediate inquiry into the causes of the f a i l u r e of the 
.Talcheren expedition had been carried against the Government. 
I t "had to deal with a House of Commons i n which there were 
besides the Government f i v e d i s t i n c t and separate parties* 
That of the V/hig opposition led by Mr. Whitbread and aided by 
a party numerous and strong i n t a l e n t . That of Lord Sidmouth 
of which Mr. B. Bathurst was the organ. That of Lord Gastlereagh 
and that of Mr. Canning, neither forfcLfllable from t h e i r numbers 
hut comprising men of quick a b i l i t y and o f f i c i a l experience, 
and l a s t l y that which acknowledged Mr. Wilberforce as i t s head. 
I t was true that against any direct measure for the return of 
the V/higs to power he might calculate on the negative i f not 
positive support of these minor p a r t i e s . Put the danger of 
Governments does not so much depend on direct attempts at 
t h e i r removal as upon successive defeats on minor points i n 
which coa l i t i o n s may take place without previous consent or 
regard to ultimate consequences." 
Nevertheless the Government survived, and Goulburn makes 
i t clear that he found h i s new work most congenial, though he 
"had to learn everything even as to the form of proceeding." 
He gives much credit to the considerate and u n s e l f i s h conduct 
of h i s sux>erior o f f i c e r , whose moral q u a l i t i e s more than 
compensated for his defioienoies xiot a b i l i t y 6¥ 3^forifiatipn, n 
The Home Office was at the time divided .into, tasp p ^ r t s , and 
eaoh was placed under the Qharge of an Uhder Secre tary .^ 
Goulburn'a part wag assigned the management o i the M i l i t i a 
and volunteera* Reference to Hansard shows that he took 
very l i t t l e part i n parliamentary work* This throws some 
Interesting l i g h t on the practice of departments at the time, 
for the reason i s given e x p l i c i t l y : ?As my Chief was himself 
i n the House of Commonsy I was not ca l l e d upon to take any part 
i n Parliamentary debate^ and I confined myself therefore to 
regular attendance i n the House and on those Committees i n 
which the Home Bepartment was interested*" Hone th$ l e s s , 
on one or two occasions he had to speak for h i s department, 
The f i r s t of these speeches recorded i n Hansard was made i n 
1813* ^  The l e f t wing Whig, ^ i r ;-P* 3urdett, moved that the 
lo c a l m i l i t i a should always be exempt from flogging despite the 
law extending army d i s c i p l i n e to ta^ i n oasii of; . 
invasion* Goulburn successfully resisted this, ftove by 
contending that i n such an emergency I t was e s s e n t i a l that 
both forces should be under exactly the same d i s c i p l i n e * 
This, however, occurred towards the end of h i s period at the 
Home Office* 
His. f i r s t : duty was to supervise the arrangements for 
securing volunteers from the l o c a l m i l i t i a s for the regular 
army i n order to supply the depleted Peninsular forces with 
r einf or cements ^  men) of already d i s c i p l i n e d s o l d i e r s * I t 
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appears that the chief d i f f i c u l t y was not absence of volunteers, 
hat the reluctance of M i l i t i a O f f i c e r s , "naturally proud of the 
e f f i c i e n c y of their Regiments," to part with the i r beat men. 
Onoe t h i s d i f f i c u l t y had been overcome, the measure proved 
en t i r e l y successful. His next task was the consolidation and 
amendment of laws r e l a t i n g to the l o c a l m i l i t i a , which were 
contained i n numerous acts of parliament, which was both l e g a l l y 
and administratively inconvenient. Here another interesting 
s i d e l i g h t i s thrown on the departmental practice of the time. 
"As at that period there was no l e g a l offioer whose duty i t 
was to draw Acts of Parliament and assistance was only occasionally 
obtained from a B a r r i s t e r himself engaged i n extensive Private 
business and acting as Counsel to a l l the Offices M i l i t a r y and 
C i v i l ;the duty of preparing Acts of Parliament devolved /mainly 
i f not e n t i r e l y on the Department to which they r e l a t e d . " 
Thus Goulburn himself drew up the b i l l , which passed through 
Parliament without opposition. Thirdly, Goulburn claims that 
i t was on h i s suggestion that Mr. Ryder secured f i r s t the 
Cabinet's and then Parliament's approval for a b i l l to make the 
m i l i t i a s of the United Kingdom and of Ireland mutually interchange-
able. This was not only a l o g i c a l and th e o r e t i c a l outcome of 
the Act of Union, but i t was at the time of immediate p r a c t i c a l 
importance i n that regular troops could be relieved by B r i t i s h 
militiamen from their duties i n Ireland,; and could instead be 
used to strengthen the counter-attack which the Duke of Wellington 
was preparing from the l i n e s of Torres vedras. 
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On the personal side t h i s period was important, "because the 
year 1811 saw his marriage with Mr. Montagu's t h i r d daughter 
who was nine years younger than he. There can be no doubt that, 
i n oontrast to h i s father's marriage, t h i s union was one of 
affection rather than of convenience. He himself described 
h i s wife as everything he could wiBh^ considered the years 
1811 and 12 i n consequence as some of the happiest of h i s l i f e , 
and could write i n 1852 that h i s marriage "during the whole 
intervening period of 41 years has been a source of endless 
comfort." The same sentiments are either implied or openly 
stated i n h i s l e t t e r s to various correspondents throughout h i s 
"The year 1812 was rendered memorable by the assassination 
of Mr. Perceval," who had been a personal friend of both the 
Goulburn and the Montagu fam i l i e s . The o f f i c i a l duties of the 
Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department compelled him 
to spend some time alone with Bellingham 3ust after the 
assassination. He gives t h i s account of the experience: 
"We neither of us spoke* I f e l t a t h r i l l of horror at being 
with him, but as I looked (at) h i s haggard countenance, h i s 
glaring eye and quivering l i p and considered how short a time 
was to elapse before he would be c a l l e d upon to answer before 
God for the crimes which he had committed, ray feelings of 
horror gave way to those of compassion, and I appreciated the 
firmness of those who when c a l l e d on to punish great wrong 
could merge t h e i r p i t y i n t h e i r paramount sense of what was 
due to ^ustioe." 
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Mr. Perceval 1 s death necessitated a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the 
Government. Attempts t o induce l o r d Wellesley and Mr. Canning 
to strengthen i t by t h e i r accession proved a b o r t i v e , as d i d 
two attempts t o form new administrations." F i n a l l y Lord L i v e r p o o l 
by c o n c i l i a t i n g two o f the smaller o p p o s i t i o n groups, those o f 
Lord Sidmouth and Lord Castlereagh, succeeded i n forming a 
Government which had a wider and securer basis of support than 
i t s predecessor. I n the r e s h u f f l e o f o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n s , 
Goulburn was given the under s e c r e t a r y s h i p a t the C o l o n i a l 
O f f i c e , a post p r e v i o u s l y held by Peel. He thus served under 
the new Secretary f o r V/ar and Colonies, Lord B a t h u r s t . Of the 
two branches of the department, the Colonial 3ide was a l l o t t e d 
t o G o u l b u r n . ^ 
This arrangement brought i n I t s wake not only transference 
t o a d i f f e r e n t f i e l d o f s i m i l a r d u t i e s , but also one group of 
e n t i r e l y new d u t i e s , f o r Goulburn now became h i s department f s 
Representative and spokesman i n the House o f Commons. His 
3XJeech.es i n t h a t capacity are, of course, on r e c o r d ^ and i t 
becomes at once obvious t h a t debating s k i l l was not the greatest 
of h i s g i f t s . There i s f a r too much i n t r o d u c t i o n - u s u a l l y 
d u l l i n t r o d u c t i o n - before he reaches the main p o i n t o f h i s 
argument, and even these main p o i n t s are too much hedged about 
w i t h l i u a l i i ' i c a t i o n s and verbose d e f i n i t i o n s f o r h i s speeches t o 
acquire the q u a l i t i e s o f poli s h e d or impressive r h e t o r i c . 
On the other hand, i t i s w e l l t o remember t h a t a t a time when 
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p o l i t i c s wore s t i l l abriaidere& s u f f i c i e n t l y interesting i n 
themselves to require no sub-editing and d i s t o r t i o n i n a cheap 
press;, eind whenf- fitqreoy-er, parllaMentary speeches were solely 
or primarily intended for the expert p o l i t i c i a n inside the 
Chamber and not for the population at. large, the more f i e r y 
oratory of men l i k e Hume or Spring Eioe was often at a disoount 
because they allowed their pass-ion to carry them away so far 
as to contradict themselves. The l e s s intereating but more 
accurate s t y l e of speaking adopted by Goulburn would save the 
Government from bringing d i s c r e d i t on i t s e l f on t h i s account* 
She combination of sorupulously accurate dotalled information 
and b r i l l i a n t r h e t o r i c , achieved e.g. by Peel\ was undoubtedly 
a more d i f f i c u l t , or at iea#t a very different attainment than 
to be a "good House of (Jommons man" nowadays;* , 
One d i f f i c u l t y which Goulburn encouateredi i n h i s new 
o f f i c e was that \ many of hia actions uoro, rendered suspect by 
thes faot thai? he himself was the owner of a Jamaican estate, 
and he uas, therefore, frequently accused of unduly promoting 
the Jest Indies in t e r e s t * This was,1 indeed, a oharge whioh 
olung to himtenaoi6$sl^; especi a l l y since i n h i s ljater offioe 
as Chancellor of the ^chequer he again had to deal with a 
matter of supreme importanoe to the v/est Indian planters, the 
sugar duties. Even so great an authority on the period as 
Mr. Kitson Clerk i n h i s scanty references to Qoulburn, connects 
him immediately with the l/est Indian i n t e r e s t . ^  I n hia 
memoirs he rebuts t h i s charge'indignantlyj , nM I had the 
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misfortune of possessing an estate i n Jamaica every act of mine 
was regarded with suspicion and I had frequently to complain 
that unfair means were used to prejudice me individually i n 
the eyes of the Public - hut they f a i l e d i n th e i r o b j e c t . w 
I t i s cert a i n l y true that he always, placed the public i n t e r e s t 
before the sectional'one- of the sugar planters* That i s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y true of h i s dealings with the sugar d u t i e s , ^ 
but nowhere is\there'evidehce that he used or abused h i s 
inf luence i n the Colonial ^ department to aeeure spe c i a l f avours 
for the group of property owners to which he belonged. The 
fluctuating income which he- derived from hie Jamaican estate 
wao; much diminished a f t e r a w e l l iatentioned change of manager 
following a v i s i t by h i s brother to Jamaica i n 1815* Since 
he f e l t that the negroes were treated tod harshly, the.change 
was made but merely with the r e s u l t of a General decline i n 
ef f i c i e n c y , as a r e s u l t of which the negroes did not benefit. 
Later i n the t h i r t i e s and f o r t i e s , when there Was. more, general 
d i s t r e s s among the sugar planters, h i s ITest Indian property 
was completely ruined, and became a l i a b i l i t y rather, than an 
asset. Yet h i s sense of the paramount; importance of the public 
i n t e r e s t was such that even when i i i opposition after 1846, and 
oven though f i n a n c i a l r u i n compelled him t o : l e t hia English 
estate at BetciMorth, he took no steps to seek r e l i e f for the 
tfest ihdies when Peel had given hi3 opinion against such steps 
i n the then prevailing circumstances of the c o u n t r y . ^ 
A more complete r Q f u ^ j ^ ^ n of; the !^ har^ !& piE p a r t i a l i t y wo aid be 
hard to imagine. • ; •' /*••..•.•••''">• " •. ; • 
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One of the main subjects of controversy which attached 
to colonial administration at the time was the question of 
slavery. tthere were complaints that the \m prohibiting the 
slave trade was being evaded, that slaves were maltreated, 
and there was agitation for the t o t a l abolition of slavery. 
Of these topics Coulburn claims; " I t i s not possible to 
review l o r d B a t h u r s ^ s administration without admitting $hat 
more was done during his administration for the amelioration 
of the Slave condition and for removing suspicion of Slave Kcade 
than at any antecedent or subsequent period previous to the 
abolition of Slavery." Shis claim may s t r i k e the cynic as 
s l i g h t l y reminiscent of the more recent ^ibe that A.tf.Alexander 
was the greatest F i r s t Lord of the Admiralty since Brendan 
Braokeh, especia l l y I f we r e c a l l that the "antecedent" period, 
during which the prohibition of the Slave Trade had been I n 
force when Lord Bathurst assumed the s e a l s of o f f i c e , was 3uat 
a l i t t l e l e s s than 5 y e a r s . ^ Goulburn supports, h i s claim 
by stating; " I n those various measures from 1812 to 1822 I 
bore a w i l l i n g part. I introduced and c a r r i e d the Slave 
Registration B i l l to which the a b o l i t i o n i s t s attached great 
value. Orders-in-council for the Crown Colonies were passed 
and the l e g i s l a t u r e s of the other Colonies were Induced to 
pass laws abridging the hours of labour and r e s t r i c t i v e corporal 
punishment." He makes t h i s claim anxious to gain absolution 
from the charge of p a r t i a l i t y to the owners, and t h i s i s perhaps 
the reason why he claims more than i s h i s due» The idea of a 
Slave.^egi-flt^-.V^^firj^V l8jiil-before Parliament by Uilberforoe 
I n 1 8 1 8 ^ a s part ©f a wider measure to Improve the status of 
slaves. Goulburn secured the defeat of t h i s measure by arguing 
. * . 
that i t would be wiser to be content, for the time being, with 
a l e s s perfeet system, and-thus to c o n c i l i a t e the planters, 
whose co-operation could then be enli s t e d for. improving the 
system. When, nevertfaeiess, he introduced a Slave Register 
B i l l as a Government measure I n the following y e a r , he waa 
again concerned to s t r e s s that transgressions of the slave 
trade laws were infrequent, but that the b i l l was designed to 
prevent even these r a r e breaches of the law. He was supported, 
of oourse, by \7ilberforce, who, however, regretted that the 
other parts of hie rejected b i l l of the previous, year were not 
included. The only opposition came from a small group of whom 
Gordon was a t y p i c a l spokesman. They attacked i t with the 
objection,.which has prob&bly•been lodged against every s o c i a l 
reform, and wMhh. oertainiy^ has a fajmiliar r i n g i n our days: 
To establish a SlaveV Radiate? i n London would mean mere 
government expenditure/ would create yet another government 
off i c e and more government patronage* 
Other problems whioh f e l l to Geuiburn's oare were those 
connected with new conquest© and the defenee of ex i s t i n g 
B r i t i s h Colonies. Among the former was the completion of the 
conquest of Ceylon, and the conquest of Mauritius* The 
l a t t e r resulted i n considerable d i f f i c u l t i e s , because i t had 
been carried out from the Bast Indies *and the Government 
27. 
established previous to communication with England was on 
the profuse scale of Indian Government.n "The d i f f i c u l t y of 
counteracting l o c a l i n t e r e s t s and plausible arguments i n 
support of extravagant expenditure 1* included the enjoining of 
great reductions '*on most unwilling O f f i c e r s 9 who were apparently 
unable.to understand that the resources of a small is l a n d were 
not equal to. those of a sub-continent. As fa r as defence was 
concerned the most important and pressing problem w/^  how. to 
guard Canadaagalnbt attaofc a^ter the declaration of war by 
the U.S.A. i n 1812« For the entry of the U.S.A.. into the war, 
as Goulburn admits, wa3. unexpected, and i n common with other 
Oolonies which did not seem d i r e c t l y ..threatened, the Canadas 
had been l a r g e l y denuded of troops, which had instead been sent 
to Spain. Thus the defeat and surrender of the f i r s t American 
Array, engaged i n the invasion of Canada was equally unexpected 
and a great r e l i e f to the Colonial Office, which was i n t h i s way 
given a breathing space for collecting, reinforcements and "for 
organizing the M i l i t i a and Volunteer force of the Provinces to 
which may mainly be ascribed....the ultimate preservation of t h i s 
part of H*M. Dominions." 
I t was natural that, when immediately after the cessation 
of h o s t i l i t i e s with Frenoe the U.S.A. communicated through 
Ur. A.Baring t h e i r readiness to enter into peaoe negotiations, 
a representative of.the Colonial Office should have been among 
the B r i t i s h plenipotentiaries. The, choice f e l l on Goulburn 
who forthwith proceeded to Ghent* His duties i n t h i s capacity 
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were onecoua, for i n a d d i t i o n . a l l papers from the Colonial 
Offioe were forwarded to him, unless a matter required immediat 
attention ("and very l i t t l e did, t t comments Goulburn)• 
Further, though he received no additional s a l a r y apart from 
expenses, h i s r a i s e d statue as one of the three o f f i o i a l 
representatives of the B r i t i s h Government involved him i n 
considerable expenditure i n h i s quasi-private s o c i a l l i f e , 
which s i g n i f i c a n t l y he did not charge to the expense account. 
Despite t h e i r t i t l e , the plenipotentiaries ;had very l i m i t e d , 
almost non-existent, executive powers. They were i n constant 
communication with London and Vienna, and never presented a 
note unless i t had f i r s t been sanctioned by the Foreign Office. 
Under these circumstances the negotiations dragged on. 
«But af t e r a time the discussions at Vienna assumed a oharaote* 
whleh made i t pbsa ible that there might be a renewal of 
h o s t i l i t i e s i n Borope, and parties there apeoulated upon the 
embarrassment which an .American war would cause to England as 
regarded her free a°t ion i n European ; a f f a i r s . '\7e were, 
therefore, instructed to accelerate the treaty with the U»S. 
by withdrawing resiatanOe to c e r t a i n of th e i r proposals, and 
the treaty was accordingly signed on 14th December.w 
One of the worst dangers facing the Colonial Offioe i n 
.the postvwar period was that of i t s imminent extinction. 
The\,outory for economy .ln : administration was loud i n those 
years of d i s t r e s s . Perhaps there was some understandable 
confusion i n the public mind as to the differen$e, between the 
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duties of the Secretary at- War ei»d of the Secretary of State for 
V/ar and Colonies, or' perhaps^it Was merely, as Goulburn suggests, 
a lack,of understanding of the Importance of colonial administra-
tion. Be that as i t may, several attacks were launched i n the 
House of Commons with the object of abolishing the th i r d 
secretaryship, ™ " and that by "no l e s s a man than $£P• TierneyP 
Goulburn found i t d i f f i c u l t to persuade the numerous supporters 
Of eoonomy that the saving, effooted would not compensate for the 
l o s s occasioned to the c o l o n i e s . ^ In any case, probably i n 
order to ,pl£pate tile c r i t i c s , i t was decided to r e t a i n only one 
Under-Secretary. This threw a considerable amount of extra 
work on .Goulburn^ so that each week he spent at l e a s t 3 days 
a week i n h i s offioe from 9 &.nu to 6 ptm. and spent the other 
days at h i s recently.purchased country residence at Betchworth 
i n the reading or preparetion of dispatches* He commends the 
C i v i l Servants at h i s o f f i c e for having 3hown an equal devotion 
to duty during t h i s period of eoonomy, and states that from 
1815-21 he "was never absent from the Office for more thgn 7 
consecutive days and only/ for that time, on two or three 
occasions•" X:'•v'^ .^ ;y•^ :^^ :'"..^ '• ' •' . v — • -
F i n a l l y , a word must be sai d about the Ionian Islands* 
whioh had been ceded to B r i t a i n by the Treaty of Vienna:, and 
whioh proved a continual parliamentary trouble-spot* This, 
Goulburn claims, was a main cause of the death of the Governor, 
General Oampbell. The new Governor, S i r Thomas Maltland, 
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was entrusted, with the task of drawing up a constitution* This 
(38) 
was attacked i n Parliament as i n s u f f i c i e n t l y l i b e r a l * 
Goulburn retorted that i t was a f a l l a c y to suppose that the 
B r i t i s h Constitution must be the best possible applicable i n 
each and every place, and that the people of the Ionian Islands 
had not reached the r e q u i s i t e maturity. These views are 
explained i n greater d e t a i l i n h i s memoirs: "Where a people 
have been accustomed to i n s t i t u t i o n s having even a shadow of 
freedom I t may be practicable and easy to extend to them to 
a great extent the power .of governing themselves} but where 
their whole idea of l i b e r t y i s to confer upon one c l a s s the 
power over,their i n f e r i o r s which-had been previously exercised 
by a despotio God over a l l ; great caution i s necessary to 
guard against a democratic Tyranny under the name of l i b e r t y . " 
F a i l i n g to gain s a t i s f a c t i o n through Parliament, the discontented 
among the Ionians secured the intervention of the Russian 
Emperor who was prevailed upon to present a note i n London* 
This note was transmitted by the Fqreign Off ice to Goulburn 
who was commissioned to draw up a reply* "Documents without 
number were referred to and no time or labour was spared i n 
making i t complete." fie concludes that t h i s "reply was not 
unsatisfaotory, as we were not troubled with any further 
Russian interference* n I t i s at any rate true that the 
Ionian Islands V stormiest days were over. 
(e) Ohief geogetary for Ireland. 
The Office of Chief Secretary for Ireland was v&eated "by 
Peel I n 1818, and on that occasion Lord Liverpool offered i t 
to Goulburn, ^  who, howeveri re,fused* This r e f u s a l was partly 
prompted by domestic d i f f i c u l t i e s - the i l l n e s s of h i s mother * 
and partly by f i n a n c i a l ddns^derations, for Hr. F e e l "having 
a large independent income**•.had been moot profuae i n his 
expenditure," but Goulburn. calculated that, even i f he added 
h i s private income to ii t s O f f i o l a l salary, he would not be 
able to maintain a su i t a b l y reduced household even, but would 
have to make reductions on;such a soale that the contrast with 
h i s predecessor would render him so unpopular as to, endanger 
his usefulness to the government. I t i s perhaps w e l l to ' •' 
remember these f e a r s before accepting the a t r i c t u r e s made en the 
man who was Appointed instead* : / ' ; •.' 
The inside story of the motives whioh ultimately l ed to-. 
the appointment of Goulburn to the office :which he had declined 
• i n 1818 i s reeora;e&. by |»ord, Sidmouth * a (and l a t e r 2e.el»s)' • & 
private* secretary ,as!; follows; "The disturbances i n Ireland 
-' '.' ' '; 'Z ,; <.,\.- • ' N • ' , v ^ >'f • ' •• • • ' ' / ' '•/, • 
having proved the Inefficiency ••of' Lord Talbot and 
Mr.. Charles Grant, e s p e c i a l l y the l a t t e r , a Cabinet was held, 
at' .iShioh i t wa'e determined; .tb •r^eail them. Lord Sidmouth 
proposed that the Duke of Wellington should,go thither, and 
Lord Melville was inclined* to that opinion.. Lord Liverpool 
and Lord Londonderry thought that the Duke was too big a gun 
to f i r e on suoh an oooasionj the Bufce himself concurred i n 
t h i s opinion* bat prof eased hiaseif ready to go i f i t v»as 
thought neoeasary for any period from 3 months to 3 years.•. 
The only two other persons thought of were Lord Hopetown and 
Lord Welle eley*...; Lord 17'ellesiey recommended -by hi s a b i l i t y , 
h i s reputation and h i s family* The Duke' of Wellington stated 
with respect to h i s brother that great energy cannot no© be 
expected o f h l % that he never was very d i l i g e n t and that h i s 
indolence has increased with h i s years; and therefore he 
advised that before the appointment was proposed to him, i t 
should be determined who was to go ae Secretary* Lord Liverpool 
sounded Huskisson as to the l a t t e r o f f i c e , but he disdained i t * 
I t was then proposed to Goulburn, Lord Bat hurst's, Under-
Secretary, who after one day's consideration aoeepted the offer* 
The higher o f f i c e was. then proffered to ; the Marquis : of 
bell e s ley, who received i t With the greatest c o r d i a l i t y . n 
By a further entry i n h i s d i a r y ^ Hobhouse makes i t quite 
clear that t h i s change of ministers; was, necessary I n i t s e l f , 
but that " i t was thought desirable, that the change I n I r e l a n d . 
should appear to be only part of the general arrangement" of 
reshuffling the ministry and admitting LSome of the' Orenville 
group to of f i c e * This impreosion of a general rearrangement 
was apparently conveyed even to Gtoulburn himself, j- when. 
the Chief Secretaryship was offered'; to him fb r ^ t h e second 
time# He records two .special, inducements f o r r a c b ^ t i n g the 
o f f i c e : "Lord Sldmouth-vvaa about to r e t i r e i r b m the- Oome 
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Department and was to be succeeded by m.. £0el.. . . . I should 
therefore have a l l the assistance both o f f i c i a l and priv a t e 
which could be afforded by an intimate f r i e n d who had been for 
many years Chief Secretary and was intimately acquainted with 
©very circumstanceconnected w i t h the Country and with the 
characters of a l l w i t h whom I should have to deal*" I t might 
'• %, . 
be worth noting, i n parentheses* here t h a t , although a separate 
I r i s h Office existed i n London at the time, the work of that 
department and of* the I r i s h Government at Phoenix Park was 
subordinated i n the f i r s t instance to the Home Secretary* who 
was the connecting l i n k between Dublin and the B r i t i s h Cabinet. 
I t was to the Home Office that the Lord Lieutenant directed his 
o f f i c i a l dispatches, while i t was customary for the Chief 
Secretary to be i n frequent ^ I r i v a t e ^ oo^BiKinioation w i t h the 
Some Secretary, v Secondly Lord Liverpool explained to 
Goulburn that h i s service, as Under Secretary had been 
s u f f i c i e n t l y prolonged f o r h l a to Top .reoommendedy for a ppnsi,pn 
of £l>06o a year, which might b$ appropriately increased 
according to the period of his p3?o9peotive;>teyi0f i n Ireland, 
ihus, already assured that: rtMtf» 0rant had brought, the 
previously expensive establishment w i t h i n reasonable ;limits, t t 
Gtoulburn could .^ fape.. 'fch£? S»itu»cji; w i t h equanimity, for even i f 
he did'incur debts i n Ire'land he tfould be. able to redeem them 
wi t h the aid of his pension. F i n a l l y the dsatfr of his mother 
me^nt that dpmestio t i e a no 'longor for/ped him to remain i n 
England",and 'thus he accepted the promotion offered t o him* 
.The p o s i t i o n accepted by Goulburn could not i n any way 
"be described as an easy one. His predecessor had i n f a c t been 
dismissed as a, f a i l u r e , and though events i n Ireland between 
}B15 and 18S2 are not usually accorded much apace i n standard 
h i s t o r i e s of Great B r i t a i n , there can be no doubt at a l l 'that 
discontent and i t s manifestations were, i n those years, at least 
as strong i n Ireland as i n England, where the violence of the 
period, perhaps because i t was more unusual, has been more 
suQcessful i n attracting; the : historians* a t t e n t i o n . The 
pos i t i o n was further complicated by the fact that Ireland could 
w e l l be described as the f r o n t l i n e of the most iio^asaiohed and 
most deeply d i v i d i n g p o l i t i c a l issue of the early 19th century, 
the Catholic cjuestioh. Of the three most important members of 
the new I r i s h Cabinet two > kord Wellesley and Plunkett^ 
the Attorney-General « were pro-Catholic and Goulburn had to 
seek to impose hi s own anti-Catholic po l i c y not only on a . 
h o s t i l e majority of the population, but also on two rather 
u n w i l l i n g co-operators i n m i n i s t e r i a l o f f i o e . I t seems cer t a i n 
that t h i s was the task intended f o r him by the B r i t i s h 
Government, f o r Hobhouse w r i t e s ; ^ "Goulburn..... i s very 
i n i m i c a l to the further concessions to theRomanists. He' 
c e r t a i n l y was selected, vjith t h i s view,- Grant having done much 
mischief by the of fence, he has £iven to the Protestants of 
Ireland, and i t being necessary that either the Lord~Lieutenant" 
or the Secretary should prefer the cause of that bddy» 
Lord vfellealey, though he supported the question i n parliament, 
: m* • 
now professes to be convinced th a t o n t i l the Catholics conduct 
themselves with more temper than they have yet done, i t would 
be highly dangerous to concede to them farther potter," 
Despite suoh p r o t e s t a t i o n s c n the part of the Marquis of 
Wellesley, i t was, however, quite obvious that even wi t h the 
best of intensions i t wou^.bfc; J^ijsai&iUi for men;, who were 
on d i f f e r e n t sides of '•^••:<5afe^l.i0i watershed, t o work together 
without some tension. Goulhurh recognised t h i s d i f f i c u l t y , 
though rather >ne>sidedly f t fet- h<e f e l t that $&uhk|>tt • •. * 
had been 00 Intimately connected w i t h the Roman <3athe£ie body.. • 
that i t was scarcely possible t o contemplate ok hi s ,par/t that 
i m p a r t i a l i t y of Judgement between the Proteatant and Roman 
Catholic pax t i e s which were essential to the sa t i s f a c t o r y 
conduct of the I r i s h (^vernme^n^ s t i l l less to prevent the , ^ 
suspicion which would Justly or unju s t l y be attached to every 
' ' • ':.-V. ' •'  ' • . t o f t ' '' ' , ' 
act of his by the Erotestai^t £a#ty i n that g o^tryv n %~-- v 
There 10 no sign, hewever; that he realised t h a t ^ t ^ i B s t r i c t u r e , 
i n reverse;- might be applied to J him :pd bn$ ; who held that. . 
Roman Catholic emancipation-was: inconsistent w i t h the 
pri n c i p l e s of the B r i t i s h . O O & B ^ V * ^ ^ ^ ' . ^ ® ^ 1 ^ ^ ^ i h t i a a t e l y 
t i e d up with the Chur.ch Establishment.^'} Nonetheless he was 
scon, decried as an Orangeman, among. Catholio partisans j - a gibe, 
though/as the following pages w i l l show unjust, perpetuated by 
the only h i s t o r i a n to make' more than a f l e e t i n g reference t o 
• Goulburn. . • / . • /.=,y-
The d i f f i c u l t i e s of th$.nefli. I r i a h Government were enhanced 
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by the character and the past achievements of the Lord-Lieutenant. 
(4a 
Co the Duke of Wellington's estimate of h i s toother's a b i l i t i e s 
we can add a corroborating account by Goulburn himself* 
I n his chara c t e r i s t i c fashion he puts down a l l he can on the 
favourable aide of the ledger. Unfortunately, however, we are 
no longer disposed to accept ''unequalled L a t i n composition"' i n 
extenuation and compensation for f a i l u r e to attend to public 
business, unlike Goulburn who "was often repaid for a long 
waiting i n his (Lord Vtellesley's) anteroom by the r e c i t a l of 
L a t i n poems, either o r i g i n a l s or translations, not i n f e r i o r i n 
elegance or style to any of those of the ancient w r i t e r s . " 
S i m i l a r l y , the modern cynio would easily misconstrue the 
i n t e n t i o n though not the sense of Goulburn'3 estimate of the 
Lord-Lieutenant as possessed o f "the valuable talent of 
a v a i l i n g himself to the f u l l e s t extent of the a b i l i t y of others." 
At the root of ,iellesley Ts troubles there seems to have been 
the vanity based on h i s early reputation gained i n India and 
at the Foreign Office, coupled with the -"ear that future action 
might destroy t h i s reputation, a fear made more r e a l by his 
downright laziness. As a r e s u l t he was "easily accessible to 
f l a t t e r y , " and perhaps i n order to hide his own shortcomings 
he was "apt.....to indulge i n occasional f i t s o f passion which 
for a time overcame his na t u r a l kindliness." So as to preserve 
his reputation as a w r i t e r , the "despatches which he addressed 
to the Secretary of State (Peel), and which were sometimes 
anxiously expected as the basis of measures i n Parliament, 
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were deferred from /day to day and froiii week to week for the 
purpose of being corrected a44 3?ei!ov^ohe4>^ ^^^^t)^tpme;^t which w i l i 
be f u l l y appreciated by anyone who has read the dispatches 
referred t o • ^  ^ • Worst, of a l l , perhaps, "he accepted the 
Lord Lieutenancy under the impression that he had the power 
which no other man possessed of c o n c i l i a t i n g Roman Catholic 
f e e l i n g , and of bringing i*it6 harmony, the c o n f l i c t i n g passions 
of the contending parties i n Ireland....His disappointment at 
the f a i l u r e of his endeavours was great i n proportion to h i s 
previous expectation." 
Such were the colleagues who were to govern Ireland f o r 
the next 5& years. G^ulburn proceeded to Brighton to C a l l 
on His Majesty, was sworn i n as a Member of the Privy Council, 
and aflier a few days spent at Lulworth w i t h Peel so as to. gain 
some f i r s t hand information of what to expect at Dublin,-
crossed:the I r i s h Channel and awaited the a r r i v a l . o f 
Lord Uellealey whiph was vto have tak^n place on the f o ^ w 
• day* : Gharaeter^^^ the Harajiis. f a i l e d to': ketfp /fco the 
previously arranged, time-table, which led to a number' of' 
yex&tidus days f o r Goulburn, who could not commence his dutiles 
u n t i l o f f i c i a l l y appointed by the new LordrLieutenant, and for 
'". the dismissed Ministers who did. not take k i i i d l y to; being i n • 
the Qompany o f one of t h e i r sup cess or 3 
She I r i s h Cabinet was presided over by the Lord-Lieutenant. • 
He was assisted: by the Chief . Secretary: and by ' three l e g a l 
ministers, the Lord Chancellor,' the Attorney«Gener.al,' and the 
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Solicitor-General, though the f i r s t of these three concentrated 
c h i e f l y on Ju d i c i a l duties, The Chief Secretary, and any other 
Minister who was a Member of the House of Commons, divided his 
time between London and Dublin* Vfhile Parliament wa3 i n 
session, his attendance was required at Westminster, especially 
while the I r i s h estimates were under discussion. Ireland was, 
however, so frequent a topic of parliamentary debate that i t 
was essential to have at least one I r i s h Minister i n London 
throughout the session. Since i t was usual, i n the 1820s, f o r 
Parliament to be prorogued at the end of July and not to 
reassemble u n t i l the end of January, Goulburn normally spent 
most of the autumn and winter as w e l l as the Baster recess at 
Dublin Castle. From there he was i n constant o f f i c i a l and 
4 
"private" communication w i t h Peel, w h i l s t from the I r i s h O f f i ce 
i n London he s i m i l a r l y kept i n touch with Lord v/ellesley - though, 
s i g n i f i o a n t l y ; h e e l i c i t e d rather fewer r e p l i e s . This 
correspondence i s the main source on which an appraisal o f 
Goulburn's work i n Ireland must be based. ^ ® 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that the f i r s t major d i f f i c u l t y 
which the new I r i s h Government encountered was connected w i t h 
appointments. The patronage, c i v i l , m i l i t a r y and e c c l e s i a s t i c a l , 
exercised by Ministers and by Departments was, of course, 
considerable and applications from i n d i v i d u a l claimants on behalf 
of t h e i r friends or themselves, usually w i t h a covering l e t t e r , 
favourable or unfavourable, by the Minister, form a considerable 
part of the p o l i t i c a l correspondence between Goulburn and Peel. 
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I t appears/auite clear from the general tone of t h e i r 
correspondence on the subject that both men, but especially 
Peel, were strongly averse frbm making any appointment eioept 
on the basis of the necessity of the o f f i c e combined wi t h the 
best possible q u a l i f i c a t i o n : o f the man to be appointed - and 
many were the disappointed place-seekera. Nonetheless, even 
so f irm~pr i n c i p l e d a man as Peel had to, allow s l i g h t deviations 
from t h i s yule i n Ireland^ f o r not only was i t essential to 
preserve a nice balance of pro- and anti-Catholics at a l l levels 
and i n a l l spheres of administrat* 0*** D U * so sour were the grapes 
of o f f i c e , or at least of acme o f f i c e s , i n Ireland that those 
singled out fo r promotion or transfer would not infrequently 
refUBe to accept t h e i r new assignments. 
An I n s t r u c t i v e example - which also sheds, some more l i g h t 
on the personal oharaoteristics of t J^arquis of Welles ley - ' 
of t h i s r e f u s a l to accept protyPtipn i a provided by the ' ; 
arrangements and appointments: that were necessary i n order to 
make Mr. Plunkett Attorney^General. ^  ^ Unlike Lord C&lbot 
and Mr* Grant, Mr. Saurin who had been Attorney-General was 
considered an e f f i c i e n t minister, and had consequently not been 
dismissed. i t wa#, therefore, proposed that he should be 
promoted to the pesi.ti0n'-o^'J^4 Chief Justtce^ (!Eh'e .Government 
was prepared to create Mr, Downes, the holder of that 6 f f i c e , 
an I r i s h Peer, and he had. obl i g i n g l y agreed to vacate h i s o f f i c e 
i n return*) J u d i c i a l o f f i c e in-> i r ^ l a n d 1 wa«L how.eyer, a most 
xeamfM&p p o s i t i p n . ^ e V j b i s h ;3&d^ ^^  
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seeking to s a i l along the narrow course of s t r i c t j u s t i c e , f o r 
on the one side he was i m p e r i l l e d by the Scylla of a v i o l e n t 
and predominantly Catholic press seeking occasion against him, 
and on the other side there was the equally threatening Charybdis 
of the s i m i l a r l y v i o l e n t Orange minority and the l i k e l y 
displeasure of the Government, implying probably the r u i n of 
a l l c i l i c e s of f u r t h e r promotion, especially to a more peaceful 
English, appointment. Horeover, i t was often completely 
impossible to r e l y on the Jury, for as soon as a oase had a 
p o l i t i c a l flavour, the s h e r i f f was l i a b l e to pack the jury so 
as to mfcke the true administration of j u s t i c e quite impossible. 
For these and other reasons Saurin had previously declined 
j u d i c i a l appointments, and was l i k e l y to do so again. The 
Lord-Lieutenant, however, was confident of his powers of 
persuasion, and f u l l y expected t o make Saurin a l t e r his 
decision. A personal interview was held for the purpose, but 
proved abortive. I n consequence, G-oulburn found Vfellesley 
" i n a state of indignation, which vented I t s e l f in.a storm of 
passion and u l t i m a t e l y i n a floo d of tears. lie treated 
Mr. S's ref u s a l as an i n s u l t to the Crown and as an i n d i g n i t y 
to himself. He denounced him i n the strongest language as 
undeserving of any favor or confidence." Goulburn and Peel, 
on the other hand concurred i n the opinion that Saurin was a 
eonsidex'able loss to the government, f o r he ceased to hold any 
o f f i c i a l appointment on handing over his o f f i c e to plunkett. 
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The Solicitor-General became Lord Chief j u s t i c e , and Mr* Jay, 
neither a Member of Parliaments nor, i t would appear, of very 
much influence in the counsels of the I r i s h Government, became 
Solicitor-General. Thus the f i r s t of a number of oriseg of 
appointments was s e t t l e d . fhe Office or honour concerned might 
vary from the Lcrd Chief Justice to the Chief Baron or the 
candidate for the representative peerage whom the government 
intended to support* The character of the problem was, however, 
always a Similar one. ^here might be too many candidates or 
too few| but one change always entailed others, and i n 
order to minimise the chances c f embittering the rejected or 
even the favoured,, much tact and patience and competence of 
judgment were required. The lack of outstanding' oomplaiats 
i s the best possible proof that. # on the whole,,; ^ Goulburn on 
whom.after the i n i t i a l incident the bulk of t h i s work deyblyed, 
discharged t h i s t $ ^ k ; ^ e i y v ^ e % f e \ "-VV'-'-M 
; : ^ e ; Irish/Cabinet having thus been completed-..it me^ .to , 
consider the, measures necessitated by] 'the disturbed condition 
of the country, which, l i t t l e , 
short of. insurrection* ^ r ^ H -. -We $av§ a .record' of the various 
opinions expressed at one of the f i r s t of these Cabinet meetings, 
held f o r the purpose o£ discussing the re-enactment of the 
Insurrection &ot.t5*U on the one side ^ ,Plunkett urged the 
withdrawal from I t of some of the most severe and somewhat 
unequable clauses, e.g. that providing punishment f o r persons 
on.account.of absence from t h e i r houses. On the other aide 
Qoulb^n^.a^p>Ttea?:>st: -j;hj& Solicitor-General and the Lord 
Chancellor, urged that the worst'posaiblo eventuality would 
be an abortive attempt to suppress the disorders^ that therefore 
the maximum rather than: the minimuiri 6^ powers should be sought, 
and that the very unpopularity of the severer clauses would 
act as a eitedk-«o» %fe& s&tor'*^e$Uettfc. -ox unjust use. Shis 
d i v i s i o n o f views i s t y p i c a l of the dissensidn, inside the 
Cabinet throughout the years of i t s existence, and i t may be 
sai€L at once that i t was of a p o l i t i c a l rather than a humanitarian 
or l e g a l nature. Where pressure to be exerted was i n the main 
4ire.eted\aga'inst • Ofi^ »oi4oft;:-xBlnnkStt urged caution i where i t 
was to be divested against Protestants, Goulburn became rather 
reluctant. But i t says, much f o r the i n t e g r i t y of a i l concerned 
that, notw ithstanding t h e i r i n i t i a l bias/ i n . the:/^ of oases, 
the severer view was adopted*, y h i l e the wisdom of such a 
repressive".i?*^ ^^ -^-W^ .v?^ ^^ ^^ ?^ ^^ t^ .^ ¥to'. doubts, ban be e ^ e r t a i n e d 
as' t o the strength of moral courage and •. sense of. 'duty th a t was • • 
reguired to cut loose xfrom one/a ^ e ^ e ^ y - ^ ^ ' ^ i M - •prejudib>i. . • 
. • :>&\:a4^tiw, fco- th«^ t£e • 
suapens ion of : • Habeas, 3 orpuie as an immediate measure to curb 
outrage. ^ 5^) Since had -had to vacate his seat i n the Commons 
on.the assumption, of his. new o f f i c e , he. briefed the Government 
at './eStminster w i t h Some of the reasons that made these two 
meiasures essential 30 that the expeoted .Parliamentary opposition 
to such an infriEgement of c i v i l l i b e r t i e s could be silenced.* °' 
!l?here was, f o r instance, a Strong ooneentration of yhiteboya 
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north and west of. Cork, aga|ngt whom a major m i l i t a r y operation 
was just: ah out to begin. ' Shej&e. ' $l9e«he*e •; some .300 Whiteboy 
prisoners had been taken, of whom a number was to be executed, 
while the remainder was. to be sent to Stew South ^/ales. 
P a r t l y , perhaps, as th.e ;rosS^t ;^'the-' f u l l byief^ng^gi^|n,.by the 
I r i s h Cablnet^Lord Londonderry encountered but l i t t l e opposition 
when he introduced the Insurrection Act i n Parliament. 
Having/thus obtained the pedessairy powers to guell the 
riot© i n progress; the xrish, .CeTernment proeeeded to consider 
"the measures: by which the d i s p o s i t i o n to insurrectionary out-
rage could In' • future be'- tieBt. prevented or/''Cpntj?o^le4*,f ••'^'^  
To do t h i s Goulburn planned a twofoId l i n e of attack; B e l i e f 
from the severity of the t i t h e system insofar us i t was 
'•consistent $$th ;ti*e mstl^e^noe of the f a i r r i g h t s of Eroperty^P 
and steps to insure the i m p a r t i a l admin^ o f the law. . 
As regarded the f i * s t ; ;Of; -theae/•'i^ ;r^ a:s-'W- s u ^ ^ t : : e ^ the utippett 
c o i ^ i e x i t y . j ; §nd i t was not thought prudeiit to take any major 
step without.;, t h e ^ - f u l ^ e ^ "The pressure , 
however on the. Government was such that: i t was .deemed expedient 
to prepare a b i l l f o r the commutatioa .of t ^ t M e ^ •:oShen; Goulburn 
sought leave to introduce t h i s & i l i * iw$ two important I r i s h 
M'*iBs.y.i '.Sir H. ^ n e l l •andy'^ir-.J^ 
quite inadequate and as a l i k e l y impediments t o a more satisfaotory 
B i l l i n the "future/ tf^ 
Goulburn h i c ^ e l f oonourred^ while the second port was proved 
incorrect by hia future action* ...This Commutation Act* 
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permit tea t i t h e owners to lease t i t l e s to the tithe-payers f o r 
periods not exceeding 21 years, during which a lease rent equal 
to the best annual value of t i t h e was to be paid. Ho machinery 
f o r f a c i l i t a t i n g the conclusion of such lease-agreements and the 
complicated a l l i e d quiaations bas set up, howevei*. On the 
contrary, the consent of the ordinary of the diocese was required, 
and sbme of them at least were thought to be in i m i c a l to t i t h e 
commutation i n any•'*opn^^:v'^t^tta,, i t " i s hardly surprising t h a t the 
Act was unproductive of p r a c t i c a l r e s u l t s . 
Oh the other hand the discussions and debates connected with 
the passing and working of t h i a Commutation measure give a clear 
i n d i c a t i o n of the general p r i n c i p l e s on which Goulburn based his 
approach to the vexed question of t i t h e s throughout his career, 
and are, therefor e^ worth some detailed a t t e n t i o n . The notion 
that t i t h e s were one f o r i i of property and In essehca no d i f f e r e n t 
. from any other fbra of property was basic to his whole conception. 
I h i a beoomes clear i n ;his'spe«fQh request ing leave to bring i n • 
.' •. the i r i s i i Tithies^ leashing B i i l ^ 6 ^ •He stated at th« outset' that 
he had no wish t o invade t h f ^toperty of the Qhuich>.which would, 
: i n due course, endanger a l i other property. • ihe clergy had the . 
"most absolute'and incontestable r i g h t " to t h e i r t i t h e s property. 
He therefore: could not agree to any ..general compulsory commutation, 
while voluntary methods,remai:n^^ un t r i e d . Again, s i x days later®-
•''' :'#ds'^h'jBtume, probably Geulburn's most peraistent opponent i n 
debateV whatever the aoha^cfev brcagh^ the same subject to the 
fore> % d'eiffian3.iug a-: pledge th'it ia .fu^Liei^ and: wider T.i;fchS B i l l ' 
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should he l a i d "before the House i n the next session. Recognizing 
the strength of Goulburn's argument he sought to destroy i t by 
maintaining that t i t h e s were quite d i f f e r e n t from any other form 
of property, sinoe clergy as public o f f i c e r s could be removed 
from t h e i r p o s i t i o n by the government, as had been done, e.g., 
i n the Reformation. He was supported by KEr. H l l i o e who claimed 
that property was no more sacred a r i g h t than that of Habeas 
Corpus whioh the Government had suspended. Goulburn, however, 
remained adamant i n defending the sacred r i g h t s of property 
from 3uch an invasion as compulsory t i t h e s commutation would 
consti t u t e . 
The other l e g i s l a t i v e step taken i n 1822 w i t h the i n t e n t i o n 
of e f f e c t i n g long-term improvements i n the state of the country 
was much more successful. This concerned the administration 
and enforcement of the law. I f we are to believe Goulburi^s 
description i n h i s autobiography - and he was not a man easily 
given to exaggeration - the I r i s h magistracy i n 1832 was i n a 
p i t i f u l condition. I n every county there were some magistrates 
" u t t e r l y u n f i t some from .-want of character, others from various 
other causes to undertake the administration o f the I»aw. They 
were i n the habit of acting i n d i v i d u a l l y , and the decisions were 
i n consequence wanting i n uniformity, and what was yet more 
objectionable oases frequently occurred where the decision of one 
magistrate was defeated by the decision of another i n the 
immediate neighbourhood acting often on a mistaken view of the law; 
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both however i n many eased' acting on interested or party motives 
with l i t t l e or no reference to th V merits of the p a r t i c u l a r ease.0 
I t i s hardly neoessary to point out that under these circumstances 
•; • \ \ ,, ; ,.'<,<. : ' : 
the administration of j u s t i c e i n Ireland bedame i mere, farce. 
Hor should i t be necessary; to. stress* that the more disturbed the 
state of the country, i^ '^ jiiu»^ e^s'sj&^ l^  I t i s that the: i m p a r t i a l i t y 
of i t s J u d i c i a l system should b^. beyond doubt. I t was therefore 
decided to purge the Haglatracy of i t s undesirable elements. 
This required the assistance of the I r i s h Chancellor, end though 
Goulbum does not seem impressed w i t h either the speed or 
eff i c i e n c y w i t h which he executed t h i s task, i t was thev Chancellor 
who devised a method which would r e s u l t i n the minimum of hurt 
feelings, always a consideration of some importance i n I r i s h 
a f f a i r s . I t was determined that the king should s i g n i f y 
an e n t i r e l y new Commission of the Peaoe as a re s u l t of t h i s 
accession, even though that event had taken place, two years e a r l i e r . 
Thus the i n e f f i c i e n t cOuld be dismissed vfithput the stigma of 
unfitness,. ajcid the e f f i c i e n t reappointed i n the new Commission. 
Goulbur^s e^ ^^  of the i n e f f i c i e n t were 
reappointed, -but nonetheless he^ y^^ ^ hiiuaelf to the 'n. 
task of preventing the new Commission frpm d e t e r i o r a t i n g to the 
condition of the old. 
This prevention was successfully secured by a l e g i s l a t i v e 
enactment, ffl) defining and reg u l a r i s i n g the duties of I r i s h 
a.Ea. and providing them w i t h an e f f i c i e n t polio e. fdree to 
enforce the magistrates decisions. The magistrates had already 
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been directed^ 7 0^ to hold Petty Seas ions regularly and to t r y 
,•• ':' • ° • ! i " . i . • a l l ordinary eases there. ,' l&e^new- aet gave the Lord Lieutenant 
• i . . , >' •' ' 
power to appoint resident magistrates where none existed, l a i d 
down t h e i r salary, and stated both t h e i r j u d i c i a l and administra-
t i v e duties, which l a t t e r inoluded the,making of monthly reports 
on the state of the county. The more important clauses of the 
Act, however, dealt with;the Police, 
Che state of the Constabulary was as unsatisfactory as that 
{ 71) 
of the Uagistraoy. Goulburn himself described i t as follows! 
"Decrees....obtained from i n d i v i d u a l Magistrateswere i n the 
great majority of instances entrusted f o r execution to the parties 
i n whose favor they were given or to a class of looal Constables 
whose feelings were equally involved I n the issue. SSnoa a 
general contempt and resistance t o the execution of the law." 
Ihp Constables\, in e f f i d i e n p y was further enhanced by the, faot 
,th^^/io^c^--p^^ .^j^ee; appointed by l o c a l grand Juries, t h e i r £ay 
wa*s'' i^de^ua^e yf or' f ^ l l ^ 
devised i>y ' the. 1822 Act i s p a r t l o u l a r i y intere gt i n g t because 
Goulburn.cluims that he and, his, dolleagea thereby established 
the system of f e e l e r s . " ^ ) "Sir Hpbert Peel when Spcretary 
f o r Ireland had established what was palled a Peace freserv a t i o n 
Police, being i n fac t a body of c i v i l o f f i c e r s under the control 
of a paid -legistrate which i n the event of the existence of 
special disturbance i n any part of the country might be sent and 
oharged. upon the l o c a l i t y so long as: the disturbance continued. 
I t l a t r u e that, the existence and proved good effedt of t h i s 
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measure where applied suggested the idea of making a somewhat 
similar measure applicable to the whole country without reference 
to t r a n q u i l l i t y or disturbance and the name of T3?eelers T which the 
fcrmer had acquired was readily transferred to the new Constabulary* 
Whence many have erroneously stated that Sir E. peel was the 
author of that which I believe to have been one of the greatest 
benefits to that country, fthe Constabulary Act. 1 "That he 
c o r d i a l l y approved i t and save i t every possible support 
i s undoubtedly the f a c t , but that the measure originated w i th 
him or owed i t s preparation to any other than the I r i s h Government 
i s an error 
The law i n i t s f i n a l shape provided that the Lord-Lieutenant 
should appoint a chief constable for each barony, and require the 
magistrates to appoint up to 16 constables per barony. A l l men 
were to hold o f f i c e during the Lord-Lieutenant 1s pleasure, and 
could, at the chief constable's d i s c r e t i o n , be armed. They were, 
however, to work under the magistrates 1 d i r e c t i o n . Ho constable 
was to have any other employment, and his maximum salary was 
f i x e d at £35 plus accommodation. I t must be remembered that 
pay conditions were a great improvement on the p r e v a i l i n g terms. 
The c r i t i c i s m s l e v e l l e d against t h i s measure i n Parliament 
have a d i s t i n c t l y modern r i n g . ^ Mr. Spring Rice attacked the 
b i l l as unconstitutional, because i t arrogated to the Crown 
powers whioh ou^ht to be exercised by l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s * Others 
while less extreme i n the manner of irheir c r i t i c i s m were equally 
disturbed by the increased hold which the central government was 
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given over l o c a l a f f a i r e by c o n t r o l l i n g , though not d i r e c t i n g , 
the pol iee fo rce . Shis l e d Llr. Grant, Goulburn'e padecessor, 
to deplore the h i l l as yet another attempt to govern I re land by 
"brute fo rea . So intense ©as the c r i t i c i s m s that the Act as 
compared w i t h the o r i g i n a l h i l l contained some eonoesalons* 
Ihese included ^sac r i f i ces to the desire fa? p a t r o n a g e t , . . . » 
tak ing gjreat part of the charge on the Consolidated Fund, and 
g i v i n g the nomination o f the men i n the f i r s t instance to the 
5.0cal a u t h o r i t i e s . 
Mother of I r e l a n d ^ perennial problems demanded Goulburn's 
a t t e n t i o n i n the f i r s t year of h i s new office*.. Ship ^as tke 
problem of food shortage arid the danger1 of s t a rva t i on . i lgain 
we. can f i n d that Goulburn at t h i s early atage^hod c l e a r l y 
f^Pimifi t^d: the broad p r i n c i p l e s on. which he-, baaed h i s ^actions 
thrQ.ughout h i s career* ^ooks, of 'po^^oWs.\.w9S.^^i |*in§' ejxhaustion 
ija. . ^om^p^ the : 
g o v ^ r i ^ e ^ 
measures. &t the. t l m Goulburn was i n I^ndbn,.; and on 
gad A p r i l he Vjrote to the iord-BleijiLeAant as f o l l o w s w i t h 
respect to reports of distress, i n Qo, Clare> 
' n I t lis advisable to defer a f f o r d i n g any r e l i e f from Government 
as long as possible , a r id . . ; .w&ere-ult imately a f fo rded i t would 
be more e f f e c t u a l l y and mdre economically adininiatered I n the 
shape of assistance to parochiai^or. JLocal^  cont r ibu t ions e i ther of 
money or provisions than i n an manner.^ L ive rpoo l , 
Sondorifterry and ?ejal en t i r e ly , agreed w i t h t h i s view. Goulburn 
fo r the r suggested that the r^tetf o^|... gondii ions r^fftr9 ^  at least 
par t ly , , ssaggerated, that ^people; could ©at the potatoes normally , 
devoted to. c a t t l e *feedih&f; ?. tha t the Government should ce r t a in ly 
not act u n t i l the country gentry did so; that Government buying 
of eorn i&buld merely raise, i t s p r i ce f u r t h e r , and Burped up i n 
these aords: w I t is bet ter to hold our hands u n t i l the evidence 
o f d is t ress i s too clear to he disputed, and u n t i l the government's 
assistance can no longer be Withheld." 
Thua, any suspicion t ha t / t he teak, uho at almost the same 
moMent suggest ad to the Lor:d;;Xieutenant that po l i ce appointments 
should be i n the hands of the Central Government and that there 
should be sa lar ied Folloe s j ^ ^ w - f t t f ^ i "under the sole con t ro l of 
the. Government to command such i p h ^ l t b l e a whenever ,aad •wherever 
, , : . ,: •• ; : V ^ - V , / ' S f r ^ t ^ ^ ••'•f?-- "£•'•?..•:•„• . !••"! ''1 • 
. be l iever i n 4i3iyv2Gth .• o / ea t f j ; ^ as 
the. c o n t r o l l e r -:i^y&ir'6ffiifa'--6£'J&l hutnati 4<>t ivi ty niuat be 
speedily Abahdone.d.. ; ;;m.Q&zb&Mv did not b > l i e w i & th> . 
T/ei-fore-.Stg<t©:i ''; •';'"''''^Sv'.:•:<'' ' ':- ' 
; i n par i i a ^ ^ 
f o r in add i t ion t o I r i s h and ;pro*Calihollo^ m^^ ' 
^2ere normally l o y a l supporters:, o f ^h.^ . ^ v i ^ w ^ i j ^ l j l M r r e d to 
aot ion ,by humanitarian f e e l i n g s . Thua:I t iaaQ hardiy possible 
f o r a J l in is ter to s ta te 10th century p o l i t i c a l and economio 
theory ^u i te 1^0, b l u n t l y in t f i % Hous$ : ^\po|^^ ' ln- , .s t i . .oh ia context. 
Moreover^ s l i g h t l y careieas ^hr^sin|; might ea s i ly 1 ^ . kirn open 
t o the charge of inconsistency, should l a t e r events compel 
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him; to r-take ac t ion , and ittoonaistenQy, i t must be remembered, 
was a t the time oonsidered one o£J8& gravest parliamentary 
o ins . Thus a t f i r at Goulburn used delaying t a c t i c s , suggesting 
that there iioeM' some-e&teiate$$ng features 1$ the s i t u a t i o n , e«g< 
t h a t o&t|aeal was cheaper tha^ normally, and that the Qovernment 
was considering hew f a r i t ceuld ^ m i n i s t e r r e l i e f , since the 
sums involved were enormous, running t o £400,000 i n County Clare 
alone. This l a t t e r statement was no empty phrase, f o r his 
correspondence w i t h Peel reveals that he was discussing w i t h him 
r e l i e f arrangements modeilbd^on-<t&osV o f . 101$*47» when Pee& :waa 
Chief p ^ ^ t o r y f o r I r e l and . ... ,. 
p|e&e di^oussibas ^jdssd-'M^ ' ta- the^lasD'A^etiott-'iof an I r i s h 
Poor Stoployment B i l l on 16th my, which was welcomed on a l l - sides:, 
arid became law W i t h i n e i g M "d^s.'^ I «' ' : ^ l s l a u t h W i s e d . the J,bra • 
Lieutiena^t td. sponsor 'pt$l|4:-w$fka^ £6$a1>l#. r^ad7$u41dlrigAa;?& 
r epa i r i ng , and lega l i sed £50^$00 already b'eing sp1 orit on such 
pro ^ ebfe . - ij | t$Eiately, G^ui^u^n; ;e|^lmated, ^ thea$ wor ka 
would eopt £25$,000, iand i n Addition he acted f o r a £100,000 vote 
o f c red i t f o r g ra tu i tous r e l i e f ; . The admin is t ra t ion of t h i s 
gra tu i tous r e l i e f neQessitatet a good a^al o f correspondence 
w i t h Peel,: and i t may be worth recording one exchange of l e t t e r s* 
because of the l i g h t I t threws on the; pr i n c i p l e 
oonduot of publ ic a f f a i r s . ^ GcuXburn wanted to send some 
oatmeal to the distressed areas. .This was cheaper i n I re land 
than i n inland, but^ he eh^ui^ed^ would i t not create a bet ter 
5S,9 
e f f e c t t o dend some from En£l£tid:.~ -h' 'Pool sent^"6hl$ I c o n i c / 
but charac te r i s t ic r e p l y : n X do not t h i n k i t "necessary to do 
anything f o r e f f e c t . I f the food can he e f f e c t u a l l y supplied 1 f rom 
parte o f I r e l and , on every account i t ought to be.'* 
33tf cotaplete p i c tu re 6i£1 Gbuihurn^S f i r s t year i n l i e i a h d 
could b& gained, 1 i f - the a c t i v i t i e s o f - t h e extremist Protestants 
were disregarded* 2he Grange1 . / i ssodiat ion-while i t had no 
leg i t imate or recognised existence, had a very r e a l existence, 
the Government. : m 
September '1822,-' ' f o r Inst an c£s f i t ^ ) i t proposed t o present an 
address ; t o the £ d r d ^ i e u t e n a r i t * : v Before t h i s p lan was' abandoned, 
they had already caused so^ 
- d i g n i t y had been hur t !a l i t t l e , when Goulburn puggested to him 
: t i i a i ^ a body that 
was fot^eenaldered^l$gltiisiayt^^^'e^^atfen-tGoulburn 'expressed 
hla - <5Wrt1 opiision ^of the e^dre's^'-'^h'^o^^certQriil *-terms ; 
t h i n k itiiia '^proof • of 'the absurdity•;;o:£itne.v.:,6eii-i*leiBBtt<-«h"o *v 
c o m p o s t h i s "-assoolation- who could •-consider an^addressrof; t h i s 
kind as, c o n c i l i a t o r y or as meetiiig iili^'wiDhes o f the. Lord- • - •. 
'Hieuteha^it'.?v • ! 'tiees'than two iaosth& ? later more serious otrouhle, • . ^  
was ih ' a i ^ l i t . •' ,^^0ran£^e•-dem6il3tration w^aeplannedain-Dublin,-^. 
which waa to culminate i n the. decoration loftfthe>atatue o f '^ -v 
Eing W i l l i a m ; - -Such :a ;4emonsrbratio^oCCuld nofe h&yj&>;£&!&9&olHfc-. •, 
produce s e r i ous • r i o t i ng and <oh' ad ro i t handling' of the S i tua t ion 
wassa i l ed f o r . ^ o ^ L e r d ; ^ 
•decoration o f ,theostatuej-;/bui?•.,the Orangemen,threatened t o go 
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Lord-Lieutenant 1 s calm and col lec ted conduct I n the faoe of 
immediate danger was not matched by equal wisdom i n the 
succeeding days. He maintained that the bo t t l e - th rowing was 
par t o f a d i s t i n c t plan by Qrangemen to murder him, and l e t t h i s 
convic t ion be generally known, although he had no concrete 
evidence whatsoever. Thus, wheh fome vague evidence of t a lk s 
overhead i n a coffee house, had been supplied, the Attorney 
General k to Goulburri's dismay, was prevai led upon t o commit 
the mon- not f o r misdemeanour, but- f o r conspiracy to murder 
the Lord-Meutenarit . Since the evidence ^as d u i t a : 
inadequate f o r p r o v i n g s u c h . s e h a ^ e ; : i t was -unl ikely tha t the 
men would be sentenced* To ipjake matters worse, „the S h e r i f f on 
duty w a s ' . : p o n v i n e § § i t o , h a v e , promised 
to p ick an Orange ^ury who would ensure acqu i t t a l* Before 
the t r i a l opened, two e j r l M m a | ^ | i : : w j e s e " ' -
of'. Jurors w&a- a c tua l l y draw beta Sher i f f e.' : con junct i o n , . 
and thje second pn$ was Jield to be's; r e l i a b l e man* Farther^ the*1 
Lord i i eu tena i i t was persuaded: to. agree t o an Iri&ictmeht f o r 
misdemeasaoQP only , y nevertheless on January 2nd the ^anid Jury 
decided t o ignore the b i l l s o f committal f o r T l o t , aS they found 
i t against two people only , and. r i o t i n g i s ho offence unless _ ' 
committed by more than two peopl,e*. I t was, there f o r e,! necessary 
f o r the A^torney-'General to f i l e e x - o f f i o i o informat ions , and f o r 
the t r i a l to be sbstponed - u n t i l ,the opening of term* 
I n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r instance the delay caused by the dorrupt state 
of the iri8h adminis t ra t ion o f j u s t i ce worked, paradoxical ly , i n 
55. 
favour o f the government, f o r i n the equrse of f u r t h e r inves t iga-
t ions the Attorney-General diaeovered evidence what Goulburn 
described as a "remarkable measure o f prepara t ion 0 f o r the theatre 
r i o t by various Orange Lodges, as w e l l as evidence that S h e r i f f 
Thorpe had a f t e r a l l been able to paek the Grand Jury which had 
(«n \ 
ignored the b i l l s of committal* I n t h i s way the ease f o r 
the prosecution was, o f course, strengthened immensely* 
The episodes of the decoration of the statue and of the 
theatre r i o t cons t i tu te an e f f e c t i v e rep ly to the charge that 
Goulburn was an Orangeman* While i t i s t rue that he was a 
convinced Protestant par t i san , and that n a t u r a l l y h i s sympathies 
would, the re fore , tend to l i e w i t h the Orange Lodges rather than 
s imi lar Catholic bodies such as the Ribbon Societ ies , i t i s quite 
d e a r tha t , however s t rongly he approved off the aim of any 
organisat ion, he would not t o l e r a t e the adoption of methods 
whioh might dtaturb the ,peape or i^pe^derthe KJjj&g*^ Govrerziment. 
This determination to ezeeute ju s t i ce regardless-ojf party 
sympathies was shared by the pro-Gatholic members of the Cabinet. 
The narrowness o f the extent o f disagreement t o which t h e i r 
par t i san di f ferences mlglit lead these o f f i c e r s of the I r i s h 
Adminis t ra t ion , i s equally w e l l i l l u s t r a t e d by the preparations 
fo r the t r i a l * When the Attorney-General had unearthed the 
complic i ty o f some Orange Lodges i n the theatre r i o t , he suggested 
to Goulburn that the Government should u t i l i s e the occasion f o r 
a public condemnation and f o r c i b l e suppression of these lodges* 
Goulburn r e to r t ed that i t would be bet ter to t r y the r i o t e r a , 
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and i f the evidence preyed adequate* to. prooeed against the 
S h e r i f f and perhaps the jury, and thus to punish delinquencies 
ra ther than membership of Orange lodges, and to give the 
Government»s view of t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s "by i rapl ioat lon i n the 
evidence ca l l ed by the prosecut ion . 1 ' While the case 
remained sub ^udice, i t must b# admitted, the procedure 
proposed by Goulburn was f a r more correct than that suggested 
by h is colleague. 
These inc iden t s , however* d i d not d i s t r a c t the I r i s h 
Government's a t t en t ion from i t s main object* f o r the coming year, 
a sa t i s f ac to ry t i t h e measure. The 1882, Act had been passed 
almost e n t i r e l y f o r the purpose of s i l enc ing parliamentary 
or i t i o s * and the government had never had r e a l hopes o f ; i t s 
success.^-^^ Thus i t i s hardly surpr i s ing to f i n d that w i t h i n 
less than three months of the passing of t h i s act , discussions 
began i n Bubl in ana London w i t h a view to provid ing a t r u l y 
e f f e c t i v e measure f o r t,he next parliamentary session^ wi thou t , 
however, Impair lag the general p r inc ip l e s of the p ro tec t ion o f 
property and the maintenance of the powers o f the Church 
Eatablishaeht.*•• , At f i r s t ,\s;igh'-fc 'fthis pr6hlem"misht,well appear • 
to b e a n attempt to reconci le what ie incompatible. i t was no 
wonder, t h e r e f o r e , ; t h ' | t the ; p ^ e l ^ i n a r y diaouaaions " l e f t soulburn : . 
ra ther depressed. He could see no prospect of a s a t i s f ac to ry 
settlement, f o r the ma|o^i ty njerely f i s h e d t o defraud the Church ) tlx- ^  :ri';^;;\\' - - v - , '. 
o f t i t h e , yet t o keep i t a^s an avallable/reaour'oe f o r the. landlord* 
Hence, to guard the Church Bgainat plunder, commutation ra ther 
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than any measure ge t t i ng r i d o f the t i t h e al together , was to be 
sought* On the other hand, he feared that i f the terms of 
commutation were to be at a i l equable, the scheme would remain 
l a rge ly inoperat ive , Thus he thought of a scheme, parte of 
Which d id not commend themselves t o sir . P lunket t , however*' by 
which i n d i v i d u a l par t ies would be given power to exchange t i t h e s 
f o r land or corn ren ts , the d e t a i l s to be se t t l ed by a 
spec ia l ly const i tu ted t r i b u n a l . 
She complex de t a i l s of t h i s problem occupy much of the 
correspondence between Goul&ttfn, Pool and Uel les ley i n the 
ensuing months, and i n order to understand the extraordinary 
d i f f i c u l t i e s beset t ing t h i s problem i t i s necessary t o examine 
at least some of them more closely? 
F i r s t and foremost i s the deldos>te r e l a t ionsh ip of events 
; i n I re land and Eoglgaad. Throughout the correspondence on the 
Tithes M i l w$ csii discern the fear tha t anything done i n 
I re land might be taken as a precedent f o r : d e a l i n g w i t h the 
a f f a i r s o f the Church o f England* Thus, f o r instance, the 
I r i s h Government was considered to be incompetent to decide the 
question of whether compulsory commutation should be resorted to* 
This , Seel and Goulhur^ ftg3?e;ett,y was iUndoubtedly a matter f o r the 
English Cabinet, since i t Would a f f e c t s i m i l a r property i n 
England. * 1 I n t h i s Way .the. d i f f i c u l t i e s o f the min i s t e r s , 
who could not t r e a t I re land as an i so la ted problem were 
considerably enhanoed. x.- •>n,' "y:-
Then there was the danger to which any compromise measure 
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i a exposed, that the extremists on both aides w i l l be d i s s a t i s f i e d 
and may combine to defeat i t . This danger was the greater i n 
days of no par ty d i s c i p l i n e and^group p o l i t i c s . The opposi t ion 
on the one side came from the clergy arft the " U l t r a - T o r i e s n . 
Of these the clergy were the more important, and at one t i m e ^ * ^ 
Goulburn commended h i s proposed scheme, because, whi le to gain 
the support o f a l l the I r i s h clergy would be an i m p o s s i b i l i t y , 
i t would secure the assent of some of them at l eas t . Later , 
whencthe B i l l was already before Parliament, t h i s d i v i s i o n 
became more c l e a r l y def ined. I t was the higher clergy tha t 
was alarmed by the B i l l , and, Goulburn added i n an aside, the 
Lord Chancel lors opinion o f i t var ied "according as he has l a s t 
conversed w i t h myself or the Arehb i shop .*^ 7 ) A few weeks l a t e r 
the B i l l was attacked i n the House of Commons as u n f a i r to the 
clergy and gentry o f I r e l and . Goulburn r e to r t ed that i t was a 
f a l s e comparison to attempt to draw a p a r a l l e l between English 
and I r i s h t i t h e condi t ions , f o r whereas English t i t h e s were 
c h i e f l y a burden on the upper classes, t h e i r incidence i n I re land 
was c h i e f l y upon the lower classes* Thus there was much vexatious 
l i t i g a t i o n about the value o f goods, which would be avoided, to 
the mutual bene f i t o f t i the,-owner and p a y e r , , i f , as under the 
B i l l , an agreed money payment had been subs t i tu ted . The 
opposite pole o f c r i t i c i s m was represented by Goulbum , s most 
consistent antagonist , Joseph Hume, who i n hi3 motion on the 
I r i s h Church Establishment proposed so r a d i c a l a scheme ot 
re form that the Chief Secretary f o r I re land stigmatised I t as an 
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attempt tq "overthrow the foundation of property and to 
- r K - • rf 
malign the established ^hu^fc .^.ja^jepgfth^v f e l t i t nepessary 
to remind the House that the C i v i l yac, which had ended, i n the 
shedding,, of the King ' s blopd, had begun in, va^ 
"by t he i r 17th oentury predecessors* On balance, . howeve r the 
Ti the B i l l as a.whole was hardly opposed at a l l , , , though, de t a i l s 
of i t were contested ; severely, and sometimes e f f e c t u a l l y , i n 
Committee.^ 9 9 ' On March 8th^,. Goulhurn informed, tfeilesley, w i t h 
the impl i ca t ion of pleasant surprise,- that bpth I r i s h and,pngilsh 
members of parliament had received the,, p r inc ip l e s o f , t h e • TJthe 
B i l l favourably. I n f ac t no dissent ient voice had been ra i sed . 
Even Spring Sice,' whp was second only to Hume i n constant , 
opposit ion to Gpulburn's J r i sh pol icy* had given i t h,ls ; b less ing. 
Before examining the B i l l i n d e t a i l i t is, worth while to 
note at least one. instance of^the^%eohniaa;k, problems, i t involved* 
Voluntary t i t h e commutation reauired agreement, between, the 
incumbent and the t i the-payers. , . There ,was,, .hoy?ey^r^,-,n9, e x i s t i n g 
l o c a l government or other au thor i ty which represented .the t i t h e -
payers and could therefore act f o r them. True, there was the 
ves t ry , but t h i s consisted of Protestants only, whi&e.the.bulk 
of the ^ i the^pe^^^w^. .Qomim»Qa^hQl^p«. ,1exgiu4|n,t^e^.-.f^p.iii 
the proceedings would have meant tp cour t ,d isas ter f o r the en t i re 
scheme from the outset . The^,obvious al ternatlye/was to c a l l a 
special meeting of the t i t h e ^ payers^af..^^. parish* . This , 
hpwever, would have run contrary to, the BPlioy .of th t^^r i sh , .. . ... 
Government, which was to prevent whenever possible, j^arg^ . ^ t h e r i n g s 
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of any so r t , f o r i n the. s tate of the country at the time a 
meeting o f many people almost invar iab ly ended i n a r i o t . 
Moreover, since the t i the-payers were very numerous - more 
than h a l f o f them paid t i t h e of a value l&ss than £1 - such 
meetings would have been too large f o r the e f f i c i e n t conduct 
of business. F i n a l l y a so lu t ion was found by c a l l i n g a special 
vest ry o f both Protestants and Roman-Catholics, but imposing a 
high property q u a l i f i c a t i o n , S i m i l a r l y i n t r i c a t e problems 
abounded i n almost every clause o f the measure. I f resor t was 
to be had to a r b i t r a t i o n i n valuing the t i t h e , how were the 
a r b i t r a t i o n t r i buna l s to be composed? Y/ould l o c a l t r i buna l s 
be too heavi ly biased to be r e l i ab le? Uere parishes composing 
a union to act as one u n i t or as several f o r the purposes of 
t i t h e commutation? y/as the composition t o l a s t i n d e f i n i t e l y 
or was i t to be of l i m i t e d duration? I f the l a t t e r was deter-
mined on, what number of years would.be the most convenient?^ 1 0 2 ) 
A l l these and other questions had to be considered i n d e t a i l , 
before a d r a f t sui table f o r presentation to Parliament could be 
passed by both Cabinets. 
This d r a f t was f u r t h e r amended by Parliament before i t 
became n An Act to provide f o r the es tabl ish ing o f Compositions 
f o r Tithes i n I re land f o r a l i m i t e d t ime . " ^ 0 3 ^ A de ta i led 
survey of i t s provisions i s o f i n t e r e s t , because the preoeding 
correspondence between Whitehal l and Dublin Castle shows that 
i t was mainly Goulburn 1s hand which was responsible f o r shaping 
them. I t i s thus one of the few major parliamentary measures 
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which con he, c h i e f l y a t t r i b u t e d to h i l l * „ 
'fhe. Act empowered the Lord-Lieutenant, on the a p p l i c a t i o n 
e i ther o f the incumbent or o f f ive t i the-payers who were 
2SQ occupiers," .to o a l l a special ves t ry i n the par i sh , n o t i f y i n g 
both the Bishop and the; incumbent and: g i v i n g at least three 
weeks.1 no t ice . She ves t ry was t»o consist o f the twenty f l v e ^ 1 0 4 ^ 
highest, t i t h a b l e rate-payers, paying more than 20 s, p»a». 
A quorum of 7 WQS f i x e d . I f such ,a ves t ry reached jao agreement, 
- i t was to -be adjourned ;slne die;4« .but ,m:ight. be res^^on-ed at any 
t ime. I f , however,- agreement, t o proceed,wa^. reached, tboth 
incumbent and £ i t h e - p a y e r s j were tp . appoint a commissioner . to. 
act f o r them, and- the .-two oommisaipnerSf were .to f i x the .amount 
.^ P .ifrS; % r ^Qpiip^s^ti^};0.n the basis of the , average payment 
; f o r .the, .^ast seven years- x ^Fpr t M 
were empowered to examine on,.oath*, . I f , the two ooqp^s^sio^r^, 0 ) 
;9P,uld,,noj;.., reach...a^eement^4>he^.twev^e tp . appoint;.^an, umpire. o f e . -
- f a l l i ng^ .agreement; pn> the. appointment , ityWas r t o be jnade by the 
^^r^i^^'B^lit , who jwasr^tol;(work, ojo; the- ,s^e r :pr,incipj.e. f i^ ' ,An 
$*ppeal< by e i ther ;side.,^ainst C l t h e award was .allowed, a^nd t h i s 
was; .tp, be ref-erred 7 .ljy vthe. ^or.d, Lieutenamt, either.,to,, th^.-^jbvy 
Council, or to .?the next,,going. Jndge of. Assize^? i;, She^pompps i t ion 
was to be..valid; ,fpr, 21;years.,af t o r , the ,conclus ion^of ; i the agreement, 
and- I n . uni ted >benef ices .a-, separate cpmppsition,would, be re&uired;, 
f o r each const i tuent , p a r i s h . . ; 0 F i n a l l y * the pay of ,Commissioners 
and Umpires was f i x e d at £ 1 . 1 0 . - . . a day i n . addi t ion, t e t h e i r .. . 
expenses^ . ,.r».. hv v . , . : . : ; . < ; -v.; r.-vw . •: 
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Goulburn^s inf luence may be especial ly noted i n the smallnesa 
of the ves t ry , and the property q u a l i f i c a t i o n , on both of whieh 
he in s i s t ed . ^ 1 ^ ) 5 ^ Further he was la rge ly responsible f o r the 
t i m e - l i m i t , as he apparently regarded the eventual reversion to 
the status quo ante as a publ ic recogni t ion of the c le rgy ' s r i g h t 
to the t i t h e , which he was most anxious to defend. 1^06) fpne 
painstaking provis ion f o r a l l possible contingencies, made i n 
59 clauses, i s also t y p i c a l o f Goulburn's app l i ca t ion to every 
d e t a i l of h is work. On the other hand, he never appears to have 
been very happy about the compulsory clause, and h i s l e t t e r to 
l /e l les ley announcing that i t had to be dropped almost seems to 
be ind ica t ive of a f e e l i n g of r e l i e f : " I believe that the B i l l 
wi thout the oompulsory clause w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t l y operative 
and i n that case I s h a l l not regret i t s abandonment." ^ 1 0 , 7 ^  
The extent to which we can say that t h i s b e l i e f was corro«* 
borated by fu tu re events depends on the d e f i n i t i o n of the some-
what vague word " s u f f i c i e n t l y . a The fac ts are that w i t h i n 8 
months of the Royal Assent to the B i l l 1026 appl icat ions f o r 
special vest r ies had been made and that 240 ves t r ies had 
decided to act under i t s provis ions , while 339 had adjourned 
sine d i e . Commenting oh these f i gu re s , Goulburn stated that 
the Act had proved p a r t i c u l a r l y popular w i t h the lower classes, 
while the low rates of composition already adopted were a t r i b u t e 
t o , and proof o f , the moderation of the c l e r g y . ^ 0 8 ) Almost 
two years l a t e r , when i t must be supposed that the impetus of the 
Act had been la rge ly exhausted, he maintained that i t s r e su l t s had 
f a r exceeded M s hopes, f o r composition had. been e f f ec t ed i n ' • 
676 parishes, or about ^ o f the t o t a l number of I r i s h parishes. I 3 - 0 9 ) 
I n other words;:even without compulsion more than a t h i r d , probably 
as many aa h a l f , the I r i s h parishes had t r i e d and a quarter had 
succeeded i n availing; themsplyps o f the provisions o f the Act . 
That i n i t s e l f i s proof tha t i t was a,workmanlike measure, a 
convic t ion which i s^p t reng the^^ i 
protest against i t s operation i s on r e c o r d . ^ 1 1 0 ) That i s 
ce r t a in ly an unheard o f thin^t i n th> Iceland; p f ; t h e 183Gs* 
Undoubtedly the Act served to. mi t iga te some o f the hardships o f 
the I r i s h people* \ V >- ;V'v: :y. • ' 
Uo impression of the work of the I r i s h Government would be 
cor rec t , i f i t f a i l e d to convey the invar iable background o f an 
e i the r openly or l a t e n t l y mut inous population* Ete rna l v ig i lance 
was requi red , there fore , to curb and prevent outrages or more 
general rebellions* A. few random examples chpgen f rom Goulburn'a 
correspondence w i t h 'Peel, w i l l serve aQ i l l u a t r a t i o n s j in 
September 18&0 Eeel r e f e r r ed to the s k i l f u l planning of the at tack 
on a Mr. Noroot t ' s house as d p a r t i c t i l a r l y gloomy omen f o r the 
w i n t e r . D i s t u r b a n c e always increased i n the win te r months* 
not only because the diminishing food steoka genea?ally exacerbated 
the d is t ress of the poor, but alse because the longer n igh t s 
a f forded the miscreants a bet ter chance to evade d e t e c t i o n . f 1 ^ 8 ) 
I n the f o l l o w i n g month several men, belonging to "Dublin Committees, 
a group of secret soc ie t ies , were being t r i e d f o r h igh treason. 
Though the o r i g i n a l charge f a i l e d , some of the men were convicted 
• •• • : • 64. 
; of-Vadministerlng^u^^ ana thus sentenced' to transportat ion? 
rA few days later*' Goulburn protested against ' the withdrawal ' of a 
bat gabion f rom Ireland.! because such ac t ion woiuld-lnspare -the 
r ebe l l i ous , especial ly i n liunster, ..with new hope . t 1 1 ^ ) 7/hile 
i n London f o r the session o f parliament, Goulburn received a' 1 
l e t t e r . f r o m .the Sol ic i tor -Genera l appris ing him t h a t Dublin 
was i n a state o f alarm, because the Ribbon-men seemed:to be 
preparing f o r . a c r i s i s , that^pikes were, being-man ufaetured; and 
that the. Orangemanl might'soon be expected 16 f i g h t i n defence 
of the Cons t i tu t ion and the I r i s h Government; The f o l l o w i n g 
exchange of l e t t e r s , marked "Secret," v/as more unusual, hut br ings 
,to. l i g h t another ^aspect of the same'.problem. ' O n October 27th , 
1823, Peel wrote: "Keep an eye on Honsieur.Romain who i s , I believe* 
French'Consul i n . D u b l i n . He..corresponds w i t h Chateaubriand on 
a l l matters of I r i s h Domestic P o l i c y . " Peel added that the 
reports were not , as ye t , treasonable and that they passed 
through.the Post O f f i c e . = Gbulburn;replied f i v e days l a t e r : 
"v/e w i l l keep a wa tchfu l eye on Monsieur Raymond*- though I t h i n k 
i t w i l l be be t te r to leave his l e t t e r s to Chateaubriand to your 
inspect ion; as they must pass through London Post o f f i c e on t h e i r 
road to Paris* and we are such bunglers at the Post O f f i c e here 
that we Bhould never get at the contents o f his l e t t e r s wi thout 
.rvendOTing.:.th.em;)WfItJfOS? del ivery . . Moreover, our opening them 
would be immediately promulgated." ; : \ - ^ - .r ; , -
:-.•> So f a r , however,. t h i s "resistance movement", had lacked any 
form of cen t ra l organizat ion and thus was also devoid of d i r e c t i o n . 
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Uhile t h i s presented problems of i t s own f o r the Government, such 
as the greater i n c a l e u i a b i l i t y o f where and when outbreaks would 
occur and hence the need f o r the dispersal of forces , the lack of 
cohesion among the rebels was ce r t a i n ly one cause o f t he i r 
inef fec t iveness . Among other causes the determination of the 
Government to que l l a l l disorder, as evidenced i n the Magistracy 
and Police reform and the Insur rec t ion Act , which had again been 
renewed i n June, 1823, was unquestionably the most prominent. 
Thus Goulburn could report three months l a t e r that the state of 
the country was the quietest sinoe he had been appointed. 
Yet ce r t a in I r i s h p a t r i o t s had then already begun to prepare the 
instrument which was to resharpen the blunted edge of I r i s h 
resistance. That instrument was the Catholic Associat ion. 
The f i r s t reference to that body shows how a l e r t Goulburn 
was to any possible danger to the peace of I r e l and . Uhile i n 
London he noticed a press report that an aggregate meeting f o r 
the purpose of r e v i v i n g the Catholic Board was to be held . He 
immediately wrote to inform the Lord-Lieutenant and to state h i s 
views on the subject . He would much prefer tha t no such body, 
would ex is t i n I re land , considering the temper o f the country, 
but he also recognized that the Catholics would frame t h e i r 
organizat ion c a r e f u l l y so as to avoid the r i s k o f i l l e g a l i t y . 
For instance, they would have no delegates, since representative 
assemblies were forbidden. Thus, a l l the Government coulcLdo was 
to watch fo r any grounds that would warrant t h e i r f o r c i b l e 
d i s so lu t i on without v i o l a t i o n of the law. He promised to 
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peruse the Home O f f i c e documents r e l a t i n g to the d i s s o l u t i o n 
of the C a t h o l i c Board by the Duke of Richmond, and requested the 
Lordr-Lieutenant 1 s views on the s u b j e c t , s i n c e i t might he r a i s e d 
i n the House.^ 1 1 7^ C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y no r e p l y to t h i s l e t t e r 
was r e c e i v e d . 
I t was some time bdfore the newly, formed C a t h o l i c A s s o c i a t i o n 
achieved s u f f i c i e n t prominence to r e c e i v e s e r i o u s m i n i s t e r i a l 
a t t e n t i o n again. That was at a time when Goulburn, commenting 
on the s t a t e of the country, h e l d that w h i l e m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of 
vio l e n c e were r a r e , i t s s p i r i t remained unabated, and t h a t he 
ther e f o r e f e l t I r e l a n d would, for some time to oome, need between 
(118) 
twenty and twenty-one thousand men to safeguard p u b l i c order. 
The i s s u e , which was being canvassed by the A s s o c i a t i o n , had been 
r a i s e d by an i n c i d e n t i n September, A Roman C a t h o l i c b u r i a l 
had taken pl a c e i n a 1'rotestant churchyard i n Dublin, and the 
sexton had prevented, though not f o r c i b l y , the sa y i n g o f the 
Roman C a t h o l i c b u r i a l s e r v i c e . The l e g a l i t y of the saying of 
Roman C a t h o l i c b u r i a l prayers was questionable. The I r i s h 
l a w - o f f i c e r s h e l d opposing views on the s u b j e c t . O'Connell 
s k i l f u l l y s e i z e d on t h i s i s s u e , on which the Government was 
doubtful, and which, moreover, was obviously charged w i t h 
indignant emotion. He made a statement d e c l a r i n g that f u n e r a l 
prayers were p e r f e c t l y l e g a l and should be continued. The 
d i f f i c u l t y was enhanced by the f a c t t h a t there wore only few 
b u r i a l grounds i n Dublin e x c l u s i v e l y r e s e r v e d for Roman C a t h o l i c s , 
the m a j o r i t y of whom were customarily b u r l e d i n P r o t e s t a n t 
churchyards. The C a t h o l i c A s s o c i a t i o n was thus provided 
w i t h a popular and t o p i c a l cause. 
Somewhat alarmed by p r e s s r e p o r t s of i t s proceedings, P e e l 
requested f u r t h e r information about t h a t "body: How many and 
what s o r t of people attended i t s meetings? Uhat was known about 
p u b l i c f e e l i n g towards t h i s "misohiovous body," and had i t any 
connection with the priesthood? Why, f i n a l l y , d i d "government™ 
papers r e p o r t i t s debates, when s u r e l y i t couldL be k i l l e d by the 
r e f u s a l to p u b l i c i s e i t s a c t i v i t i e s ? ^ 1 2 0 ) Goulburn's r e p l y 
showed that he underestimated the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of the 
A s s o c i a t i o n very c o nsiderably. He maintained that the l a s t 
debate had been most u n s p i r i t e d , f o r e c a s t that the A s s o c i a t i o n 
would d i e of i n a n i t i o n , and f u r t h e r reported that the Roman ,. 
C a t h o l i c a u t h o r i t i e s were s a i d to disapprove of i t . P u b l i c 
i n t e r e s t , however, must have been g r e a t , for he explained, 
r a t h e r i n corroboration o f the more modern adage t h a t the p u b l i c 
w i l l get the type <of pre s s i t wants, t h a t i t would have been 
i n a d v i s a b l e to prevent government papers from p u b l i s h i n g the 
debates, as such a course of a c t i o n would a f f e c t s a l e s , s i n c e a l l 
other papers published the p r o c e e d i n g s . ^ 1 2 1 ^ 
P e e l ' s and Goulburn 1s a t t i t u d e to the I r i s h p r e s s deserves 
a b r i e f d i g r e s s i o n , s i n c e i t i s the only o c c a s i o n on which we can 
reproach Goulburn w i t h p o l i t i c a l dishonesty. P e e l , on a l a t e r 
o c c a s i o n ^ 1 2 2 ) made an almost i d e n t i c a l a c c u s a t i o n a g a i n s t the 
" P a t r i o t , " and Goulburn took steps to ensure that i t s e d i t o r i a l 
views would i n futu r e be more favourable to the Government. 
He h i m s e l f had at one time secured the immediate examination of 
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the e d i t o r of the " C o u r i e r , n which had p r i n t e d "a moat v i o l e n t 
and indecent paragraph,"?and had taken the view t h a t the e d i t o r 
was " u n f i t even i n name to continue the government paper u n l e s s 
able to give a s a t i s f a c t o r y excuse." Yet, when i n 
parliament he was confronted with the a c c u s a t i o n that a d v e r t i s e -
ments of government proclamations were used to "bribe s e c t i o n s of 
the I r i s h P r e s s , he r e p l i e d that he d i d not know which I r i s h 
papers were f r i e n d l y to the government and which were not«'^**4) 
I n any case i t may be doubted, whether f a i l u r e to report the 
A s s o c i a t i o n ' s a c t i v i t i e s would have had any ap p r e c i a b l e e f f e c t on 
i t s v i t a l i t y . I t s remarkable f e a t u r e was that i t appealed to and 
was supported by a l l c l a s s e s , and the I r i s h poor, who formed the 
m a j o r i t y of the population, were not*able to a f f o r d the luxury of 
a d a i l y paper, e s p e c i a l l y a s . i t was burdened by the paper tax* 
Be that as i t may, the A s s o c i a t i o n u u i c k l y grew i n str e n g t h and 
i n f l u e n c e , so much and so q u i c k l y that throughout the year 1824 
the Government sent i t s own shorthand-writer to r e p o r t the 
debates, f 1 ^ ) ^he p r i n c i p a l object of t h i s a c t i o n was apparently 
to a s c e r t a i n whether anything s a i d i n the course of debate put the 
speakers w i t h i n the re a c h of the law. The r e p o r t s were always 
p e r s o n a l l y perused by both Lord-Lieutenant and C h i e f - S e c r e t a r y , 
and dubious passages were then r e f e r r e d to the L a w - o f f i c e r s to 
decide i f they warranted the i n s t i t u t i o n of proceedings. 
F i n a l l y the r e p o r t s were t r a n s m i t t e d to London. :/hile attempts 
were thus made to remove individual l e a d e r s , no s i m i l a r attempts to 
suppress the A s s o c i a t i o n as a whole were at f i r s t contemplated. 
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The turnings-point i n tfeo Governments a t t i t u d e occurred, i t 
appears:, when the c o l l e c t i o n of the C a t h o l i c r e n t was decided on. 
Goulburn wrote from London t h a t the Bishop*s support f o r the 
C a t h o l i c A s s o c i a t i o n s notion to c o l l e c t a C a t h o l i c t a x rendered, 
that body f a r more formidable than he had p r e v i o u s l y regarded i t . 
S h i s change might n e c e s s i t a t e & r e o r i e n t a t i o n of Government 
p o l i c y i n ths d ^ a o t i o ^ i n t e r v e n t i o n . ^ 1 8 6 ) On h i s 
r e t u r n to I r e l a n d he immediately reached the d e c i s i o n t h a t 
suppression. Was 'indeed e s s e n t i a l . i n r e p l y to P e e l , who aa4 
:: • '-.^ H V v ^ ^ ^ . - ' v ^ o / : . ' ' - - * - >•'••>•...• ^  ' . ^ 
expressed a n x i e t y t h a t a r e g u l a r l y c o n s t i t u t e d "body a f e s i i ape the 
forms o f Parliament' and c o l l e c t ; a tax from the Rdman C a t h o l i c 
population f o r ari 'uiispe3oif^ed purpos;e, he stated; r e g r e t f u l l y 
t h a t the Attorney^General thought'tie Convention Act, p r o h i b i t i n g 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , assemblies, had-not yet been i n f r i n g e d by the 
A s s o c i a t i o n . Goulburn added, however, t h a t i t s e f f e c t s on the 
oountry were "most e v i l ^ n and t h a t i t t h e r e f o r e ought most 
aejfte^n:^ ^ • 
Hev^othelesa, t h e Goverament d i d not pursue the question 
o f s u p p r e s s i o n w i t h great r a p i d i t y or even w i t h g r e a t urgency. 
One reason f o r th a t was undoubtedly the c l e v e r n e s s with, whioh 
©iGonheil c o n t r i v e d to balance on the edge of l e g a l i t y . $hus 
he i e r e p o r t e d as having spoken o f ^ h a t great and mighty body 
c o n s i s t i n g of seven millions.; of people whom, they (the Asisooiation) 
d i 4 • not r e p r e s e n t ^ f o r the law forbade ouch a r epresenta^ion, but 
for whom they a e t e ^ M ' ^ V Moreover, during the summer months 
"parliamentary" meetings were l a r g e l y abandoned, w h i l e 0*Connell 
and other l e a d e r B p o u r e d the opuntry, holding meetings e x p l a i n i n g 
the objects! o f the Association; add o r g a n i s i n g i t on a nation-wide 
s c a l e . !Phis d i s p e r s a l of a c t i v i t i e s may have co n t r i b u t e d to the 
somewhat complacent a t t i t u d e of the Government, which was l u l l e d 
i n t o a\ f a l s e sense of comparative, s e c u r i t y by t h e u n u s u a l l y 
peaoeable s t a t e of I r e l a n d , ( * S 9 J and had t o f e a r no c r i t i c i s m ' 
from opposition groups due to the e a r l y prorogation of Parliament 
at the end of June. 
By the end of October, however, Goulburn was thoroughly 
alarmed at the extent of the A s s o c i a t i o n ' s a c t i v i t i e a , and h i s 
r e p o r t to Peel was t r a n s m i t t e d to s e v e r a i members of the E n g l i s h 
Cabinet. tthereaa o r i g i n a l l y i t had c o n s i s t e d c h i e f l y of 
"demagogues o f d o u b t f u l r e p u t a t i o n , " the Aaaooiat ion'a new 
members inoluded r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the n o b i l i t y , some of them 
P r o t e s t a n t a * aM of the higher Roman Ca t h b l i o c l e r g y , Membera of 
Parliament and o t h e r s o f the higher clataaea' who would be s t r o n g l y 
exposed"; tpvQ^thoiio i n f l a ^ •. I t s finaiibea were. secured by' the ' • 
pri«$'w?' encouragement to the collection of " r e n ^ , " which secured 
a weekly tmoto&>. of £800-500• Each p a r i s h had i t s n r e n t - o o l l e c t o r w 
who c o u l d easily be transformed into an • agent i f ; d i s o r d e r a broke 
oat, i/herever a P r o t e s t a n t waa i n v o l v e d i n a law-ease with & 
Ca t h o l i c , the A s s o c i a t i o n sent a b a r r i s t e r and sought to i n t i m i d a t e 
the m a g i s t r a t e s irito g i v i n g judgment f o r the C a t h o l l a * Y e t, how 
could these e > i l s be combated, o s p ^ e i a l l y s i n c e aetot l e g i s l a t i o n 
• y-C" • [IZi would be easy to evade under the cloak of c h a r i t y o r g a n i s a t i o n s ? 
Within/a f o r t n i g h t of t h i ^ .report* rumours o f imm^ent Mde spread 
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r e b e l l i o n abounded i». $*e 4oou|ltry • , ¥ith 80 f000 troops and a 
r e l i a b l e p o l i o e f o r c e , however, Goulburn, though apprehensive, 
was prepared .to, face any; e v e n t u a l i t y , without f u r t h e r reinforcements 
from England, ^hese rumours Were l a r g e l y without foundation 
of any s o r t * oisS, are r a t h e r to be taken as an i n d i c a t i o n o f the 
i n t e n s i t y o f unjrest, Which- the A s s o c i a t i o n had succeeded i n 
s t i r r i n g up, than -oil'^^i^Jpres^at iVns• for an armed r i s i n g , 
There i s even some s u s p i c i o n t h a t O'Gonnell f o s t e r e d or c r e a t e d 
tiiem I n t e n t i o n a l ^ i n an eff^s?^ a t viaat would nowadays be c a l l e d 
a wwar oif nerves, wC3-331 ^ succeeded i n so far as the atmosphere 
of deepened the I r i s h Cabinet's s u s p i c i o n s of 
eacfh other's i n t e g r i t y . -..In ^ajptip^lsat'^ Goulburn f e l t that 
PlVUiket% was t r y i n g , to avoid a. c o l l i s i o n w i t h the CathoHo . -.; . 
A s s o c i a t i o n at almbst any. c o s t . ^ 1 3 3 • 
f i n a l l y the E n g l i s h Cabinet decided on a c t i o n . On 
15th Decembsr P e e l wrote to Goul>,urn: M l b e l i e v e a new !$« 
' ' n d c e s s ^ ^ * / ^ I b e l i e v e t h a t iaivlraust be a v e r y s t r o n g one^ bat •'. 
i f we^ the king's S e r v a n t s , s h r i ^ J : f r o i a ; t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of 
d i r e c t l y proposing i t and -fighting s t o u t l y every otep of i t , 
u n t i l i t i s . e i t h e r r e j e c t e d or passed i n t o a law, \ve are u n f i t 
f o r our s t a t i o n s ; " Some time e a r l i e r another avenue for. 
governmental a t t a c k had opened i t s e l f * 0 1 O o n n e l l was rep o r t e d 
a s having asked h i s audience: "Y&o was t h e r e that d i d not 
r e v e r e the memory o f a Washington or a D o l i v a r ? who had made 
t h e i r c o u n t r i e s independent and g r e a t , and any man t h a t admired 
a B o l i v a r or a Washington ought to stamp on the grave of the 
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misereant Castlereagh* He would i n s t r u c t h i s o b i l d r e n t h a t 
Castlereagh, was the man who had s o l d h i s c o u n t r y . " ( ^ 3 ^ ) 
Lord r l e l l e s l e y u n d e r l i n e d t h i s passage i n p e n c i l and made a 
note * t h a t i t should he r e f e r r e d to the L a w - O f f i c e r s . I t seems 
d i f f i c u l t to understand why they should have taken more than 
a month to g i v e t h e i r opinion, hut i n any case on 20th jDeoember, 
Goulburn j o y f u l l y reported to P e e l t h a t they h e l d there was an 
e x c e l l e n t case f o r proceeding a g a i n s t him fo r s e d i t i o u s words* 
He had been h e l d to b a i l to take h i s t r i a l , which w&uld be. 
heard w i t h i n a few days, though a m i s c a r r i a g e of j u s t i c e might 
be p o s s i b l e i n I r e l a n d despite the d e a r e s t e v i d e n c e ^ 1 3 5 ) 
The next fbw days* correspondence r e v e a l s t h a t f e v e r i s h a c t i v i t y 
took p l a c e oil both s i d e s of the I r i s h Ohdinnel tb ensure t h a t inso 
f a r as i t l a y w i t h the prosecution, O 1Conneil would Ve convicted, 
l e t t e r s were complicated by t h e f a c t t h a t , as adon as. he had been 
a r r e s t e d , S i r Haropurt Lees c a l l e d the Ul&tbr P r o t e s t a n t s t o arms 
ag a i n s t the Catholios 1 on the grounds t h a t f t h ^ Government, w ^ too 
weak to protedt them* GouXburn b i t t e r l y ' complained t h a t he 
should have chosen such an "inopportune moment for- h l a r a v i n g s . " 
They could, however,* obviously not be Ignored^ though p r o c e d u r a l 
manipulations ensured t h a t h i s t r i a l would take plsjce a few day's 
l a t e r than O*0onaeli*a. Thus.at l e a s t the I s s u e would not be 
confused i n e i t h e r c a s e * ^ 1 3 6 ) 
I t I s yet another comment on the q u a l i t y of I r i a h law^opurts 
of the time t h a t the b i l l s a g a i n s t the aeouaed i n both oaaea were 
ignored. I n t h i s i n s t a n c e the Grand Jury waa p e r f e c t l y 
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r e s p e c t a b l e , bat Judge Moore d i r e c t e d t h a t they must be 
s a t i s f i e d t h a t the person u s i n g the words intended them i n the 
sense of meaning chargedj or e l s e they could not f i n d the b i l l s . 
U l t h t h i s r i d i c u l o u s d i r e c t i o n before them the Jury had no 
choice, and u n l e s s repudiated i t made nonsense of a l l f u t u r e 
t r i a l s of the same type. ^ ^ 
E f f o r t s were t h e r e f o r e redoubled to produce as n e a r l y 
waterproof a measure f o r the suppression of the C a t h o l i c 
Association a t the e a r l i e s t . moment. • On 5th January, Goulburn 
could, f o r once, r e p o r t t h a t the I r i s h Cabinet agreed unanimously. 
What was more, t h e i r ideas on the b i l l f o r the suppression of the 
C a t h o l i c A s s o c i a t i o n were almost ' i d e n t i c a l w i t h those of the 
E n g l i s h Cabinet. Goulburn r i g h t l y i n s i s t e d , however, t h a t i t 
was probably even more'/ic^rtant -to, look} beyond the b i l l to the 
f u t u r e of Roman C a t h o l i c o r g a n i s a t i o n i n I r e l a n d * se f o r e c a s t 
t h a t t h i s would take the form of s e r i e s o f aggregate N e s t i n g s f o r 
avowedly l e g a l purposes, always attended by the sarnie people * ' 
Thus the l o r d ^ i i e u t e n a n t should be empowered to d i s c o n t i n u e by 
proclamation any s o c i e t y formed i n evasion of. the new law and 
to d i s p e r s e meetings. C h a r i t a b l e and eduoptional s o o i e t i ^ s 
should not be s p e c i f i c a l l y exempted from these p r o v i s i o n s , ' ; •, 
Quite unaccountably, however^ he withdrew these, very sound, and 
almost obvious., suggestions s e v e r a l days l a t e r , g i v i n g a s the 
ohl^r reason for h i s r e c a n t a t i o n t h a t a l l the I r i s h M i n i s t e r s 
thought such ;&owe^ 
i t i s not easy to. fathom why the thus w e a ^ 
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should have aroused such f i e r c e parliamentary opposition* 
Brougham opened the a t t a c k oh i t a f t e r the King's speech had 
requested Parliament to take steps to d e a l w i t h unlawful 
a s s o c i a t i o n s . Wien on l o t h February Goulhurn sought l e a v e 
to introduoe h i s Unlawful S o c i e t i e s B i l l , ) he had to fade a four 
day debate i and the 1 v o t i n g f i g u r e s of 278^-183 are evidence of 
ths. goo^ attendance of. which t h i a v measure was considered worthy. 
He made\ the case f o r the Government i n one of h i s b e t t e r 
speeches. He contended t h a t the o b j e c t s of the C a t h o l i c 
A a s p c i i t l o n l w e r e cjuite ^ t o a t e i p i a l ijd t h i s c o n t e s t . What 
mattered .were t h e i r methods of seeking to a t t a i n t h e i r o b j e c t s , 
and those were incompatible w i t h sound government* The 
A s s o c i a t i o n , he a l l e g e d , had a l l i e d w i t h t h e remnants of the 
1798 r e b e l l i o n committee. The: methods by which the C a t h o l i c 
' r e n t was c o l l e c t e d resembled f o r c i b l e eactortiony s i n c e r e f u s a l s 
to c o n t r i b u t e were recorded i n a s p e c i a l book. . The funds 
d o l i e o t e d i n t h i s way were q h i e f l y used to i n t e r f e r e w i t h the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of 4q^tioe, The; B i l l should i o r b i d two of the 
most obnoxious f e a t u r e s of the AssotJii^tibn, namely permanent 
• s i t t i n g s and the levying- trf money f o r the r e d r e s s of p r i v a t e 
o r / p u b l i c grievances. At a l a t e r s t ag> o f the B i l l ' s progress 
: ; ^ w r i i b ; a t i ^ d the charge t h a t it.was a, p i e c e ©artfal l e g i s l a -
t i o n / ^ " ^ I t M d indeed.;from the outset been intended t h a t i t 
should be a p p l i e d e q u a l l y a g a i n s t orange and any/ other i l l e g a l 
a s s o c i a t i o n s . ^ 1 4 ^ • . -.' - . - j . - : ; - . . ' l ' ;,"'."-. 
. I n i t s f i n a l shppe the "Act to amend c e r t a i n A c t s r e l a t i n g 
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unlawful S o c i e t i e s i n I r e l a n d , " ^ 4 2 ^ which was l i m i t e d to a 
duration of two y e a r s , was r a t h e r formidable i n appearance. 
I t made i l l e g a l any s o c i e t y or committee a c t i n g f o r the r e d r e s s 
of g r i e v a n c e s , f o r an a l t e r a t i o n of the constitution or f o r 
a s s i s t i n g people l e g a l l y , or meeting f o r more than 14 days, 
or l e v y i n g money, or employing o f f i c e r s of other s o c i e t i e s 
doing 30, or having v a r i o u s branches, or corresponding w i t h 
other s o c i e t i e s , or excluding members of any l e g a l l y permitted 
r e l i g i o u s f a i t h . Any two J.Ps were empowered to command 
unlawful meetings to d i s p e r s e , and to e f f e c t f o r c i b l e e n t r i e s . 
Membership of an u n l a w f u l s o c i e t y became a misdemeanour 
punishable by f i n e or imprisonment. Exemptions were, however, 
granted to s o c i e t i e s f o r r e l i g i o u s worship, or to f a r t h e r c h a r i t y , 
s c i e n c e , a g r i c u l t u r e , manufacture or commerce, and to meetings 
c a l l e d s o l e l y to p e t i t i o n King or P a r l i a m e n t . 
The Act's b i t e , however, was i n no way commensurate w i t h i t s 
bark. I n the f i r s t p lace the numerous exemptions, as could have 
and indeed had been foreseen, could cover a multitude of s i n s . 
Che r e s u l t was c e r t a i n l y not what had been intended or expected 
by i t s p r o t a g o n i s t s : "O'Connell evaded the l e t t e r of the law, 
founded new a s s o c i a t i o n s as q u i c k l y as they were broken up, and 
s t i l l c o l l e c t e d the r e n t . w ^ 1 4 : 3 ^ I n c o n t r a s t to these Roman 
C a t h o l i c attempts to thwart Parliament, Goulburn pointed out 
t h a t the Orange gentry had t r i e d to stop p r o c e s s i o n s and other 
d e m o n s t r a t i o n s . ^ 1 4 4 ) I n f a c t by January, 1836 i t had become 
c l e a r t h a t the Act had succeeded f a i r l y w e l l i n suppressing the 
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Orange^ or g a n i s a ^ i o ^ ^ ^ i l e d ^ c b m p l e t e l y ^ i n ^ i t a ^ > 
primary' object of p u t t i n g d;Bt;n:' the :Cathoi'i6 l a s b c i a t i o n ; ; 
The i d e a of a t t b m p t i n g p r o s e c u t IdM"Was'-'canvassed' then and -again 
"12 months l a t e r s i n both governments. But f e a r i n g ' t h a t : a 
p r o s e c u t i o n would f a i l ; hoping on ^ather' J slender evidence'" t h a t 
the p o p u l a r i t y of'-'%hi9AAaBbella i^bnr''nks on the''decline, and 
r e a l i s i n g ' t h a t : it's Suppression" would^ no longer' achieve 'the 
'desired obj'ect 1-^inoe 'the"pri^athbod^had taken up : the" p o l i t i c a l 
b u ' d g e l ' s ^ 1 4 5 ^ : t h e M i n i s t e r s 'f i n a l l y abandoned such -'plansV 
O'Connell had c l e a r l y beaten 'Geulburn i n the b a t t l e of w i t s , 
partly 1 1bboauae : birth'e Government * s f a l i u r e H o ' -make5 -the'!~'"'" •• 
Unlawful'Sbcie'tiea 'iLdi s u f f i c i e n t l y strong, and partly*bebause 
b ^ b n n e ^ i ^ iir dealing- with f- the 
' t e c h n i c a l i t i e s o f " t i e l a w " * 1 ^ 6 * had' an i n f i n i t e ' - a b i l i t y ' f o r 
s k i r t i n g ' the edge o f ' i l l e g a l i t y v/ithout' comniitting' h i m s e l f 
s u f f i c i e n t l y " to warrant a prose cut ion under tne u n r e l i a b l e " 
bircum'stancea a t t e n d i n g j u s t i c e . ' 
Goulburn's defeat enabled O'Connell to c a r r y obit' h i s 9 campaign 
f o r 1 Catholic.emanc i p a t i o n . 
''After-this account b f t h e major developments i n ; I r i s h ' 
a f f a i r s during' ; Gouiburn'b tenure of t h e " o f f i c e ; of Chief :> J: 
S e c r e t a r y 6£ Ireland'^ we muat turn;'our,,;,attenl;fbnAto,,'Bbme:''' 1 
p o i n t s o f l e s s i n t r i n s i c importance and f a r reaching" e f f e c t s , 
perhaps,' but' nonetheless v a l u a b l e for' an" inbigh^r into' ther day-to 
day 1 a d m i n i s t r W or i n t o the p r i n c i p l e s of 
Goulburn's p o l i t i c a l thought. ~ J'"f': 90v-xoCa^li^ > ^  
Reference has alre a d y been made to I r i s h food shortages, and 
to the genera l d i r e c t i o n of Government p o l i c y regarding t h i s 
problem* I t must, moreover, be remembered that t h i s was very 
n e a r l y an annually r e c u r r i n g event* She l i n e of p o l i c y to be 
adopted was thus almost a u t o m a t i c a l l y copied from the preceding 
y e a r . Hor was there any d i f f e r e n c e i n the devotion w i t h which 
Peel and Goulburn accepted the d i c t a t e s of the "dismal s c i e n c e . n 
Thus P e e l i n d i s c u s s i n g the s u b j e c t s t a t e d he would r a t h e r r i s k 
a t t a c k s on the Government i n the Commons than the dangers of 
Government purchase of food before the commencement of famine. 
Such a c t i o n , i f open, would encourage improvident consumption, 
and, i f conoBaled, would r a i s e p r i c e s , which might l e a d to the 
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opening of the p o r t s and thus damage the a g r i c u l t u r a l i n t e r e s t . 
H r i t i n g some weeks before the potato h a r v e s t of 1834, Goulburn 
put a s i m i l a r view even more crudely* The Government's c h i e f 
problem was the constant clamour f o r r e l i e f * Because a l a r g e 
number of p a r i s h e s were reported without food, i t was, he s t a t e d 
r a t h e r i n d i g n a n t l y , "expected to send money or p r o v i s i o n s i n t o 
a l l the d i s t r i c t s . 
(~"rhis was not done, however, 3ince potatoes were procurable 
"at p r i c e s not g e n e r a l l y speaking e x o r b i t a n t when the season 
of the year i s considered." He concluded by say i n g that such 
an experiment was p o s s i b l e i n t h a t year because parliament had 
al r e a d y adjourned, and that the period of s u f f e r i n g would not be 
of many days 1 d u r a t i o n ! ^ 1 4 8 ^ 
Another question which r e a r e d i t s head p e r i o d i c a l l y was 
t h a t of the s i z e of I r e l a n d ' s population and the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
r e l i e v i n g d i s t r e s s . b y sponsoring or a s s i s t i n g emigration. 
Apparently P e e l wa3 the main proponent of ouch schemes. 
Unfortunately, however, U e l l e s l e y took offence at the way i n 
which one of the e a r l i e s t attempts was handled, and l i t t l e could 
be done to renew these, w h i l e he remained i n o f f i c e . U h i l e i n 
London, Goulburn d i s c u s s e d the p o s s i b i l i t y of encouraging 
emigration from the d i s t u r b e d d i s t r i c t s w i t h Lord L i v e r p o o l 
and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. They agreed to provide 
immediate t r a n s p o r t to Canada f o r 1000, to be s e l e c t e d from those 
w i l l i n g to proceed, and f a c i l i t i e s for a l a r g e r number i n the 
f o l l o w i n g year, b e l i e v i n g that n t h e hope of being conveyed to 
Canada as a reward, f o r good conduct (might) induce the lower 
orders to adopt a more peaceable l i n e of conduct." The Lord-
Lieutenant, however, apparently stung by the f a c t t h at he had 
not been consulted, considered that bad consequences would a r i s e 
from the encouragement of emigration, and Goulburn had t c o f f e r 
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the c a n c e l l a t i o n of the proposal as a r e s u l t . 
F u r t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s ensued from Lord ' J e l l e s l e y ' s p r i v a t e 
a f f a i r s . H i s son, IJT* Johnstone, held a post at the Stamp O f f i c e 
i n London fo r which he drew a s a l a r y of £1,000. notwithstanding 
t h i s "occupation," he spent much of h i s time i n Dublin where he 
exerted a most unsteadying i n f l u e n c e on the Lord-Lieutenant's 
p o l i c i e s * S h i s s i t u a t i o n was complicated by the second marriage 
of Lord U e l l e s l e y , which took p l a c e i n November, 18S5. His 
w i f e was a Roman C a t h o l i c , and that i n i t s e l f was a matter of 
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comment and some annoyance i n the s t a t e of I r e l a n d . By the 
end of the year a contest f o r power i n the household, r a t h e r 
on the l i n e s of that "between Mrs* Proudie and Mr* Slope i n 
B a r c h e s t e r , had reached i t s climax and was decided i n favour 
of Mr. Johnston and a g a i n s t the Lady-Lieutenant* She, t h e r e f o r e , 
threatened to separate from her husband, which would have put 
him i n a completely impossible s i t u a t i o n , s i n c e he had a l r e a d y 
i n c u r r e d a good deal of r i d i c u l e preparatory to and attendant 
on h i s marriage a few months e a r l i e r . I n desperation, Goulburn 
suggested t h a t Mr. Johnston should be threatened with l o s s of h i s 
s i n e c u r e u n less he r e s i d e d i n London, but P e e l mentioned the 
matter c o n f i d e n t i a l l y to the Duke of l / e l l i n g t o n , who apparently 
succeeded i n smoothing the outward r i p p l e s of the family c o n f l i c t 
{150} 
at l e a s t . 
Among the most frequent t a r g e t s of parliamentary c r i t i c s 
were v a r i o u s t o p i c s connected with the Church of I r e l a n d . I n 
at l e a s t two i n s t a n c e s Gouiburn introduced new l e g i s l a t i o n 
l a r g e l y i n response to such c r i t i c i s m . I n 1823, while repudiatin, 
almost everything e l s e that Hume had 3aid i n a debate on the 
I r i s h Church Establishment, he agreed w i t h him on the need for 
e n f o r c i n g the r e s i d e n c e of c l e r g y , as long as i t l e f t Church 
p r i v i l e g e s unimpaired. I n the f o l l o w i n g year he secured 
the passage of a measure, which forbade beneficed c l e r g y to 
engage i n t r a d i n g , and arranged t h a t they should l o s e graduated 
p a r t s of t h e i r income, i f they were non-resident f o r more than 
three months. Exemptions i n c l u d e d those granted f o r t e a c h e r s , 
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masters of h o s p i t a l s , Bishops* bhap&ains and canons.-"^^ 
I n the second i n s t a n c e a p r i v a t e member's h i l l , 1 introduced "by 
S i r J . Newport ^ 1 5 3 ^ provided the stimu l u s f o r a law to r e g u l a t e 
I r i s h v e s t r i e s * The government measure d i v i d e d v e s t r y b u s i n e s s 
into two p a r t s , e c c l e s i a s t i c a l and s e c u l a r * The two types o f 
bus i n e s s had to be d i s c u s s e d f t ] sje^arate v e s t r y meetings* 
At v e s t r i e s d i s o u s s i n g Church matters, Roman C a t h o l i c s were 
not allowed to vote/; at. a l l : o t } i e r v e s t r y meetings a l l 
par i s h i o n e r s were e n t i t l e d t o vote. • ftoman C a t h o l i c s were 
permitted to r e f u s e -service a s ohurohwardena. and the incumbent's 
r i g h t to be the ordinary v e s t r y chairman was r e a f f i r m e d , ^ 5 4 1 
F i n a l l y ^ a few i l l u s t r a t i o n s of minor a d m i n i s t r a t i v e matters 
may be of i n t e r e s t * : Pr • Jooelyfc, Bishop o f GlbgheM," accused on 
charges of immorality, had been deprived of h i s see. Before h i s 
t r i a l he had l e f t the country. / On 3rd December, 1833$ Gbulburn 
r e c e i v e d S e c r e t information t h a t he had r e t u r n e d to I r e l a n d , 
^and;;immedJ$bi^^ ./• 
r e p l y marked ^ S e c r e t * * r e a d s : ( I agree t h a t t h e ) "apP^ehens 
and t r i a l of Dr. Jocely.n ^bUid be a ^ e a t pubiio' p a i e ^ ... 
to the church*. ... . ...16 avert• l t / ^ . we ought to d i s r e g a r d the /". 
P r i n c i p l e s on which we s y u l d aot. i n ordinary: o a s e s H e added 
the suggestion t h a t an i n f l u e n t i a l member of / t h e fami^jr should 
be apprised'of the Government's knowledge, and warned t h a t a 
t r i a l would be i n s t i t u t e d u n l e s s Dr. Jobeiyn. immediately; l e f t 
the country* : T h i s advice was; o a i r i e d out and a f t e r a few 
anxious days i t succeeded. ) The case i s p ^ t i b u l a r l i y : . 
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i n t e r e s t i n g , though, because P e e l here enunciated i n miniature 
the d o c t r i n e on which the l a t e r " b e t r a y a l s " of h i s p a r t y were 
baaedi To a v e r t c a l a m i t y we must d i s r e g a r d ordinary p r l n d t p l e s 
o f a c t i o n * 
I n November, 18£4, P e e l requested an account o£ the; 
a g r i c u l t u r a l and i n d u s t r i a l s t a t e of the country. Goulburn 
contended t h a t i t was '''net easy to reduce t h i s to any d i s t i n c t 
form, w but a month l a t e r s u p p l i e d t h i s -tiiiUBual economic r e p o r t j 
The best i n d i c a t i o n of the improved s t a t e of agr i c u l t u r e . was the 
promptness w i t h which r e n t s were paid. ftor wag th e r e any 
longer d i f f i c u l t y i n l e t t i n g farms. There was a notable 
deer ease i n unemployment (b,ut no s t a t i s t i c s irce g i v e n ) . 
The cotton maiiuf.aoture was. expanding s u r p r i s i n g l y ^ &V& cotton 
exports had almost been doubled w i t h i n a year.(i 5§) : 
The u n i f i c a t i o n o f E n g l i s h currency i n 1826 l e d /.. 
" to some f i n a n c i a l and commercial d i f f i c u l t ioa:.. 'v^G^p^b^rji•:"... • 
r e p o r t e d t h a t the P u b l i n manufacturers, had ho employiaent except 
what waa provided by charity.:- iiaziy. w o r k ^ r a r i ^ d ^ as. 
- much • payment, i n ' t h e new; B r i t i s h , , e4 'fy*tihk\ojQ:';V$j&- ctiir^enoy, -
and aa the e ^ l o y e r s had "very p r o p e r l y * r e s i s t e d t h i s demand^ 
a, g e n e r a l " t u r n o u t * ^ 7 ^ .bf*' t^jffur^ifa'- had "ensusoY. » t the 
s t r e e t s were f i l l e d w i t h i d l e menV knd typhus was spreading. 
• The Government was doing, ..its utmost, to. check diabase, .«inae. 
i t considered t h a t the unemployed were to. b 6 . p i t i e d , but not 
thoae who r e f u s e d employment o f f e r e d to them f. I t waa t r y i n g to. 
encourage c h a r i t y . for the former, and to r e p r e s s the ^.fttter* 
— ess. 
It is striking to note that again no direct re l ie f measures 
were undertaken "by the Government, although Goulburn noted that 
the primary difficulty was lack of money, sinoe a l l resoureea 
had been d r a i n e d / 1 5 8 * 
The end of Goulburn^ association with Ireland was brought 
about by the end of the Liverpool administration* On » 
17th February, lQZ7t Lord Liverpool was seized by an apoplectic 
f i t at breakfast as a result of which he died some dayja^later. 
By the middle of April the reshuffling of groups had made i t 
clear that Canning would head the new administration, and on 
14th April, Goulbum intimated to Lord Weilesley his intention 
to resign* He explained that he "thought it inconsistent with 
(his) charaoter to take a^ iy sh|rey in the 'administration," beoauqe 
the newly formed Government a&uld vit^Lly : a&fefot the Eoaan 
Catholic question, sines Canning was at its head* Thug he 
would resign as soon: as a su<*ee&sor had Veen fffttni for alnri 
though he would of course support the new Government, which 
contained many of his> &i§nftd« ^ ^ i^^Eaw'e^r ,- had also 
r e s i g n e d / 1 5 ^ 
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(f) Chancellor of the Exchequer 
1828-50. 
In the succeeding months the death of Canning, following 
so quickly on that of Liverpool, played havoc with the 
stability of the British Government. Goulburn, like Peel, 
remained outside both of the pro-Catholic administrations, 
and very l i t t l e ia known of his activities during that period, 
especially as most of it coincided with the parliamentary 
reeess. When, however, the Duke of Wellington was called upon 
to replace Goderich as head of the administration, the way to 
* 
the resumption of ministerial office was no longer barred to 
him by conscientious soruples. That Goulburn did not merely 
resume a post under the Crown, but was promoted, was dud in 
part at least to the influence wielded by Peel, who expressed; 
his view in a memorandum to the Duke: "Mr. Goulburn has in my 
(160) 
opinion a fu l l claim for efficient Cabinet Off ice . 9 
Thus he obtained the post of Chancellor of the Exchequer in 
accordance with, the custom of the time, by which a Commoner 
was giVfen this office when' the First Lord of the Treasury sat 
in the ^ouse; of Lords,, while the two offices were held by the 
same person i f the First Lord was a member of the Lower House 
himself* • 
Before we proceed to an examination of Goulburn's work as 
chief financial minister^ i t w i l l be convenient to deal with 
the religious question which reached its oilmax, while he was 
a member of the Cabinet. It must be remembered that he 4o3-n@& 
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the Cabinet, "because i t had. set its face against recognition 
of the Catholic claims. On the other hand, his failure to 
suppress the Catholic Association, while in charge of Irish 
affairs, forced him to become instrumental in granting these 
claims. 
Catholic rel ief had been left an open question in the 
Liverpool administration. Cabinet colleagues a poke and 
voted on opposite sides when the topic was under discussion in 
parliament. Sir F . Burdett's Catholic Relief B i l l of 1825, 
was a measure which had; been Very efficiently prepared and 
canvassed by O'Connell himself (who claimed that he would 
submit to the suppression of the Catholic Association, i f the 
b i l l passed)^ 1 6 1^ and gave Goulburn the opportunity to state 
his opinion in detail. The B i l l , he contended, was incompatible 
with the British Constitution, which was tte(l up with the Church 
Establishment• That the B i l l was dangerous was self-evident, 
for else there would have been no need tp include safeguarding 
clauses, To pay the Roman Catholic Clergy would be tantamount 1 
to making the Irish Catholic Church the Church of Ireland, 
The B i l l might even endanger the Protestant succession, i f the 
Royal Family became extinct. The imposition of an oath that 
they would not work for the subversion of the Established 
Protestant Church would be inadequate unless taken by a l l 
Catholic clergy. The oath required of those, who partook in 
the government of the realm in parliament,' stated that they 
recognised no ecclesiastical or spiritual power exercised by 
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the Pope as valid in Britain* Surely that ought to exclude 
Roman Catholics from parliamentary plaoes automatioally. 
These and other arguments notwithstanding, the third reading 
passed the Commons by 848 votes to 227, and only the Duke of 
York's impassioned speeoh in the House of Lords defeated the 
Catholics'almost oertain hopes« 
There is no reason to suppose that Goulburn would have 
recanted any of these opinions in 1829, when he oast his vote 
in the other lobby. In Mayt 1828he s t i l l voted against 
emancipation/ 1 6 3 ^ and his f i r s t public defence of his 
conversion was outstanding only by his lack of enthusiasm for 
his new faith. Uhile petitions against the Beman Catholic 
claims were being presented he indicated his agreement with the 
petitioners' fears that many dangers might result from concessions, 
but added that he had reached the conviction that even greater 
dangers would result from resistanee to the claims. ^ l s ^ ! 
During the second reading debate he found a l i t t l e more warmth 
for his Government's measure, but characteristically began by 
saying that he appreciated the honesty of the convictions of 
the B i l l ' s opponents, though he believed them to be mistaken* 
He reiterated that a bhoioe had to be made between two evils , 
and that in his opinion the greater evil lay 1& a continued 
division of both Government and Parliament by Eoman-Catholie 
agitation. He hoped that the removal of the grievances which 
had formed the basis-of that agitation would open the way for 
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the re-establishment of Roman Catholic-Protestant co-operation, 
especially in Ireland.f 1 6 5 ^ it is important to realise, how 
much this public recantation must havecost G^ulhurn. in 
common with many other Tories he had regarded the question of 
the iProtiestanta'' assendency as the ma^r polit ical issue sinoe 
the beginning of his public l i f e . 1 '^ \ t must have appeared to 
him as though he had decided tq pull down with h^ f own hands 
the structure which he had staunphly defended for so long* 
Onbe the Catholic question had been settled, parliamentary 
reform moved into i t s plaee as the main polit ical watershed, 
bttt^  ^though Goulburn remained convinced until the eat of his 
l i f e that t>^; Reform' Bill had been a calamity, his duties as 
Chancellor of the ^che^uer did. .Rpt place him, except by 
Booiden't, in the forefront of this polit ical struggle. It . 
must also be noted' that, since Peel, had returned to the Some 
Office, jthe of f ic ia l connection between the two men was. less 
strong than Vat any o ther t ime at which bo th. of t^ em held • : 
Cabinet rank. Apart frem the, ooeaisionai parliamentary 
, aaoistance afforded by'-|^ .Ql.> aQ. fieade»vOf -the. Souse, there -was 
very little nete&i f bi» • ddnaultatlon between them*' and the 3?eel-
Goulfcurn correspondence ,.shdws that in fact hardly any Such 
• consultation did t ake;place Jon matters Of ina^ or financial : 
policy. J5or» on th$ ; othei? hrnxd," ia : there einy indication that 
the First Lord of the Treasury exercised a dominating or very 
considerable influence in that f ie ld . Utile, the t)uke of 
iveliington'a eorrespondenee with Goulburn suffices to s>o,w how 
,8.7. 
un^uatr is> the• popular a^OQfflQntvuhioh attriM^ea^hl^-^attainment 
of high polit ical offi'oe merely to his success-aa a oold'iei?;' 
i t is quite evident that ^despite^ hi& clear gr&ap oS-intricate 
financial, problems, he was not the"prime mover df the Government's 
budgetary or other f Inonoial po 11 c y . J 1 6 7 ^ * • 2hus Ck>ulburh*a 
work at the Exchequer during the three ydars from 1828-30 was 
probably<more independent and freer of outside influences than 
at any .other point-of his career. • Finally,- i t Is Well-to- :' 
bear in-mind .that, ^ financial 'disacreome'nta between nuskisson - : 
and Berries had led to the break .up of the Goder ioh aduinistra-
t4umy-;bjttfc ithatjtHfiyiC'didi^ not .se&aA i-h the :hew ;-Gov-3r:n^ en1i$ 
altfcoagft:..it(t.inolttdie4-.*l)ath'»£,,tlie3©r.as.»ffltHtatf.ers*'^8^«« • 
,: j.£arOnet of vvthe f^ i r s t -.aotionra oo£ -the new Chancellor, of the> -
exchequer; , the .^e11 ins >up r of -x® %Eouse • ofCommons? cbmmittde,; 
underi the .Chairmanship of v5ir-iBi.;BarrLell^ ^o ;lncjuire into1 oia 
national:.f in<moe..x. ' Shia motionf2iad been foreshadowed in^the 
£iM^rSp£SQ^ critical'Hume, 
who>:had demanded twelve .separate: committees fo'AM'oub^eci; of 
go: -many' ramifications,. ..by...';assuriixg him«'that Ifi'-'Otf^'a^i^aBib1^1--'« 
s a ^ r a t e j ^ ^ rnetfeaaaryv i t would be -appointed 
after; ;the ,inyeQti^lQnSj^fv;the^ ^ I n : committee 'had; •."begun. x^y"' * 
lt: ;,7as"v.apparently the deliberat ions o^ - thatIciommittee chichio 
delayed the Imagers tatsfltent.^ 'dateMDf :"' 
11th. iJFuly.;.;. . . . t 0:: .,\v:U;. .-. '••>... \ v-: ->••., 
The. budget -,C hows:ver,; vvao >of ioaorei: than- or dinary^ itit erest, 
for; it ; sounded the. death knell-, of the -<ylcious; i)Olioy;c ,by-.which 
such religious deference was paid to the Sinking Fund, that in 
order to keep this instrument for the reduction of the'national 
Debt intact, new debts were incurred by raising loans* 
Introducing the Budget Debate, Goulburn explained that for 
the financial year 1827 an expenditure of nearly £03 million 
had been incurred, of which, i t is interesting to note, £31 
million, were accounted for by interest payments and pensions.^ 1' 0 
Subtracting thie: sum from the total net revenue a surplus of 
a l i t t l e more than £1-^ million was le f t . For the coming year 
he anticipated' a rise by at least £800,000 in the revenue, for 
although it could not be expected that corn imports, and thus 
corn duties; .would be -'&s high in the previous year, an i^mproved 
sugar crop would raise the receipts from the sugar, rum and. 
brandy duties. Similarly the revenue derived from the Excise 
would be improved by.higher yields on malt, hops and beer on 
account of the good harvest.' The supply estimates for the 
public services had been considerably reduced so that an 
expenditure of £51. million, a^ reflehue of £64 million, and a 
surplus of £3 million could be expected for the following year. 
That, however, would be £2 million short of the sum which 
existing lasvs required to be applied to the reduction of the 
national Debt* Thajfc left him with these alternatives* He 
could seek to raise new taxation, which, however, he did not 
consider warrantable. Or he could raise new loans to meet 
the Sinking Fund deficiency, a oourse of action, which he 
dismissed as illusory. He had, (therefore, determined on 
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amending legislation, under the terms of which only the real 
• (171) 
surplus would he applied to the reduction of the national Beit. 
He effacted this determination by an immediate^ hut 
temporary Aot4 which after a year's experience was replaced "by 
a permanent and slightly more complicated measure. Ihe f i r s t 
of these, merely: statedthat the Rational Debtwasto be 
reduced by 3 instead, of five million pounds in the next year. 
lJ?he second measure instructed the Treasury to transmit a fourth 
of the annual surplus to tha Commissioners for the Reduction of 
the national Debt each quarter. The Commissioners were 
empowered to purchase Exchequer B i l l s , and a l l stock thus 
purchased was to be deemed cancelled and interest on i t was 
to cease. 
She change in the Sinking Fund Polioy was generally 
welcomed, by;bothGovernment supporters and Opposition. This 
welcome is made particularly clear by two facts: even Hume 
joined in i t - though with, some qualifications. • and Berries 
found it necessary to point out to the House that this proposal 
had originally been made by a Government and not an Opposition 
member of the Finance Committee. Unfortunately, he did not 
mention his name. Finality, the committee's chairman, 
Sir H. Parnell, summed up, somewhat in contradiction to 
Go ulb urn's assurance that the Government would continue its 
strenuous efforts to reduce the /National Debt'. ; "Bfe suggested 
that the reason for the Committee's advice had been that 
reduced taxation, especially inspfjgp as it was hampering 
, 9o.° 
industry, would be o^  'gre^fer'UdVant^Q tb'^ 'thW'Gauntry's 
finances than a Sinking Fund,1 foa* i t X/ouid ;e6ntri'bute"to 
raising'-the level of p r o s p e r i t y 1 7 3 ^ ' " : " • • 
rf such had indeed been the lino of thougi^ ot a l l the 
^domniitee'menhei?s - 'which may1 well::ise doubted - they must have 
h e ^ aisappointed', for in neither "the l£28 nor the :i829 
hudgei did '^ulhtif n 'p^opbae^^n^ro'duetllbns of tasaitibn* 
Instead he was'ahle to onn6^ce<'witH ibtae pride, when opening 
the 'buaget debate on 8th'~ilayy-l&a^ du*plus/bf £5^85d^bb0, '"' 
whichuwas the "biggest since 1822* On the other hahd^^he-
could"noii""repeal therassertion of the'p^eobding1year•itha^-;r 
" there was "general' and ikcreasing1:gr^!^per''i!By'; ':'fb& :-a>'fc&a,:jiiarVest 
and" a' part i a l e'edndmib" a^pivbss£on were'" basting' some" shadows on 
the'prbspectb for ; 1829V 'Uhile lie war anxious that - tiiese;' : 
' ohoaid noV e : s , Ms«iS' ma|jni£ted ,fAW admitfcsd-;tli&t • the^  v ' ; ^ ' : - -
''"fiibvl^a^le* ij&p'r essibn'' f biloMng^ii'* & peribfc" of ; ^ rfea^1 l c i 
'prosperity"'TO G ust bias and the 
SxVise " notiiec^ilS.' :? ^ suiiiing;J ihWf6i*e;, ^ ^xponiitiire" of. 
£51§ 'nillienV' he 1)u"d^ eted for" a' ^ o'dubed" o u r p ^ of ^ i a i l l i o n 
in 1830• Chip das" immediately at t ackad "of ilunie. v! The . 
depression, "nV eonfcenllea^ ''was'"' n^finej^ teMp'b^ar^ %oi»^ ^ e^vi^D'^e» 
I f the Chancellor'^ri^fred ;intbv ;oa^fee'^V''v^i:ij6^:# *£kid> toiat 
i-b was occasioned by''%bd''h'etavV itra^ tt"i"6n \&i'"$fc f^ts/' b^vbfciifeient 
waa doing nothing -tKf r^ au%e:.*?'' "TSe 'uaa Buiipbrtbd5 by? tfaithato 
'who descr ibed" l ihe"^ %oia' iiiie; pocket's3 of ftlie ; ; ' I; 
people," and instead demanded more protective duties for. 
industries,:^ 1 7 4 1 ^  a'proposal which ia paradoxical on3$ to 
appearance, since most revenue was derived from Customs and 
Excise duties on foodstuffs pr raw materials* Hume was always 
fiery in speech, and oft'eii' uronghead.ed, hut in this inatonoe it 
is diff icult not to feel sympathy with much of what ha and his 
colleague aaid. He was certainly right in saying that the 
depression was not going to he ahortlived. It deepened 
throughout the year into, the conditions provoking the labourers1 
revolt of 1830, By February.1830 distress was the subject of 
an amendment to the Address.^ 1 7 5^ la the long term interest 
i t was undoubtedly important to proceed energetically with the 
reduction of the national Debt, but i t seems probable that a 
diversion of at least part of the surplus of almost iaillion 
from this purpose could have done much to mitigate the hardship, 
experienced by those 'worst hit toy': the; depression, i f applied to 
tHe removal of aome indirect taxes* though a policy of 
government investment w&s,, of course^ outside .the notions of 
early 19th century economics,, i t is interesting to; speculate 
to what .ext ent the use; of the {'avallabile; 'surplus for such a 
purpose would have rl^ed^he =-e;dtmtpy',of;'d^ presst6n; qdfttageth©*.-
It is certain that many individual Ilembers of Parliament 
wore not satisfied. Slaney pressed for an inquiry Inte 
the' restrictions on the' manufacture of malt and beej?, 
especially those ocoaaioned by high taxation, and their effects 
on the middle and lower olaos'ea. Goulbum evaded the attack by 
suggesting that the decreasing consumption of malt , per head 
was not the result of the duties levied on i t , hut of growing 
preference for other drinks such as coffee and tea (the latter 
, . (176) 
having become the customary drink insome factories even!) 
Similar attacks were launched,against the sugar and tobacco 
duties, but also proved abortive. In the new year Hume 
changed his tactics slightly. He moved for the reduction of 
the public establishment, so as to make possible the reduction 
of taxation, though Goulburn stigmatised the attempt to 
tamper with the Civ i l List as dishonourable, explained that 
the highest Government expenditure was the payment of interest, 
sN-ute&r 
and maintained that h&ghoort economy was already being exercised 
by departments, he rose four days later to announce reductions 
in the. c i v i l and military estimates amounting to more than 
£1 million. ; How far this, was due to publie pressure is 
diff icult -to gauge in the absence of private correspondence on 
the subject. , It is quite clear that such extensile euts i s 
the estimatef.eould not possibly have been ^de within four days. 
On the othen hand, notice of Hume's motion must^ have been given 
some time previously, and this fairly obvious line of attaok 
would* under the duress of the worsening economic conditions, 
have been undoubtedly anticipated by the Government* 3Jhat i t 
was responsive, even i f slowly, to parliamentary pressure -is 
made clear by the fact that a few days' later Goulburn, in reply 
to a petition for the repeal of the malt tax, stated that he was 
inquiring into the possibility of altering the lieensing system 
• 93. • 
so as to allow the free sale of beer without endangering the 
morals of the people.^1 7 8^ In fact he was somewhat belatedly 
acceding to Slaney's motion of the previous year. 
Special historical interest attaches to the 1830 budget, 
because as a "crisis^ budget it i s bound to bring Goulburn's 
economic doctrines into rel ief more clearly than its two 
precursors, which were presented while conditions were more 
normal. In opening his statement he admitted that his hopes 
of the preceding year' that' the depression would prove temporary 
had been disappointed. The level of the anticipated revenue 
had not been reached, since the bad harvest had, affected, e.g. t 
the malt and beer duties, though unexpected increases in 
Customs receipts and the skle ofthe City-Ca>al. for £120,000 
had reduced the defalcation i n the* expected. 'surplus so that i t 
had been possible to make a real reduction of the National 
Debt by nearly £3^ milliem* Moreover, he had secured ' thfe,;... 
conversion of a Similar Sum of permanentannuities into l i f^ 
annuities, which would belief i t the Country within the n e x$ 30 
years* . An accurate forecast for the coming year was very 
diff icult to make in the unsettled state of the country. 
Those in distress had clamoured for tax-reliefs for themselves 
and for a property-tax, but, he declared amid cheeks, the lower 
orders would not be helped by the imposition of heavier tax^s 
on their opulent employers. Thus after careful consideration 
the Government had decided against such taxation and intended, 
Instead, to reduce those taxes which pressed most heavily on tfte 
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poor, but the reduction Of which would least affect the; revenue. 
Thug, sine© beer had become almost a luxury for the poor, the 
beer duty was to be abolished, and since the monopolistic reta i l 
system had further raised ita price, the sale of beer was to 
become- free. The malt tox t however, was to remain- Theae 
changes^  together with the remission of the cider tax. were to 
take effect from loth iletobsr, while the leather tax and 
restrictions on its'modes, of manufacture were to disappear 
as from Sth July. This would bring a total :&KK rel ief of 
£3^ million, with additional benefits to be derived from the 
ending of restrictionsf Such, however*, ware the mtm^tiSLimits 
to which : i t was possible •t,p..-'gg. •Elf«n' SO, in <?rder' to budget 
for a reduced surplus of £3 million in 1831,. i t would be 
• neosss^yjtQ/r^ 
low enough to i«$Te^:.Qfi^ 
corruption of morals «.\7hiie the pro3eoted .consolidation of 
the stamp laws Hio«ild ;aisb.' i a £ ^ Stamp-duties. As 
regarded.the rest of the rctenuej bad internal production would 
mean, a f a l l in S&ois.e to'higher imports, : 
inersaaed,G^ .to effect. economies in 
C^endlfedre he would^ in-'^tureV'fr^ir^- a l l ;Givii"Srv^nts to 
pay money into a superannuation fund, and he intends^ id 
reduee the interest on. part of the Mtional IJebt from 4 ^ 3-£$. 
It ia quito clear that insofar''as this budget was intended 
to Give real rel ief to the distressed., i t muat have been largely 
itto^brative. indeed the cynic might observe that the only 
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way out of misery which it provided for them was the time-
honoured one of getting "dead-drunk for twopence." Goulburn 
must have been unaware of, or unwilling to operate, the ways, 
by which national financial policy can he used to .promote 
greater industrial activity. It might he suggested that this 
budget, was intended to he the beginning of a cheap money policy, 
which, would decrease the risks of industrial entrepreneurs 
and thus create more employment. Any such suggestion must f a l l 
to the ground, when we consider Goulburn's more detailed state-
ment on the conversion of 4$ annuities to &j$ stock. Far from 
regarding himself as giving a lead, he justified the measure, 
because in the general money market mortgagee had already 
displayed the tendency* of dropping from four to The new 
rate of interest was to be guaranteed for 10 years, the old 
guarantee having expired in 1829. Thus any idea of a 
progressive "cheapening of'money" eannot have been under 
consideration. Indeed he declared, the only object of the 
/ TO 
transfer to be the easing of the burden on the national Debt. 
This emphasises the main charge that can be levelled.against 
this budget* I t was fatally preoccupied with long-term 
interests, so as well-nighs to exclude the immediate and more 
pressing needs. 
On the other hand it must be conceded that i f Goulburn 
was not ahead of his time, the spontaneous criticism which his 
budget ppeeoh provoked shows that few members of the Commons 
were more enlightened. Baring set the tone in a speech, which 
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in. view of his later conduct when associated with the Exeheque: 
makes rather ironical reading. The Chancellor's surplus 
rested on flimsy hopes, not concrete facts, and he was thus 
light-heartedly frittering away the Sinking Fund. Thereafter 
the discussion largely centred on the surplus and other 
teohnioal aspects of the budget, while the plight of the poor 
was forgotten. During the next few days specific taxes were 
attacked, hut usually by interested^?Mnbe5S» Lord Chandos 
pleaded for the remission of duties on West-Indies produce. 
It is to the credit of Ooulburb's political integrity that, 
although his own fortunes shared in the general ruin of West-
Indian property, he regretfully;: refused to accede to this plea 
Sir J . lewport inquired about the-chances of Ir i sh grown 
tobacco to escape taxes; Only Ifeulett Thompson in a motion 
on *injudle idue taxation" prepared a comprehensive indietaent 
of financial policy. The length of his introductory speech, 
which covers 39 columns in the closely printed Hansard of the 
1820s, was, however, one reason why he failed to attract 
+ (1811 support. 
The only other major measure for which Goulburn was 
responsible during his f i rs t tenure of the Chancellorship was 
the implementation of the 1826 Act forbidding the issue of 
banknotes of a value of less than £5 in England, This had 
been passed as an attempt to deal with the dangers arising 
from the imperfect knowledge of the banking system which 
resulted in frequent bankruptcies in the 1820s. The pros and 
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eons of this Act, which was due to become operative on 
5th April , 1829, need not concern us here. It is important, 
however, to note that the law did not apply to Scotland or 
Ireland. I f , then, the circulation of small bank-notes was 
an ev i l , i t would be necessary to prevent the circulation of 
Irish and Scottish notes for the evil to be remedied* To that 
end Goulburn introduced a b i l l on 3rd June, 1828. He explained 
that the change-over contemplated by the 1826 Act would run 
very smoothly. The only date for which exact information on 
small bank notes was available was January, 1826. The notes 
then in circulation had amounted to £6,200,000* Of these, i t 
was reasonable to suppose that ordinary wear and tear, 
bankruptcies and the new law would have induced the withdrawal 
of a stt'ffie ient number to require replacement by no la>ger sum 
than £2^ 4QQ,OQ0# Such a sum in gold was available, and sinee 
existing ©agilsh notes would remain valid until withdrawn, there 
w as no need:what ever for Irish or Scottish notes to tide over 
the transitional period* in fact, Greshaifl?s law made i t clear 
that paper l&oney woulddrive put gold, i f the two were circulated 
concurrently. Oppoait^n tie.. t^is«jfleasurq was mainly national-
ist le in character. It was led by Sir J . Graham, who contended 
forcefully that the 1826 .committee had found that.Scottish notes 
did. not displace English metallic money, that the hew law would 
cause considerable hardship in ;bor^er distriots* where most 
business was transacted in Soottish nojfces;, 'and that the trouble 
with English notes was noit that th,ey were' notes, but that they 
raere bakedon the unsound English banking system, which stood, 
i n great oont?ijiat %p the very sound Scottish system-
Hev-ertheleaa* leave to I n t r o d u c e t h e b i l l waa, grafted ky 1M 
notes to <M>« i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t , hewaver, c f the aoafusion of 
thought, which existed on currency ^ueetioas at the^ time^ that 
some M.Ps. attributed the. 1830 degression to the w'ithdr^\&al of 
small bajj^notes from oirou^aMonl.4^®i 
One or two s i d e l i g h t s :o£ varying nature, *but' of considerable 
in t e r e s t * a?^ ^oovered while studying Go alburn •a, a^ia4&tration 
of the Ssohecitier, For inatance, Peel wrote, to him that he had 
been informed by: a Dr . d o ^ 
Advocate of' 36etlahd that 1<2 murders had jb&kei&ip&agp>.iwithin 
$''BK>aih;i3-'a^ i?eei added 
•t;h^t ,h^-;l|adV,a|^e^dy• requested vCust<>m; House Offioeya to .permi* • 
the ixajio^t o£ dead bodies from I^anee for piirpeaoa. ,ef ftia^dlsion 
' . ^ i ^ h p u t f ^ j j ^ ^ ^ ; - B e 4a3cea ^ u i b u r i i to addreaia;vfcb^..l . 
; Custom nofcaea .; o|;^^^y{gnd> and-, Irelani: i n ainiilar |.erraa.'Btor, 
'he. ar^Qdy though thio waa- o o ^ l v i n ^ a , atatulipry offenc*^ •' 
that ima p r ^ r a b l e to giying r i a e te murd&rv . ireed^eaa. to 
add t h e ^ - i e t t ^ 
B u r i a l o$e^ ^  unaaceea'aful attempts. ^ 
C i v i l Service .pens iona scheme contributory again, Soulburn 
fcave 3ooe; alarming figures about the boat of the: non-effective 
charge on the public se r v i c e s . While, aalories. qtaotuAted to 
£S1 million, pensions eoat £5^ mUliph pi>a.^^ G \ I t i a 
inter eating to compare these, f igurea with tliosef condemned aa 
9$. 
excessive by a Soyal Commission on the O i y i l Service 60 years 
i&tor: The annual money value of the non-ef f Qc,t ive charge was 
then a l i t t l e l e s s than £2 m i l l i o n * * 1 8 6 * 0 I t ia some indication 
of the extent, to which sinecures etc. uere a t i l l part of 
B r i t i s h national expenditure at the e a r l i e r date. The only 
reason why t h i s very u s e f u l ! b i l l did not beoome las? was that 
i t had been introduced, too l a t e during the session to make 
possible i 4 a parage t*P9&gk.parliament, ^  
She distress, of ;183Q stimulated a l l manner of ingenious 
ideas designed to help the poor. 0ne of the most interesting 
of these, tias ipropouh&ed. ;by Sianey i n the House Q£ Commons • 
He suggested a state sponsored insurance acheES& by which viorkers 
could make protip^on; ^ a i n f t . ^^ayqVLrable fluctuations i n trade. . 
Goulburn did not think such a scheme possible, and by h i a 
r e f u s a l deprived himself t>f the • lasting"'. fame <>f having been • 
the precursor of Lloyd George and Sever i d g e ^ T 1 8 8 ^ 
• • Distress, wis. only one cause of in0rease&>political tension. 
The l^enoh revolution which displaced Charle3 £ r and the i l l n e s s 
and death of George iVy necessitating a gerieral election^ were 
edually important eontr ibutory factors. I t .was'. qiiit e. clear 
ihat. these e^aira :raoi&&;<vi^ 
Seform. . 58hig put nei* heart into the parliamentary 
opposition. Gounburn on 11th H&y w?ote( to had 
tip leave London, on family buoinesaj that the . Sottas had sat 
t i l l three i n th> morning and oMy got fekpii^.''seifeaunimportant 
vote3 i : because th^;-\/h'igs wished to delay a l l business to•" show. 
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t h e i r strength, and to gain popularity. Some clays l a t e r he 
complained, -chat 'Peel's absence and the King's i l l n e s s were 
almost f a t a l to the conduct of business. I f more withdrawals 
{190 were forced on the Government he would prefer i t s resignation. 
I t was i n t h i s way that finance suddenly came into the fore-
front of p o l i t i c s , not because of i t s i n t r i n s i c importance, 
but because i t was a convenient testing ground for p o l i t i c a l 
strength. 
I t was well-known that the General E l e c t i o n had 
strengthened the Reformers' camp, but the exact position 
could not be known u n t i l f u l l d i v i s i o n on party-lines had taken 
place. 2he opportunity for t h i s was provided by the necessity 
of granting the new King the C i v i l L i s t . The King's Speech had 
forecast minor changes in t h i s f i e l d j n I place without reserve 
at your disposal my interest i n the Hereditary Revenues, and 
i n those funds which may be derived from any Droits of the Crown 
or Admiralty, from the "Jest-India Duties, or from any casual 
revenues..... In surrendering to you my interest in revenues 
which have i n former settlements of the C i v i l L i s t been reserved 
to the Crown, I r e j o i c e i n the opportunity of evincing my entire 
re l i a n c e on your d u t i f u l attachment, and my confidence that you 
w i l l cheerfully provide a l l that may be necessary f or the 
support of the C i v i l Government, and the honour and dignity of 
(191) 
my Crown.1* I f such indeed had been the King's expectations, 
they were soon to be disappointed, 
Goulburn, i n introducing the C i v i l L i s t , explained that 
l o i 
for the f i r s t time in history daring the whole of the l a s t reign 
no debt'.had been incurred on t h i s account. The new King's 
willingness to surrender' the casual revenues of the Crown i n , 
addition to the hereditary ones would save a further £85,000. 
The c r i t i c s , however, were not to be appeased by such minor 
p a l l i a t i v e s . Led by Lord Althorp they demanded the separation 
of the charges incurred by the Monarch i n his private and 
public capacities. This concession was refused by Goulburn 
on the ground that the d i v i s i o n l i n e s were too blurred for 
such separation. When the House divided on th i s issue 
the Opposition mustered 233 votes against the Government's 
204, Wellington decided to resign without waiting foe 
further confirmation of the election r e s u l t s . 
Ho blame attaches to Goulburn's management of the C i v i l 
L i s t question. I t appears that he had to fight hard to, 
wring from Wellington these minor concessions even, Y/hen the 
Cabinet had s e t t l e d on i t a lineeof aetien, Wellington had an 
interview with the King as a r e s u l t of^  which th? Bake expressed 
himself as " r e a l l y anxious that the Cabinet should for the sake 
of the Eonarehy reconsider t h e i r proposal respecting the Droits 
of Admiralty and the Bscheated PropertyP ipparentiy the Xing 
f e l t that under the new arrangements there was no provision for 
unforeseen expenditure, such as journeys to Scotland, which, 
he feared, would i n future, require separate estimates. He also 
r a i s e d the question of whether i t was right to r e s t r i c t the 
King's power of eonferting favours^ which he was able to do 
because Badheat ed Property v/as ^ p e c u l i a r l y tho- 2?roporty of 
the Sovereign,"' 1 9 3* Oouiburn non the battle inside the 
Cabinet, but tie l o s t the battle ontaide, not because f e e l i n g 
ran High on the creation of the C i v i l ILiet* but because 
feeling ran high on.the queation of Par1lamentary Reform. 
is) In Opposition 1830 * 84* 
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"She Reform B i l l had "been mainly carried by the 
efforts of the various classes of Dissenters operating i n the 
general pressure of distress at the particular period and 
inflamed by the unparalleled exertions of the Whig Government. 
Having been long excluded from a l l participation i n power they 
were reokless as to the consequences of the measure, farther 
than as i t might tend to give them, i f not a perpetual, at least 
a very prolonged tenure of office. Indeed those among them the 
most active i n promoting the extreme measure which they submitted 
to Parliament did not hesitate to avow that the perpetual 
exclusion of the lories from Office was one of i t s main objects 
and advantages. Lord J. Russell was, i f not absolutely the 
author, at least the approver and propounder of the measure 
i n Parliament, and as tn$ leader of the tfhig Aristocracy carried 
with him the large; portion of thst .paifty. Whatever popularity 
he had i n the country rested on his oo-operation with the 
Disaenters and he was, aa many men i n p6|^io.al l i f s have been, 
ultimately the to o l of those whom he professed to lead, and 
obliged for the s^^ ef p r e s e r ^ to saorifioe 
muoh of principle at their bidding. He had not indeed muoh to 
surrender #e^*) I t must be quite olear t&at a man ;who could, 
many years after i t had been enaoted, write i n such terms of 
any parliamentary measure, must have aought to do whatever was 
i n his power to secure i t s defeat while i t was yet under 
oonsideration. 
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Such i n fact was his course of action from 1880 to 1832. 
Thus, for instance, on the seventh day of the debate on the 
Ministerial £lan for parliamentary reform he succeeded In 
oatohtng the Speaker's eye, and attacked the b i l l i n tejms, 
which were oharaoteristio of his p o l i t i o a l principles and his 
parliamentary tactics• He explained that he would not vote 
against the introduction of the h i l l so that f u l l disoussion 
would make the measure's pernicious principles more completely 
apparent. Speaking as member for Cambridge University - one 
of the most ln^eonre M 1^^ - he pointed out thfct opposition 
to th4 b i l l did noV only' oome from members repre sent ing rotten 
boroughs, thonga they had the/Obvious duty of defending their 
eonsiiiuentsl;:./ikier^tsa.'?;;;' :'$he ex'|a^i^'.'system was good, • and 
the prosperity of the country was patent proof of that* 
'•••d.9pres:3:io%l) yY She oh^ty guarantees that the promoted system 
wou^d better were l l l u a ^ j ' (^verxmient promisia. in ' 
i l i n s t r a ^ i o n of the defective system, whioh th& b i l l would set 
;  up* • was. that • the C^ own, though possessing' the'right • to • appoint •' 
:.-what:ministei*5,'.it ^ ohe^ e.^  we^^. los t a convenient method, Of 
. p l a e ^ .,'; Ag^iiig^on the . . 
17th day Of the .Cdmaitteo Stage of the f i r s t b i l l he opmplainea 
that the. b i l l was'being; rushed through} • 'Buring' the; f i n a l '•'. 
•Oommons^  debate on the Reform B i l l he warned that i t wevftd • 
afford the multitude a greater influence on aff a i r s than to .' 
ly other 'fihterest," and the,t i t would thus endanger tn<i 
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safety of the s t a t e . t 1 9 6 * 
Apart from these open and unavailing attacks Goulburn 
attempted to k i l l the ministerial measure by a more subtle 
method* He sent Peel a measure drawn up by a Mr. Hlldyard. 
This, he believed, might secure the support of many reformers, 
but at the same time be f a i r l y harmless. while he had at 
once informed l£r. Hildyard that he could not be a party to any 
sort of reform b i l l , he had promised him, i f Peel oonourred, 
an introduction to Lord Harrowby who might be more amenable.'197^ 
A second l e t t e r on the same subject concludes with the sentence: 
" I am daily more convinced that t h i s reform la not desired 
except by those who are to gain by i t . 1 ^ 1 9 8 * Apparently, he 
did not t r y to estimate the many who were, or expected to gain 
by i t i n comparison with the few who knew they would lose by i t . 
More probably, however, he would have dismissed any suoh 
numerical consideration as irrelevant* 
Finally, he seems to have t r i e d to embarrass the Government 
on as many other subjects as possible, i n the hope, perhaps, 
that i t might be forced to resign and that the cause of 
parliamentary reform would thus lose the advantage of i t s 
ministerial champions. This was a role for which he was not 
particularly well suited on account of his limited oratorical 
powers. Thus, when allowance i s made for these limitations, 
i t must be admitted that he used these tactics very s k i l f u l l y 
and with considerable success* He achieved this by concentrating 
on those subjects with which he was best acquainted and oould, 
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therefore, speak with some authority i n the House* I t was 
obvious, e.g. that he would attack the new C i v i l L i s t settlement 
and especially the departure from the old principle that the 
' C i v i l List and the C i v i l Government should be provided for from 
the same grant. He c r i t i c i s e d several provisions, 
either e x p l i c i t l y or i m p l i c i t l y , as attempts to reduce the 
prerogative of the Grown unduly* The Whigs, who before long 
were to need the King's assistance, obviously wanted to avoid 
the stigma of anything approaching republicanism, and when i n 
committee Goulburn moved that the proposed £10,000 grant to the 
(8 
' Crown for sudden emergencies be doubled, the Government gave way. 
fie scored a similar success when c r i t i c i s i n g the budget* True, 
hie warning that the projected surplus of £450,000 was inadequate 
to allow for a l l emergencies went unheeded. His oastigfctIon 
of the Government's proposal to tax the transfer of funds as a 
breach of faith,, on the other hand, secured i t s withdrawal within 
three d a y s * * 8 ^ paring th,e next" fi n a n c i a l debate he contrasted 
the small surplus of £493,000 with his own administration Of the 
Bxehequetf, where i n three years he had reduced the National Debt 
by £30 millioft, and tb$£ the interest ehargeable by almost 
£l£ m i l l i o n . ^ 8 0 ? ) W&en i t beoame clear that a de f i o l t had to 
be expected, because revenue was £1,200,000 leas than anticipated, 
he was provided with more ammunition* AS an opposition member 
he also f e l t freer to press the ease of the West-Indies f o r 
special consideration, e.g. when the Government proposed a 
committee to inquire into West-India distress, he demanded -
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unauaeesefully « that immediate action should toe taken! 
dismissing a oommittee as useless and undesirable beoauss i t v 
would create d e l a y . I 8 0 3 * 
Geulburn* & dieappointment at the passing of the Reform B i l l 
was commensurate with the tenacious e f f o r t s he had made to 
defeat i t . This i s made clear i n a l e t t e r to Peel who had 
asked him i f he would be prepared to accept nomination aa 
Speaker. Be replied that i f the old constitution of the 
country had remained that, po s i t ion wo uld have been most desirable 
to him, but that the change of: the constitution had ended a l l his 
p o l i t i c a l ambitions*; '. He> only remained i n public l i f e , because 
God had east his l o t there, and to avert the progres* of e v i l , 
- whioh oouid only be •doae by keeping. to^ethe* ft party opposed to • 
"the frant i o progress of the Government." Ehus^ it his 
candidature fo^ Jthe Sp^ei^rsi^ip-w^ t h i interest of •' 4 
that party #. he was w i l l i n g to stand. • I f not, he would support 
whoever advaneed that interest % o t . . This lot'tW:1 : • • 
incidentally def ined very well t i e task to whioh ;'(3ouih^Ji-. 
devo:%eiYej^ keep 
together a party. Ana how much t h i s task was needed! 
. , l t wee not i n Geulburn^s nat^e to be permahiently Respondent 
Within a month he sent a much more hopeful report from Cambridge 
aa: the result of his canvass: preceding the ; general Election. 
•The manifestations of support he had received, 3howed, '•that 
conservative principle hady gained, g^reat strength itx the eduoated 
Glasses of the community.»*2<*6) 
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In the following months he attended the House oonstalentiously, 
except when i l l , although his a c t i v i t i e s were not so p r o l i f i o as 
i n the two years before the passing of the Reform B i l l * He 
ooncentrated his attaok on the measures to reform the I r i s h 
Church. He objected to them as designed to diminish the 
influence of the Churoh of Ireland, for he believed that the 
salvation of Ireland depended on that Ohuroh, that her paoifioa-
1 t i o n could only be effected by the Protestant f a i t h . He 
singled out as "monstrous1* the provision to abolish a l l livings 
where ho services had been held for three years, since he 
contended that many o£ thejrf4were exiled by violence. Instead, 
• ^ :-SQ^eateft|.-^|b^'-ssf|eQl;&l:proTi#io& should be made fo r the 
restoration of a c t i v i t i e s m such parishes** 2 0 6* He also 
c r i t i c i s e d the measure for the abolition of slavery, not because 
he objected to the- emancipation of the. • n e g r o e s b u t beoause. 
tha minister's f a i l u r e to protect the colonial agricultural 
interest would r u i n colonial trade. During the recess 
he visit e d Ireland, where h£ considered the* new Chief Seoretary, 
L i t t l e t o n , to be l i t t l e more than a to o l of the Soman Catholic 
party, while he reported of his former chief who had just 
resumed the Lord-Lieutenancy that he found "Lord TCellesley's 
conversation almost purely conservative* 0^? 0^ 1834 gave 
Goulburn yet another budget to attack* He pointed out that 
ithe last three years had seen an increase of £600,000 i n the 
National Debt, while-common prudence dictated that i t should be 
reduced. Althorp had,, admitted that' trade was prosperous, but 
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had then proo©oded to reduce trading duties, instead of 
alleviating the harden on agriculture which was i n a more 
languishing condition.(3©9) 
Then the unexpected happened* D i f f i o u ^ i e a i n Ireland^, 
which had already caused the defection of some of the ablest 
Whig Ministers, led to the variouslx^tyl^d^e3ignation_or | 
dismissal of the Melbourne administration* Once again, after 
the short interlude of the Duke of Wellington's "personal re£gn, 
Goulburn was called to hold office under the Crown* 
l i e . 
(h) Home Seoretary. 1884-S* 
Peel's f i r s t government was i n a constitutional position, 
whioh appears to us now, and appeared to some people at the 
time, to he rather irregular* H i 8 plldweeaor had not he en 
defeated i n the House of Commons, nor had he appealed to the 
electorate before resigning. I t was well-known that Peel could 
not have commanded a parliamentary majority, and i t was 
exceedingly doubtful that new eleotions would result i n a more 
favourable composition of the Commons. Goulburn, however, 
was troubled by no scruples as to the unconstitutionality of 
hid office. In his speech against the Reform B i l l , which has 
been referred to i n the last chapter, he had made i t clear that 
he held that the King had the rig h t to appoint what ministers 
he chose. (Bejhad, therefore, merely exercised t h i s r i g h t i n 
replacing Melbourne by Peel* 
The po s s i b i l i t y of forming a Cabinet not including Goulburn 
was never considered* On the contrary he appears to have 
advised Peel on the composition of the Cabinet* He sent on 
l e t t e r s he had received, confirming his view "that the property 
of the country desires a conservative and net an u l t r a Tory 
Government - meaning by that a Government deaf to a l l 
improvement whioh comprises change, however much en other 
grounds to be desired* 0 He discussed the advantages and 
drawbacks of including Stanley, and stated that "general opinion" 
favoured a union with him both as an insurance against u l t r a 
I U . 
Toryism and in hia own r i g h t * * 2 * 0 * This i s inter set ing not 
only aa & forecast of the typa of policy the Government would 
• . ' . <o seek to pursue, hut also as indicative of the confidence whioh x 
Peel placed i n Goulburn. 
Thia impression of confidence and trust la corroborated 
by the Secretaryship whioh was allotted to him. Sinoe Peel was 
a member of the House of Commons he automatically aasumed both 
the offices of Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
The Home Secretary was the moat' important Cabinet minister at 
the time, y '.-Any. doubt abcfut that i % dispeiled, when we remember. 
t&ttt Wellington, Grey and Melbourne had chosen peel, Melbourne 
and Rusaell respedtimely to b^ their Home Secretaries. 
i n this particular instance, however, there i s further proof 
tOr.ia found • in'.the-3BB^3ckc^9 *r^-watas^W^^^ arwiia^ iEk^  • 
contentsy and from.' the ;.s,tepa made nsodsae^y by. the destruction •'. 
. 6f''/this 'Pattoe of We£tfcin^ er^  by f i r e ^ i ^ referred to ' a humber 
'' of ohangea tp ^ o h Parliament would be asked to give legal; 
• effect* '. • #i*h* one exception, these ohangea;WOu^ d i n one way 
or another have come under tha supervision, of the. Home department . 
highly controversial aiid i h $ ^ ^ suoh. as. "m^ ans of 
- " a f t E ^ l i ^ of'5 the i ^ i s h Titha • 
o^ eatio%',»' measures.... .to promote the commute^ ion Of t i t ha i n 
England and V/ales - to improve our c i v i l ^ u r i e ^ u ^ ^ the 
ad^iniatratioji.'of justice i n eOoieaiaatlo^ causes - to make 
provision for the mora ^f^feotuai maintenance of ajtetoaiaetioal' 
v . 
u s . 
discipline,, and to relieve those who dissent from the dootrines 
or discipline of the Churoh from the necessity of celebrating 
the oeremony of marriage according to i t s r i t e s . " Farther a 
commission had been appointed "for considering the state of the 
several dioceses In England and Wales, with reference to the 
amount of their revenues, and to the more equal distribution of 
episcopal duties** Finally, the report of the commission on 
Munioipal Corporations was awaited so that action could he taken 
on i t . ' 8 * 8 * • 
flor were these merely empty phrases of a Government that 
knew i t s e l f to be doomed and which was seeking to impress public 
opinion* That i s proved by correspondence which took plaoe 
prior to the end of the elections* While Goulburn was busy with 
his constituents at Cambridge, Peel wrote to him as follow*: 
n I am afraid Gregson w i l l decline. B9 seems to think such an 
appointment as his ( I mean of a lawyer capable of preparing and 
examining B i l l s for Parliament) indispensable for your comfort 
and satisfactory discharge of your duties.. .. I t is the real' fear 
of encountering such questions as Corporation Reform, Churoh 
Reform, Tithes etc. - I mean the consideration of details -
which w i l l lead Gregson to deoline your offer*" on the 
following day he wrote: "Pray speak to everyone you safely and 
confidentially can as to Dissenters' marriages and Church Reform, 
I mean as to the general principle of the l a t t e r , not Of course 
mentioning our interview at Lambeth." Goulburn replied that the 
only two f i e l d s of d i f f i o u l t y would be Church Rates and l i t h e 
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Commutation^ aAnything on other matters which we can get the 
Archbishop of Canterbury to agree to w i l l be gladly adopted."^ 2 1 3^ 
This la not the language and a c t i v i t y of an effete Government. 
They were f u l l y i n earnest with.each of their projected measures, 
and i f further proof of this were needed i t i s to be found i n 
the fact that the conversations with the Arehbishop of Canterbury 
oontinued. By 13th January, apart from the d i f f i c u l t y of f i x i n g 
a fee^ the Marriages B i l l was ready for submission to the Cabinet 
i n a l l details* 
I t was not from unwillingness on the Government's part that 
none of i t s main measures passed into law never had the 
chance to prove i t s e l f i n action. In Ireland the Chief 
Seoretary was replaced by Sir H. Hardinge, and Wellesley was 
spared the humiliating experienoe of having to correspond with 
his erstwhile subordinate by being requested to vacate his office 
to make possible the appointment of Lord Haddington as Lord 
Lieutenant* These changes were very neoesaary, -for i n the 
debate on the Address, both Busasll and Goulburn pointed to the 
I r i s h Church question as the watershed between Government and 
Opposition supporters* Goulburn taunted his predecessors i n 
office with their lack of unity on how to use the surplus revenue 
of the Churoh of Ireland. He gave the pledge that i f there was 
i n fact a surplus he would not agree to i t s use for any purpose 
other than ecclesiastical. He expected, however, that i f the 
I r i s h Churoh were to be plaoed on a proper footing there would 
rather be a defieienoy of funds* He was, however, unable 
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to promote auoh. a reorganisation of the Irish Oharph, or to 
superintend any of the changes that had been for ©oast In the 
King's Speech, for though the Peei administration struggled, 
bravely against a stronger opposition, i t had to surrender 








U) In Opposition. 1835 - 41. 
It was during this second period as a leading member of 
the opposition, that Goulburn began to concentrate on his 
work as a party organiser. Except in periods of high politioal 
tension, he no longer devoted the greatest part of his energies 
to public criticism of the Government in the House of Commons, 
but found a more suitable sphere of usefulness in organisation. 
His emphasis on this theme was not new. He had deplored the 
lack of cohesion among Government supporters during the last year 
of the Wellington administration. She oooasion for the complaint 
had been the success of a motion for Jewish emancipation by a 
narrow majority. At the time a number of ministers even left 
Just before the division, and a large number of members, who were 
usually hostile, voted with the Government. Goulbum pleaded, 
therefore, for greater exertions to secure attendance.^2*6^ 
This demand was frequently echoed in his later correspondence, 
but became particularly insistent after the Whigs had resumed 
office in 1835. One reason for this was undoubtedly the fact 
, that Peel hald himself rather aloof from the main stream of 
politics after the end of his "hundred days." 
While Peel was absent from London, Goulburn was active 
in keeping his friends together, and in many ways he appears to 
have been the main communicating link between them and their 
nominal leader. He was, however, aware that nothing he could 
do would have so stimulating an effect as the presence of Peel 
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himself. Accordingly he often pressed his colleague to travel 
to London. There was, e.g. some excitement as to the way in 
whioh the Government would deal with the Lords* amendments to 
the Corporation B i l l . Goulburn informed Peel that about 100 
of their friends were in town, and that they a l l wished for his 
presence at so cr i t i ca l a time.^"^ 
The task of organising the opposition was indeed a formidable 
one, not least because of the strain imposed upon unity by the 
new Conservative as distinct from the ultra Tory conception of 
polities. I t would have bean easy enough to lead a party to 
oppose the administration root and branch, but how exactly was 
the difference between a judicious and an injudicious reform to 
be discovered? A rough classification would place in the latter 
category a l l reforms tainted by radicalism, i . e . a tendenoy to 
enhance the powers of the Central Government, or dealing with 
the Established Church, unless the ecclesiastical authorities 
had expressly notified their approval, or threatening to change 
the constitutional rights of the Monarchy or the House of Lords. 
At f i r s t sight such a classification seems clear enough, but in 
practice the border-line oases outnumbered those which f e l l 
unquestionably into either one category or another. 
These diff icult ies were increased by two factors. F ir s t , 
for some unspecified reason, Peel was often anxious not to 
'commit himself even to his friends and supporters. One example 
of this is supplied by the following instance: Lyndhurst and 
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Wellington informed Goolbqrn of the amendments they intended to 
propose to the Corporation B i l l . Shey were identical with those 
proposed by the Conservatives in the Commons, except for an 
additional one seeking to ensure that l#pd or -£ of the existing 
governing body should form part of the new councils for whatever 
period of time they were entitled, to off iee under the old 
arrangements. This proposal appeared of doubtful wisdom to 
Goulbnra, and he wrote for Peel's advice, assuring him that he 
would ensure the Lords1 consideration of this advice without 
committing Peel by submitting i t as his own opinion.-W^. 
Another letter/ a fortnight later, again assures Peel expressly 
that his opinions w i l l not be assigned to their originator* 
She second factor was that there was some divergence between the 
views of the Opposition in the ^>per and Lcrwer Chamber^  chiefly 
beeause the ultra lory element was stronger amon^  the Lords* 
especially since Lyndhurst 'uas. nearly as Influential! as Wellington, 
Shis r l f t w£s admitted. - and deplored by Goulburn. Shortly 
before the opening of the ^ a r | i ^ e n t ^ sels^on .of 1836 he ' 
suggested the advisability of moving an a^ en^ menk to the Address* 
In that way their friends, who were eager to fight after the 
suooess of the Borthants election* would be given their chance, 
and also "they would bo able, as indeed they wished, to condemn 
the attacks made on the House of Lords at the end of the previous 
session* which might incidentally restore the cordiality of 
relations between the opposition parties in the Lorda and the 
Commons*(019) 
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These obstacles notwithstanding Goulburn continued his 
organisational work* After the 183? General Election ha sent 
an interesting analysis of the results to Peel* assuring him that 
(220) 
he had included a l l doubtful cases with Government supporters* 
The aggregate result showed that the Government had a majority 
of 34, but the analysis made clear that it depended on the 
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At other times he hardly ever hesitated to add his freeterum 
censeoff on party organisation whatever had formed the main subjeot 
of hie letter. These subjecta might be as diverse ae the 
historioal parallels to be drawn with the year a preceding the 
French Revolution, or the.iosa occasioned to the Exchequer by 
the intiwctuotlo& of the penny postage. The eminence yhtcb 
Goulburn attained in determining party strategy ia perhaps best 
appreciated, when we find that by the end of 1639 Peel'asked him 
whether or not an immediate attaofc on the Government should be 
l a w * * M « . of se,llwm*.(zm 
In the Hooae of Commons these 6 ysars are important in 
Gotilbui*n,e career. because they included his unsuccessful 
candidature for the ChAlr of the House. There can be no doubt 
• • ? 11%, 
.tih&fa#.toavM$i$!&.ftQGm8L'& Jealous guardian of the, traditions 
o f ;the Commons* The. Speakership wasy how ever a^ositimJiiueh 
mom polit ical in character than nowadays# and: the ^  candidatur e 
in itself;<must- have.been largely intended as s partisan t r i a l of 
strength. . .&bereromby»s rasignat ion, took plaeevonly. a .few; :;day s 
after: the i^Be&Gftainher/questio^^anCfc the: election of/cthe ; 
opposition's nominee, to the :Speake.rshlp; might have lea^ L to the 
renewal of the:x(^verhlnent 'CrAslS*!; ?.The; division, therefore, .was 
strictly, on^a^ty•-linos and Shaw^Lefevre was elected- by .317 i 
votes; to GtouiburRts . 8 9 9 . - ,-. -: . ,.../,...;/. ... 
• : ;^,su^ey :of hie parliamentary record. dur.ing^these iyear$ . 
ffhowa' .that hsrxtooJe^ parjb i n cmost, of<>the outstandingly controversial 
-debates.- ou: -fie. $»ath::ther©: regularly:., to oppose the ^measuresi .with 
i-regardi to the>Chur;ch -of --tolaia&^anA):.tji^CJiujBoJt^tgs ^ etQr^ tinja 
•iMglM** rHis arguments •<*: theJ-mportanoe of .;th0; Prot est ant 
.Churbh/to.the; welfare; iof: Ireland,-an* the-4anger *ouall other 
•property, once Church property: W.aer> touolieU^)^e^.rby^'Juiw^fejniliar 
ianft' netd '^mo^ <be?^ epe's;tett.tto ^-#trai£»; , Ete ;had .quite obviously to 
a t tacks i r a d l ^ like the, Registration!cb© Births.! B i l l , 
^sp?sciat|y.^9oaus«{Uh& vSameey danger ithatl i t Ijiiightitttisajooiateii nWlng 
from Mpt ismVand might thus iincline Pthe Ignorant vto omit baptism 
altogether* t 2 2 4 ) -i^ aky a^large^sxtent vthisi-wara "iias-proved" 
correo t *•• '•> He' ^ oineoy in the? iindic tment lof cthe .(.Government;, :when . 
the^suspe^siom of-the; ajajaaican ^ coiistitution^was;^ ...How 
far?*45ia^  ithe ; offence^, if-any;'of Jamaica. due.tto ^ the 'tJovernaent^s: 
•policy with- regard to' the W e s t ^ d i e s ? i ^ ^ ^ ^ b s administration 
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esoaped with a margin of five votes* Before i t s even narrower 
escape on the famous Education Estimates of 1839, Goulburn had 
voiced his suspicions that the failure of the Government to state 
the purposes for which i t intended to appropriate the supply 
aafced for, had sinister reasons. Might i t not seek to divorce 
education from religion, and, by doing this through the estimates, 
hope to evade the criticism which the clergy in the House of 
Lords would o f f e r ? ( 2 2 6 ) when Parliament debated the provision 
to be made for Prinoe Albert, he supported an amendment for 
reducing i t by £20,000. This was carried against the 
(227) 
Government. Then, of course, the budget debates always 
gave him the opportunity of crit icising the Government effectively, 
while no surplus was shown. In 1839 he moved unsuccessfully 
that the introduction of the penny postage should be postponed 
until there Was a surplus of revenue.^2 2 8^ In 1841 while 
welcoming the Governments intention to balance revenue and 
expenditure, he pointed out that the postal experiment had 
meant a loss of £1^ million, and that, though revenue in 1841 < 
was l j - million higher than in 1836, in the course of those five 
years an aggregate deficiency of £5 million had been incurred. 1 ' 
Of the minor debates in which he participated we need only 
note a few, which throw some light on his attitude to issues of 
his time with which he did not ordinarily oome prominently into 
contact. For instance, in the course of a debate about railway 
construction he gave a very sound warning that i t was undesirable 
to have too many companies, rivall ing each other. This would 
isi. 
lead to the lnve a tors * los $ of the i t money, and hence i t would 
(230) be far preferable tp, 9pno^tr^te.^on.^ .smaller number of lines 
He supported one Of Ashley s got ions on children itt factories* 
While adults were able to lopk after their own interests, 
children needed protective law^ to prevent their being overworked 
The main question was one ef enforcing the existing laws, e.g, 
the provision of education in factories, and the Government was 
blameworthy for the delay in taking action. C331) H Q opposed the 
Sunday opening of the public exhibitions as a desecration of the 
Sabbath. Be countered the argument that the provision pf 
serious amusements would lower the incidence of drunkenness on 
Sundayj by contending that statistlea showed that there was no 
oprreiatipn between .drunkenness and serious pleasures* 
Finally,, we may note, that on 23rd March, 1841, he epposed a 
private motion for a.property tax on the grounds that direct 
taxat ion would dislocate capital and thus cause much unemployment 
and other economic i l l s . How he must have wished a year later 
that he had never intervened in this debate! 
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( j ) Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
1841 - 6. 
On 4th June, 1841, Peel had carried a vote of no confidence 
in the Melbourne Government by a majority of one. A general 
election ensued. The accounts of the election proceedings in 
"The Times" make fascinating reading, i f only because of the 
strong resemblance which the contests in several oonstituenoes 
bore to the Eatansyille election recorded in the "Pickwick Papers," 
and because the journalistic standards and methods of "The Times" 
were, in the 1840s, not so very far removed from those employed 
by thectwo newspapers in that notable borough. In any case, 
they make it clear that by 5th July a Conservative majority was 
ensured. Melbourne, however, retained office, in accordance 
with the customs of the time, until he had faced the Hew 
Parliament. Meanwhile "The Times" indulged in a l l sorts of 
speculations as to the composition of the new Government. 
For instance i t reprinted a report from the "Standard," which 
in turn quoted a "respected correspondent,n that "so soon as 
Mr. Goulburn had decided to accept the Home Department, i t was 
arranged that Sir E . Wilmot should be elected to the Speakership?^ 
Such speculations were rudely shatter4d when in the following 
month the unanimous re-election of Lefevre to that position had 
to be reported. I f any further proof of the partisan and 
unreliable character of "The Times" must be sought, i t i s 
provided by the fact that it described a very lame speech of 
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GoulburnTs, in critioism of the ueenfs speech, aa "powerful," 
in a leading ar t i c l e .^ 2 3 4 ^ On the other hand its editorial 
comment on the l i a t of ministers, which showed that Goulhurn 
had returned to his old post at the Exchequer, deserves not 
only quotation, hut a large measure of approval: "The separation 
of the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer from the Premiership 
is most judicious, and w i l l form a salutary constitutional 
precedent for the future. Everyone who considers what an 
important department of the public service the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer has to preside over must perceive the fitness of 
this arrangement. ITo-one would like to see Sir Rober Peel 
transformed into a mere Finance Minister; and that there should 
be a Finance Minister, devoting his whole time and attention to 
the management of the public revenue is indispensable under the 
(235) 
present circumstances of the country." 
Why did Peel make Goulburn Chancellor of the Exchequer? 
One suggestion might be that he had not proved a success at the 
Home Office in 1835. That suggestion can be immediately 
dismissed. The duration of Peel's f i r s t administration was 
far too brief to permit any man to prove his worth in a new 
office. The truth appears to l i e in the diametrically opposite 
direction. It has already been noted that Goulburn became Home 
Secretary at a time when Peel intended the main work of the 
administration to f a l l under that department. I t is well known 
that his second Government has become famous chiefly for the 
changes i t effected in financial polioy. Indeed it is clear^ 2 3 ^) 
that from the outset he intended considerable innovations in 
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f i sca l policy for the f i r s t year of his administration. Ihe 
person chosen for carrying out the new policy had to toe a 
particularly reliable man. Thus Goulburn "became Chancellor 
of the Exchequer. 
He had made i t abundantly clear, while he was yet a member 
of the opposition, that he regarded the frequent budget deficits 
as the most serious feature of the financial policy of his r iva l 
Chancellors. Hor had this fir i t io ism been mere political olap 
trap, for he had expressed his real concern in his private 
correspondence with Peel. How was i t that people were easily 
reconciled to such a policy? Slowly but surely i t would break 
the basis of Britain's prosperity* While Pitt 's Sinking Fund 
might have been of questionable value, i t s purpose, namely to 
reduce the national Debt annually by a specific sum, had been 
undoubtedly right* Revenue would have to be brought up to 
expenditure* He added the interesting comment? "It w i l l be 
di f f icul t tp do this. I t can only be done by one who like 
Yourself hat weight and author ity• * ^ 237) 
He had, however, been far less explicit in his suggestions 
for the ways and means by which the budgetary gap should or 
could be oloaed. She stoek solution offered by nearly a l l 
oppositions to the ministers facing them i s , of course, that of 
economy, especially with regard to the establishments of the 
public departments. Goalbnrn had not used this argument 
extensively while out of Office, Ho doubt his experience of 
holding responsible positions, combined with his customary 
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uprightness, made him shrink from what he knew to fee not only 
a two edged hat also a somewhat dishonest weapon. It is 
interesting to note, in parentheses, that nonetheless, the new 
administration feegan a drive for Civ i l Service economy very soon 
after assuming office. Peel wrote to Goulburn suggesting a 
new idea for the reduction of staffs in Government departments. 
Gladstone and the junior lords of the Treasury were to form an 
unpaid eommission to investigate the establishments oh the spot. 
They were to be armed with f u l l powers to effect decisions and 
were to be instructed to disregard a l l patronage. Yet, 
however,efficiently executed, such economies would at best be 
a drop in the ocean. s^' more radical steps had to be taken to 
secure a budget surplus. 
Almost innaedie>bely aft§r the' Conservative election success 
had become indisputable, and more than a month before he was in 
fact entrusted with the formation oC' a Government, Feel began to 
plan the details of p s \tinafcejiai^oiiOy,* ^ough these would not 
be required for another 6 months at leaist. Thus he requested 
Goulburn*s opinion on the possibility of an Income Tax, and a 
long letter enumerating both the advantages and disadvantages of 
such a lev£ was sent in reply. This letter repays detailed 
study. (839) -
In favour of the imposition of an Income Tax Goulburn 
argued that i t would relieve the poor from taxation, and that 
although, they might suffer indirectly through the taxation of 
the wealthy; they would consider their fInaneial position to be 
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improved by being freed from taxation. She net income Of the 
United Kingdom would be at least £180 million, the figure reached 
in i e iSy^*^ i««r before the great trade expansion in the years 
after the end of hosti l i t ies . Thus a Sfe£ tax would raise 
£4*5 million* whioh would be. encoding the actual contingency 
of the budget deficit by « 3 - 3 | mi l l ion ,* 2 4 1 * Such an exoaaa 
struck him as ve*y desirable, for he thought I t "wis© to have a 
margin and a surplus applicable either to the reduction of Debt 
or to supply deficiencies o£ r;ev<3nu| dopa l^oneA by experimental 
reductions of taxation with a, view :< to relieving;the sufferIng 
Glaeae.a and to increase ooasumpt ion. * •. • I t is quite clear, then, 
that GOulburn recognised the Income Tax as a possible means of 
combating the aspect of national finance which he most abhorred. 
He then showed that he als*o recognised i t s value for/ deal ing with 
one of the most Intractable polit ical problems of his time, the 
Corn and Sugar Duties. This was, moreover, a problem In whioh 
he waa personally interested as a West-India planter. He 
suggested that the Property Tax should be paralleled by a 
reduction of, tthfi duties onj. sugar frot*. 24/- to l4/*^> and on 
foreign (ae*Blfrom 63/r- to J10/*> This .would have meant a loss of 
£1,800,OQO i f consumption remained static. He wad at pains to 
defend the selection of sugar and mentioned four reasons, the last 
Of which showed that he was not extending undue sympathies to the 
West-Indian interest. Flratlp* i t was a cheap commodity in use 
by ftll classes, also,- i t would benefit Ireland, i f the recently 
observed change from spirits to tea and coffee consumption would 
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continue there. In addition, i t would bring rel ief to the 
West-Indies, while chiefly i t would facilitate a new commercial 
agreement with Brazi l , since i t would make possible e, reduction 
of the coffee duties* West-Indian protests which were likely 
against such an agreement could be over-ruled, since the planters 
would have been compensated by the increased sugar trade. 
Netft, Goulburn listed the principal objections to this soheme* 
A direct peouniary payment, especially as i t involved disclosure 
of income,, could not but be unpopular. i t had never before 
been attempted in peace-time. There would certainly be 
parliamentary dif f icult ies . A virtuous Bouse of Commons was 
nee&od to oountenanoe such a measure, and could virtue be 
ejepaoted in a reformed House of .Commons? Since*:; in justice, 
Ireland would have to be included, additional trouble would 
arise* A b i l l oft, at-^'east' 360 Olauses.<would be required,; end 
the Ckjvernment would hardly be able to risk modi float ion of a 
single clause i > . :'fhm '-Hhe task of fgettijig . i ^ through Committee 
would be awful and perhaps impossible." Further, the tax might 
act ad an inducement ;to '^ ef^ aud the toternment, and doubtless 
?f •• ' there would.be evasions,;$.g,-.by; investments in foreign funds* ' 
;"'v': > Finally, Goulburn suggested- that 1% would be; both politio . 
and just to limit the operation of the b i l l to a number of; years* 
He was unable to state whether alternative methods of raising 
reyenue to a similar extent existed, before a careful scrutiny 
of taxes already in. force had been undertaken;by the Revenue 
Officers. One of the last sentences isg perhaps, the most 
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significants "These strike me as the principal topios of 
consideration, before you decide upon the adoption or rejection 
of income tax*" Shis is a striking confirmation, before Peel's 
assumption of the Premiership, of the charge whioh Gladstone 
levelled against him after his resignation: Tour Government has 
not been carried on by a cabinet, but by heads of departments 
in" each in communication with you. n There can be no doubt 
at a l l that this major policy decision was taken by Feel on his 
own, long before his Cabinet had a chance to discuss i t . In 
fact, he enforced i t on a rather reluotant Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. Small wonder, then, that the 1842 budget was 
introduced by Peel, and that Goulburn rose only twice in the 
course of the main debate to elucidate polmts of detail 
I t must not be supposed, however, that the embarkssment 
which Goulburn experienced in sponsoring a measure, which he 
had opposed in public in the previous year, extended to other 
aspects of the budget. I t 1^  quite clear from their correspondence 
that he shared Peel's views as to the desirability of lowering 
tar i f f duties* There i s no direct evidence to show that either 
one man or the other v&s' more responsible for initiating the 
policy of bold reductions* The letter on Income Tax shows that 
Goulburn was quite prepared to advise alterations in even the 
highly controversial sugar and corn duties. There seems to 
have been spontaneous agreement between Premier and Chancellor 
that reductions were, generally speaking, desirable, but that 
they were necessarily limited by budgetary considerations. 
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For instance, Qoulburn, referring to fears of overabundance 
resulting from low taxes, wrote: "The outcry to' which low prices 
w i l l give rise is preferable to that which results from a 
population in want of food . fW^^ : On another occasion Peel 
asked his Chancellor to decide i f the country could stand the 
abolition of oinnamon duties financially^ since there was no 
' • ' " ' ' ' (245) doubt that i t was right commercially. 
Bpir we>s Goulburn too ^t^t^}^^i.^.i^6!^pitX^ that he heA 
been wrong in Opposing the tooorae Tax. By 1844, when he posed 
the question of whether or not i t should be renewed, he 
answered $ °To that I say decidedly yes , and I think i t had 
better be continued by an Act to be introduced this year.* 
His reasons fdt that answer were the danger of am- only just • 
balanced budget in lajfT and of a.deficiency in 184?i ' He • . 
suggested tnftt the renewal ^ *t. least three years . 
sp as to last beyond the general eiootlon due in ^ 6 e i t 
' mig|t ; b>. dif fidult te .oarr^,;a -reaaew l^ in/f ace'':.o^ '- a:^issolutlon.. 
If* ' to ;.ii^..^ne ^ene^al more palatable, majiLy duties were, to 
reipeale^, t ^ # i ) s $ ^ ^ •'' 
more than three years, sinoe the recovery of revenue resUltiiig • 
f^ om Vrepeeil took a longer pe*iod^ because itfc causes were; • 
i n d i r e c t . i n fact he showed the natural, affection of a 
ta^ collector for a thoroughly, efficient te£ . Peel in his 
reply feared great diff iculties for the renewal qf income Teat 
unless aooompatiied by "some reductions in $axatlo^ benefitting 
greatly' the mass of the population, - and what more>; carrying 
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suoh benefit i n the f^p© of them." He threw out some 
suggestions: Reduction of sugar and ooffee duties, abolition 
of wool and vinegar duties* On the other hand he cautioned 
against touching cotton duties, as such a r e l i e f for the 
manufacturer might he a farther weapon for those who demanded 
lim i t a t i o n of working hours. He d i s l i k e d the notion of renewing 
i t for three years - the same length as the o r i g i n a l period -
because that would give an im^ession of permanence. ./ 
At the end of that year Gounburn calculated that he would have 
£S£ m i l l i o n available for reductions, of which. £1 million.would 
go on sugar duties. Since that was a r e l i e f c h i e f l y for the 
general consumer, the remaining reduotione ahould be designed 
to benefit other inte r e s t s - . That wouia eyolude tea..,and, jbobaoco. 
Instead manufacturers should be given r e l i e f , since th$y .. 
encountered t a r i f f b a r r i e r s i n other countries:* That applied 
es p e c i a l l y to glass and cotton, a taz on whiph wag, objectionable 
" i n principle 1* as they were raw -materials* i t past be^ 
beyond doubt that, whatever differences there werf on d e t a i l s , 
Peel ana Otoulburn were e n t i r e l y agreed on the principle pf large 
scale tax reductions* _ 
The introduction of the Income lax,. which u^timat^ly r e a c t e d , 
despite the different intensions of i $ s originator, i n the 
complete r e v e r s a l of the B r i t i s h syatem of taxation by making 
direct taxes the mainstay of the revenue, and the movement towards 
freer trade, which d e t f e ^ 
decades to oome, oannol; be d i p p e d to^ 
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f i n a n c i a l decisions, the repeal of the Corn Laws and the Bank 
Charter Act. The repeal of the Corn Laws, though of great 
p o l i t i c a l importance, was i n t r i n s i c a l l y only part of the Free 
Trade policy, while the Bank Charter Act "by putting B r i t i s h 
ourrency and hanking on a secure basis was a concomitant of 
the Free Trade policy and equally e s s e n t i a l i n fostering B r i t i s h 
commercial expansion* 
In the years following 1630 the railway mania and the 
beginnings of American commercial enterprise offered multitudinous 
opportunities for investors, and acted as an inducement for an 
expansion of credit, leading to the multiplication of banks of 
issue. The f i r s t crashes following imprudent speculative 
investments, undertaken despite o f f i c i a l warnings, were not 
long delayed. By 1838 they had become s u f f i c i e n t l y serious 
to lead to the appointment of a sp e c i a l parliamentary committee 
to consider the question of note issues. This committee, which 
had included Peel, did not, however, lead to any direct action. 
On the other hand i t brought the problems connected with paper 
issues to the attention of a l l who were concerned with the 
nation's finahoes. VThile discussing budget d e f i c i t s i n 1939 
Goulburn had expressed his anxiety about the issue of deficiency 
b i l l s r e s u l t i n g from them: "As long as the Bank (of England) 
i s required every quarter day to issue i n advance from 4 to 7 
millions of paper ~ which i t cannot refuse «• the efforts of that 
body to reduce thei r c i r c u l a t i o n must be either ineffective or 
must be made so v i o l e n t l y as to derange many commercial and other 
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transactions. Bat i f you. are to change t h i s system, i t can 
only be by increasing Revenue as compared with i&penditure, 
and thus suspending the necessity of advances to pay the 
(849) 
Dividends." 1 ' ,: -.>-..••. 
Once he had resumed the of f loe ;6f <*hano«iior t of the 
Exchequer, the problem pressed, on bjin* even mor• urgentltf, and 
i n a l e t t e r to Pee1^gave a v e r y , f u l l exposition of h i s viewe 
on the sub^eoti "With respect to Joint Stock Banks.. .v. £t was an 
unfortunate measure i n 1B36 to encourage t h e i r tfstafclisiy&enlli* 
Looking at the: time to the immediate fact of the hreajsing of so 
many private Banks, and the d i s t r e s s ocoasioned to the holders 
of t h e i r notes by the Uibtea* loss of their property, s u f f i c i e n t 
regard was not paid to other e v i l s which Joint Stook Banks have 
• ;"r .' V ' ' ' •«'?*•' L' : \ ' • •• * - i. . .. r - "v v?* j. •' J' •<<.:'11' 'j, " i - * v • • -
• , 1 "• . • ' • < • - ' : . • i i - .. .. . -"V Si' ' . ' 
oocaeionad, f a r greater than what any lo s s to individual.holders 
of notes could haye occasioned. Bo.$ a ste$> on'o«f tyfoin i a no* 
e a s i l y retraced. Joint Stpok Banking i$ now not, only i Branch 
of our Banking ayetefii,, hat has; superseded i n a greets majority 
of instances the private Banks that previously supplied the.wants 
. '•  •. vy> -r " • - y . • • v.-'' •• ..-A • >.;• • •• y -v >• 
of the Ooiflmunlty^ Remote 1?nem you oannotf, and cohsid^risg t ) % 
habite ot trade and: commeroe engend^reo,- by " t h e g e n e r a l , 
establishment, I oannofc dl0olO;ver aiiy sal/iQfftotor^ ^ todft'Of 
subjecting them to oheofc or to r e s t r a i n t * I have looked a t the 
Reports of 1836-7-8, but although I find there a discussion of 
e v i l s a r i s i n g out of them, I see nothing a t a l l s a t i s f a c t o r y 
suggested i n the way of a Remedy. & single Bank of Issue i s 
indeed suggested i n one Qt the; subaeonent Bank Committees* 
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Bat I cannot make out how i t would or oould aot aa suoh* 
I f the Bank of England were to he the issuer the cry against 
the s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d monopolist would overwhelm i t * The 
Government could not exercise the function so as to check abuse 
without at times produoing the greatest l o s s to traders and 
c a l l i n g forth combinations against the Government to effeot 
improper extensions of the Currency. I do not indeed know how 
i t would, be possible for a Government to work i t at a l l * I fear, 
therefore, that we have l i t t l e to t r u st to as a oonsolation 
for past sufferings or a remedy against future sufferings but 
the prudenoe which may r e s u l t from the past experience of the 
misery whioh suoh proceedings oooasion, and i n t h i s i have 
l i t t l e confidence, when I see how soon even in private l i f e and 
yet more i n public a f f a i r s a l l profitable r e c o l l e c t i o n of the 
past passes away.n 
There i s no direct evidenoe to show that i t was Peel who 
was responsible for changing Goulburn's opinion on the subject . 
of a single bank of issue. The circumstantial evidence, however, 
i s very strong. Goulburn was remarkable for the tenacity with 
whioh he clung to h i s views, and there i s no record of h i s 
a l t e r i n g h i s opinions on any major question except under the 
influence of Peel* Moreover, i t appears that he did not discuss 
the question i n d e t a i l with anyone except Peel. In 1854 he wrote 
to Gladstone: "The main object which S i r Robert Peel and myself 
had i n the arrangements (of 1844I,"* 2 5 1* thus bracketing Peel with 
himself. Yet, there i s no other instance, however great h i s 
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aamiratidii fo# h i s leader wa,s, of Gouiburh assigning the 
authorship of any measure to Peel, unless the l a t t e r did i n 
fact hear the c h i e f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for i t . Rather the opposite 
tendenoy i s tp be observed i n Goulburn*©lat|t VBritings* 
F i n a l l y , i t must be observed that Peel' introduced the Bant 
Charter Act i n Parliament, while Goulburn remained s i l e n t 
throughout the i n i t i a l debate. On the second reading he did 
reply to some c r i t i c i s m s . The c o n v e r t i b i l i t y of notes Into gold 
demanded Government regulation of the note i s s u e j otherwise 
bankruptcy uould be a continuous p o s s i b i l i t y . A large number 
of country banks issuing notes without due caution or under^ 
standing of the problems involved would render such control 
impracticable. This was a sound contribution to the argument, 
but i t can hardly be described as the most prominent speech of 
the debate* The conclusion that Peel rather than Goulburn 
was the father of the; Bank Charter Act i s almost inescapable• 
V/hile the o r i g i n of the central idea of the Act mpy then be 
ascribed to P e e l t i t must be added that extensive discussions on 
the d e t a i l s of the measure took place between Chancellor and 
Prime Minister* : These began at l e a s t as early as 13th October, 
l | 4 3 * ^ 5 3 ^ Most of them, however, were o r a l and i t is therefore 
impossible to assign with cer t a i n t y the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for any 
clause either to Peel or Gouiburn. The h i s t o r i a n may indeed 
regret the proximity of Hos* 10 and 11 downing Street, which has 
undoubtedly robbed us of much evidenoe which would have become 
available had o r a l discussion presented greater obstacles. The 
"Act to regulate the Issue of Bank notes and for giving to the 
Governor and Company of the. Bank of England cert a i n P r i v i l e g e s 
for a limited period, n* ' required the Bank of England to set 
up a separate department for the issue, of notes. A l l the gold 
coin and gold and s i l v e r bullion not required by the hanking 
department were to be transferred to the issue department, which 
was to base the maximum issue of notes on t h i s backing and an 
additional fiduciary issue of £14 m i l l i o n . The s i l v e r contents 
of the backing was not to exceed 26$ of the gold. The public 
were e n t i t l e d to demand ^notes',forKgolJkjat the rate of £3*17*6d. 
per ounce* . The fiduciary issue could be inoreased by Order-in-
Counoil, whenever any other banker ceased to issue notes, but suoh 
an increase was not to exceed 2/3rds of the notes issued by that 
banker. The Bank of England was to.pay the Government 
£180,000 p.a. for i t s p r i v i l e g e s . The p r i v i l e g e s were, however, 
to be held redeemed after 1855^ i f the Government paid back the 
public debt due, to the Bank* Ho new banks of issue were to be 
authorised, and bankers ceasing to issue notes would have no 
power to resume that a c t i v i t y . E x i s t i n g issuers were to continue 
with the average amount of notes i n c i r c u l a t i o n during' the twelve 
weeks preceding 27th A p r i l , 1844* Such issuing banks, would have 
to render four weekly accounts. 
V/ith regard to the Repeal of the Corn Laws various writers 
have demonstrated that Peel was primarily responsible for i t , and 
some of the documents r e l a t i n g to Goulburn 1s attitude to the 
Repeal have been pub l i s h e d . ^ 2 5 5 ^ i n view of the e f f e c t s of the 
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repeal on Goui'barn'a career, and I n view of the importance of 
these documents i n throwing l i g h t both on h i s own p o l i t i c a l and 
economic thought and on h i s relationship with Peel, i t i s nonejbhe^ 
l e s s e s s e n t i a l to refer to them i n some d e t a i l here, whether they 
have "been published or not. 
The protection of agriculture as one of the main facets of 
conservative policy had never been questioned by Goulburn. 
££hen the Ant 1«Corn Law League became prominent, he found an 
additional reason for maintaining protection. This i s made 
clear i n a l e t t e r i n which he lamented the l o s s of a by-election 
i n the City, which he f e l t ought to spur on the Conservatives 
to "endeavour to repair the injury which t h i s Victory of the 
Corn Law League or rather the Victory of the Democratic pri n c i p l e 
has caused*" - I t i s w e l l to remember that nobody had 
previously attempted similar democratic organisation other than 
the iioman Catholic Association i n Ireland, and t h i s comparison 
was not l i k e l y to predispose Goulburn i n favour of B r i g h t 1 s and 
Cobden's movement. There was no question of Goulburn's 
conversion prior to the I r i s h d i s a s t e r . 
On 8th October, 1845 t he forwarded l e t t e r s from the I r i s h 
P r o v i n c i a l Bank to Peel. These stated that the potato crop a i l 
over Ireland appeared to have been affected by a serious bl i g h t . 
Goulburn, however, i n whose experience Ireland had hardly ever 
been free from the threat of famine, was not disposed to panic, 
and added the following covering note: " I f they have a week or 
ten days dry weather, the I r i s h harvest may be taken as an 
average one sojfar as regards grain* As regards potatoes i t w i l l 
not be easy to form a good judgement until, next month, when the 
extent to whioh the Hot has prevailed w i l l be ascertained." This 
appraisal of the situation was undoubtedly oomplaoent, but Goulbura 
may perhaps be forgiven oil account ot h i s long association with 
Ireland, i f he regarded alarms from that quarter with some degree 
of scepticism* 
The extent of h i s misreading of the sit u a t i o n i s revealed 
by the secret communication which he received from E e e l ten days 
l a t e r : "The accounts of the Potato Crops from Ireland are very 
alarming - Lord Heytesbury writes with great anxiety and 
apprehension. I am f u l l y impressed with the necessity for 
great caution, for not immediately taking for granted, that I r i s h 
Reports must be w e l l founded, even when there appears to be,a 
concurrent mass of evidence* I see before me a l l . t h e oonseauenoes: 
of our i n t e r f erence by an Act of Authority with the ordinary 
operation of the Law § or indeed of our invoking the aid of 
Parliament; but s t i l l we must be preparing for the necessity of 
action. I t i s one thing to act and another maturely to consider 
what are the steps which we sh&ll take i n the event of pur worst 
fears being confirmed..*.*I have earnestly begged Lord Heytesbury 
to take such measures as may be r e q u i s i t e for supplying me with 
the. Elements for consideration and. decision*.... .Let us assume that 
intervention either by prerogative or L e g i s l a t i v e w i l l be r e q u i s i t e . 
You appeared to think that there was no Immediate pressure, that the 
severity of the E v i l ' would not be f e l t , u n t i l the Spring and that 
we were relieved from the necessity of Immediate decision. 
I doubt Whether t h i s l a so, whether at le a s t Immediate decision 
may n6t he forced upon us. The t o t a l f a i l u r e of the crops i n 
many large d i s t r i c t s w i l l produce an immediate demand for other 
means of subsistence to be provided for those who have no means 
or very scanty means of providing i t . Let. us consider the 
remedies. I see l i t t l e advantage I n the prohibition of export 
or the Stoppage of D i s t i l l e r i e s . The one remedy w i l l be, the 
removal of impediments to the free import of those a r t i c l e s of 
whioh human food consists* Some say permit the import of Indian 
Corn. I foresee that the admission of any one, description of 
human food out of th# ordinary course by, 4n AOt of Authority or ." ••.-- • " V -^  >•.• < , •' ,. •, '-,'} ' • - • by L e g i s l a t i v e , proposed'to meet a temporary but most severe 
pressure ? mrill i n f a l l i b l y lead to the admission of every other. 
I t W i l l be so invidious to remit from the fear of soarolty the 
duties on Maize and to r e t a i n them on Wheat that the attempt would 
be hopeless. The temporary remission of a i l duties on Corn i s , 
in the present state of public feeling, tantamount to the permanent 
and t o t a l remission of those duties. Once remitted they w i l l 
never be re-established-. I do not oonceal from myself, therefore, 
the Vast consequences which w i l l follow the necessity for i n t e r -
vention. ••••There are various things independently of the 
remission of duties on foreign produce which might be of s e r v i c e . n 
Among these things he mentioned the chances of chemical action or 
conversion into potato flour to save the affected crop, the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of the Government securing a supply of sound seed 
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potatoes for the future, and. $ he question of untapped supplies 
i n South America* He concluded by stating that i t would 
probably he necessary to r e c a l l Parliament for Hovember, and 
asking whether the Grown was capable of assembling Parliament 
at a fo r t n i g h t 1 s notice. 
Goulburn sent an immediate reply, whioh shows that he must 
have been rather staggered by Peel's communication. He expressed 
no opinion on i t s main proposal at a l l for the time being, and 
merely r e i t e r a t e d : "That there has been a p a r t i a l failur.e i s 
undoubted From the enclosed which I received to-day' i t would 
appear that the danger has been exaggerated i n the county of 
Monaghan. A l l accounts concur i n the abundance of the pat Crop 
i n Ireland, and as to Potatoes I confess that I f e e l unable and 
I do not think anyone can form a just conclusion u n t i l the 
Potatoes are dry. on looking over h a s t i l y the l e t t e r s (you 
enclosed) • * *.. some are evidently from persons who have taken up t 
a general report as proof," 
After three days 1 consideration, on 21st October, Goulburn 
sent a f u l l reply and h i s counter proposals* He admitted that 
the state of the Potato Orop i n both England and Ireland would 
"occasion pressure on the lower c l a s s e s . " He clung to the 
b e l i e f that some of the reports from Ireland were exaggerated, 
for i n England such exaggeration had already been proved. 
He continued: " I hope that the same may turn out to be the oase 
i n Ireland. The l e t t e r which I sent you on Saturday tends to 
confirm t h i s idea - But assuming the worst the question i s what 
oourss s h a l l the Government pursue? To supply potatoes for 
the population i s out of the quest ion* They are too, bulky.••• 
and besides i n •% voyage of even a moderate length they heat and 
become unfit for consumption*. .. .Yott cannot get Potatoes from 
neighbouring countries, for i n them the Rot has been more 
destructive than with us* The People must be provided with 
some other food.. • • ( I s there) i n the United Kingdom any deficiency 
to a considerable extent of other means of subsistence?.....I 
believe that the barley and oat crop both i n Sootland and Ireland 
has been most abundant.....if t h i s be so we s h a l l have but l i t t l e 
r i s k of not having enough on whioh to feed our people, although 
the food may be of a different and more expansive kind. I f the 
Corn Law i s worth anything I t must be s u f f i c i e n t to supply the 
additional quantity of Grain which when added to an abundant 
crop here w i l l make up for a . p a r t i a l f a i l u r e of potatoes » I 
should deoidsdly object to any suspension of the Corn Law* 
I f we should suspend i t on our present apprehension of s c a r c i t y 
we should e f f e c t u a l l y condemn the measure of 1842... We should 
incur a l l the e v i l s of a fixed duty and should not have a word 
to say against i t , i f again proposed. The Law as i t i s admits 
a free importation of Oats when the Average of Oats i s 27/-, that 
i s long before they reach famine P r i c e , and i n expectation of 
t h e i r price being attained we may r e l y , I think, upon a supply 
from abroad i n the natural course of Trade. An unlimited 
importation now would, I think, aggravate d i s t r e s s . " For 
instance, home-growers would at once lower wages, thus worsening 
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the workers' plight* As for the other suggestions made by Peel, 
a stoppage of d i s t i l l e r i e s would only oause discontent i n the 
areas not yet affected, would r a i s e unemployment, derange trade, 
decrease revenue and thus the Government's power of assistance. 
Government importation and d i s t r i b u t i o n of a r t i c l e s was usually 
unsuccessful. Rice was the most useful commodity for such a 
purpose, but i n general he thought "the interent of individuals... 
a far surer ground of r e l i a n c e for an adequate supply of any 
a r t i c l e . " Regarding potato flour, S i r Benjamin Brodie held 
that Professor Hinslow's receipt for extraction would not 
afford much nourishment. '.Zhile Parliament could always be 
c a l l e d at two week's notioe, no case for such action existed 
yet, though l e g i s l a t i v e interference, i f resorted to, should 
preferably come from Parliament and not from the Government 
assuming authority. What ought to be done was to "direct the 
attention of the Government to giving means of employment to 
the destitute." When the potato crop was dry an accurate survey 
of stocks should be made, together with a survey of oats and 
barley stocks. Then, before the breaking of the storm, stocks 
from d i s t r i c t s with good supplies should be transferred to those 
threatened with famine, and the land-owners should be induced 
to devise means of employment, e.g. railway building. "This was 
pretty much the course pursued i n 1822 when the deficiency of the 
Potato crop from subsequent rot t i n g , after they had been pitted, 
was very great indeed." Those suggestions, he thought, should 
s u f f i c e to remedy the e v i l , though he observed that "to prevent 
altogether the power of such a v i s i t a t i o n i s not i n the power of 
man.1* 
Peel's Cabinet was i n serious d i f f i c u l t i e s , for Goulburn 
was by no means the only one who could not at once see hia way 
clear to throwing overboard the central in t e r e s t which Tories 
and Conservatives had for decades represented. As a stop gaj> 
measure the purchase of a large quantity of maize was determined . 
on, although even t h i s minor experiment i n s t a t e trading cut 
against the grain of the ministry. I t was thought necessary, 
i n order to prevent a r i s e i n the price of maize, to keep the 
Government's part i n the transaction secret, and thus to entrust 
i t to a merchant. The quantity to be bought was s u f f i c i e n t to 
provide one m i l l i o n people with a pound for forty days. On the 
day after the decision had been taken, Goulburn suggested that i t 
would be better to entrust the contract to HCr. Baring than to 
S i r R. Routh's brother* since the l a t t e r did not make such deals 
ord i n a r i l y and thus would rouse suspicion. Two days l a t e r he 
reported that Baring had accepted, although he was c r i t i c a l of 
the p r i n c i p l e of Government interference. ^57) 
Meanwhile the reports from Ireland grew ever more alarming. 
The Governor of the Bank of Ireland stated that one t h i r d of the 
crop had been destroyed already, and that, although potatoes could 
be immunised i f "dug, dried and sprinkled with lime," i t was feared 
that many peasants would not take the steps necessary to prevent 
further spreading of the p e s t . ^ 2 ^ Thus Goulburn Was gradually 
feeling h i s way towards agreeing to the opening of the parts, but 
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was rebelled when he understood that Peel intended,-*indeed he had 
altfe&dy hinted in his f i r s t l e t t e r on 18th October, 7 the, cessation 
of corn duties to he permanent and not temporary* $hat was s t i l l 
too violent for Goulburn, " I have," he wrote, "such an habitual 
deference to the superiority of your judgement and such an entire, 
confidence i n the purity of your motives that I always f e e l great 
doubt as to my being right when X d i f f e r from your Opinion* But 
the more I r e f l e c t upon the observations you m$de to me a few days 
since as to your d i f f i c u l t y i n again defending a Corn-Law i n 
Parliament, the more I f e e l alarmed at the oonsequenoes of your 
taking a different course from that which you have previously 
adopted." He suggested that i t would damage thei r character as 
public men. The repeal of the Corn-Law oould npt affect the 
I r i s h famine, since i t s ef f e c t s would not be f e l t before 1847* 
Other countries might be misled into thinking B r i t a i n ' s position 
worse than i t was, and thus forbid exportation so as to protect • 
themselves* Despite or because of the Corn Laws the pri c e of 
corn i n England had r i s e n l e s s than i n other countries, and was 
l e s s i n 1845 than i n the period of 1838-43• The abandonment of 
the Corn Laws would rend i n twain the Conservative party, "the 
only b a r r i e r which remains against the revolutionary ef f e c t s of 
the Reform B i l l . " Then, indeed, the prospect would be bleak: 
nl see nothing before us but the exasperation of Glass animosities, 
a struggle for pre-eminence, and the ultimate triumph of unrestrained; 
democracy. »^ 5 9V That ^as written j u s t before the temporary* 
15 days* resignation of peel's Cabinet.' ' - ; 
The only other written document relevant to Goulburn's 
evolution of thought on the Corn';Laws i s an undated memorandum, 
probably w r l t t e x i i n the f i r at days of January, 1846,. I n whioh he 
considered the claims and reasons for- the protection of agriculture 
"absolutely," i*e» without reference to personal and party 
censiderations. It i s important, because i n i t he admitted for 
the f i r s t time the p o s s i b i l i t y of withdrawing protection, i f the 
withdrawal was made very gradually' and.aooompanied- by other ' 
r e l i e f s , suoh as a decreased land or malt t a x . B y 
5th February he was defending the Government's purchase of maize 
i n the House of Commons*. Later i n the month he rose on the tenth 
day of the twelve day debate on the corn Laws and made a speech, 
which i s remarkable for i t s frankness* I t wad d i f f i c u l t to add 
new arguments after so long a debate. I t had, however, been 
publicly stated that he differed from the r e s t of the Cabinet on 
the Corn-Laws* He wished to deal with that accusation* He 
admitted that i n November he had opposed the opening of ports 
by Order-in-Counoil or a sp e c i a l session Of Parliament* The 
reason for that opposition had been h i s conviction that the I r i s h 
case was not urgent enough to warrant interference with the 
existing laws. That oonviction was based at the time on 
incomplete and inaccurate information* I t had been i n fact an 
error of judgment, which had been corrected when oomplete informa-
tion became available* Such a change of opinion did not, as had 
been suggested, necessitate h i s resignation of hi s seat,- for 
consistency of opinion depended on consistency of ciroumstanoes, 
but was impossible to maintain when they changed. ^ 2 6' L^ 
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I n surveying the corn-Law oontroversy as fought put between 
Peel and Goulburn i t I s impossible not to be impressed with the 
strength of many of the arguments urged by the l a t t e r * For 
instance, i t was p e r f e c t l y true that the tQ;timate. repeal of the 
Corn Duties, scheduled for 1849, was en t i r e l y . i r r e l e v a n t to the 
c r i s i s of 1845* Again he was right i n forecasting the p o l i t i c a l 
_ _ ' • . . . . )r . ' . , 
r e s u l t of the s p l i t t i n g of the Conservative party, and though we 
may d i f f e r from him i n our assessment Of the d e s i r a b i l i t y of 
"the triumph of unrestrained democracy,11 i t i s undoubtedly true 
that t h i s was; hastened both »by the .fr&lg- administrations Which 
•• i • <• : ' ' ' • ' '• ' .' • • . 
• • • , : > • ' •. • ' r ' • ' 
included some,Radicals and by the succession of D i s r a e l i to the 
Oonservatlve leadership* I t must, moreoever, be remembered that 
the v i c t o r y of democracy would nave been as obnoxious to Peel as 
to Goulburn. On the economic r e s u l t s of repeal both men,; l i k e 
almost a l l t h e i r contemporaries, seem t o have been quite wrong. 
I t brought no substantial reduction i n the price of corn - as 
might have been expected i n view of Goulburn^ statement that 
English com price s had r i s e n l e s s than those of other countries -
nor did i t lead to any of the dire consequences which had been 
predicted for both the land-owner and the a g r i c u l t u r a l labourer. 
At l e a s t they were delayed u n t i l the speeding up of transport by 
new inventions led to the cheapening of American corn i n the 1870s 
and 80s, when the advocates of protection, who had by then ; 
abandoned protection, were often i n power and watched the r u i n of 
B r i t i s h agriculture without taking action. I t i s i n fact hard to 
r e s i s t the conclusion that the importance of the Repeal of the 
;- • , 146-
Corn-Laws waa an iaaue which waa greatly over-rated by oonteatants 
on both aides. I t was endowed wi t h an emotional, and hence 
p o l i t i c a l , significance which waa quite unwarranted by the 
economic facta. The atmosphere i n which the measure waa 
disouased i s perhaps characterised heat by Lord George Bentinok'a 
contribution, who waa content to dismiaa a l l f i n a n c i a l considera-
t i o n s , atated, "v/hat I cannot Bear i s being a o l d , n ^ 2 ^ and 
thereupon proceeded to destroy the Conservative party without 
stopping to work out, whether he was i n fact being aold. 
The Repeal of the Corn-Lawa did not a f f e c t the revenue to 
any serious extent. The budgetary policy of the #ears, 1841-6 
had been one of gradual, but very pronounced movement towards 
freer trade. Insofar as i t related to the famous t a r i f f - o a t t i n g 
budgets of 1842 and 1845 i t has already been diaouased. The 
budgets of 1843, 1844 and 1846 were introduced i n the House by 
Goulburn, and while they have been given less emphasis by the 
general h i a t o r i a n , they are nonetheleas important since they 
atreas the difference between the Whig p o l i c y of Free Trade 
pursued by Baring i n 1841 and the Conservative policy of Free 
Trade pursued by Peel and Goulburn. This difference waa that 
Baring budgeted f o r a deficiency, but that Goulburn always 
budgeted for a aurplus. 
The f l r a t aigna of the new resime became apparent very aoon 
af t e r the change of Government i n 1841. On September 27th, 
Goulburn announced i n the ftaya and Means Committee that he intended 
to tranafer £2^ m i l l i o n of the unfunded debt to funded debt. 
Since the rate of interest 1 on.the :£utid«d debt was lower than on 
the Exchequer B i l l s t h i s would help to reduce expenditure and 
thus the expected deficiency. Peel's budget of 1843 contained 
an estimate »of -a surplus of £600,000.^6^) This surplus was 
not realised, and instead a deficiency of almost £Z& m i l l i o n was 
Incurred. The reasons for that defalcation were explained by 
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Goulburo, when he introduced the budget of 1843;, • i n the 
previous year there had been an annually recurring d e f i c i t , 
aooompanied, however» by a general desire f o r the reduction of 
duties* Peel had dealt w i t h both aspects, but while the income 
from the property tax had started t o flow i n only a f t e r 6 months, 
the effects of the remission of duties had become noticeable 
immediately* Moreover the t o t a l Customs revenue had f a l l e n 
short by about £1 m i l l i o n , and the Excise had f a i l e d to reach 
the estimate by a s l i g h t l y larger sum. On the other hand, there 
had been an unexpected income of £§ m i l l i o n from the ransom of 
Canton. Moreover, the poor revenue could be confidently expected 
to be a temporary phenomenon only. I n the next year the ef f e c t 
of the Income Tax would be f u l l y f e l t , and the Customs duties had 
shown d i s t i n c t signs of a r a l l y . The excise defalcation was due 
to an exceptionally bad barley harvest, whieh had cut Malt Tax 
reoeiptst Thus, v/ithout any changes i n taxation he could expect 
a surplus of about £3 m i l l i o n i n 1843. AS regarded the 1842 
d e f i o i t he did not propose t o meet i t by r a i s i n g new loans, but, 
having always disapproved of adding to the national Debt, he 
proposed to meet that additional charge i n the coming year, thus 
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altogether the power of such a v i s i t a t i o n i s not i n the power of 
man.1* 
Peel's Cabinet was i n serious d i f f i c u l t i e s , f o r Goulburn 
was by no means the only one who could not at once see hia way 
clear t o throwing overboard the central i n t e r e s t which Tories 
and Gonaervativea had for decadea repreaented. i s a atop gap 
meaaure the purchase o f a large quantity of maize was determined 
on, although even t h i a minor experiment i n state trading out 
againat the grain of the miniatry. I t waa thought neceasary, 
i n order to prevent a r i a e i n the price of maize, to keep the 
Government*a part i n the tranaaction aecret, and thus to entrust 
i t t o a merchant. The quantity to be bought waa a u f f i c i e n t to 
provide one m i l l i o n people w i t h a pound for f o r t y days. On the 
day af t e r the decision had been taken, Goulburn suggested that i t 
would be better to entrust the contract to Mr, Baring than to 
Sir R. Routh'a brother, since the l a t t e r did not make such deals 
o r d i n a r i l y and thuawould rouse suspicion. Two daya l a t e r he 
reported that Baring had accepted, although he waa c r i t i c a l of 
the p r i n c i p l e of Government interference. 
Meanwhile the reporta from Ireland grew ever more alarming. 
The Governor of the Bank of Ireland stated that one t h i r d of the 
crop had been destroyed already, and th a t , although potatoes could 
be immunised i f "dug, dried and sprinkled with lime, r t i t was feared 
that many peasants would not take the atepa neoesaary to prevent 
further spreading of the p e a t . ^ 2 5 ^ Thua Goulburn waa gradually 
f e e l i n g hia way towarda agreeing to the opening of the p&rte, but 
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passed the Commons without d i v i s i o n , and the number of dissentient 
holders was so small, that the necessary compensation was only 
one tenth of ifi of the- t o t a l involved. Such a sum could be found . 
easily from the budget surplus. 
Thus Hume's usual protest that there was a high budget 
surplus, accompanied by high taxation, was more J u s t i f i e d than 
at some other times. I n any case, the surplus which was i n 
fa c t realised amounted to more than £6-^  m i l l i o n , an excess of 
about' £3j m i l l i o n over the estimate. I t was t h i s surplus which 
enabled Peel to make the second of h i s famous duty reducing 
budgets i n 1845. He forecast that as a r e s u l t of these reductions 
the surplus would shrink to £678,000 i n 1846. I n actual f a c t i t 
exceeded £2^ m i l l i o n . The 1864 budget was, of course, overshadowed 
by the Corn Law question. As soon as i t became clear, however, 
that the surplus would i n fact reach such proportions, Peel seems 
to have determined to attempt at least to submerge the Corn-Laws 
i n another general reduction of the t a r i f f . Sounding a rather 
f a t a l i s t i c note, he wrote as follows:- "My wish would be not &o 
give undue prominence to corn, but to cover corn by continued 
operation on the Customs t a r i f f , expunging a l l a r t i c l e s which are 
not worth r e t a i n i n g either for Revenue or protection » diminishing 
duties which have been, though not so intended, p r o h i b i t o r y or 
nearly so *• reducing, as f a r as i t may be safe, a ^ l protections 
where there i s no special case to be made out for r e t a i n i n g them -
and thus applying to Com a p r i n c i p l e of universal application. 
I see no reason f o r r e t a i n i n g protective duties for cotton, woollen 
e 64'm i l l i o n 
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or l i n e n manufacture.»...Surely our reduction of the duty on 
gloves i s an encouragement to consider s i l k - I believe there is 
more smuggling i n s i l k than i n any other a r t i c l e of clothing*... 
I should much wish t h i s year to p u r i f y the remaining T a r i f f by 
s t r i k i n g out a l l such a r t i c l e s as Asses, Horses, etc. Let us 
leave the T a r i f f as nearly perfect as we can. Dean may perhaps 
shake his head as he has done before, but I attach great importance 
to our doingy and doing now* what yet remains to be done. Let us 
put the f i n i s h i n g stroke to t h i a good work." Action was 
taken mery much along those l i n e s , though these reductions were 
kept i n a separate b i l l from the Corn Duties, which thua retained 
even legialaVbively t h e i r apeoial character. 
Thus there was not much that waa new l e f t f o r Goulburn to 
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announce i n hia budget abatement. Including the change a i n 
the Corn-Law a loaa of about £l m i l l i o n was anticipated as a 
reault of the new reductiona. Even ao a aurplua of £776,000 
could be expected. He then devoted himself to a review of the 
Government'a f i n a n c i a l policy Blnoe his assumption of o f f i o e f i v e 
years e a r l i e r * Duties had been reduced on 727 a r t i c l e s and 
repealed on 503. In the same period the balance i n the Exchequer 
had been increased by £4,800,000, and the national Debt reduced by 
£7 m i l l i o n so that i t stood at £785,115,000. The annual oharge on 
the debt had as a r e s u l t of t h i s , i n conjunction w i t h the interest 
reduction, been lowered by £l| m i l l i o n . He appended to what he 
appears quite c l e a r l y t o have recognised aa his awanaong aome 
remarka on the general proaperity and welfare of the country 
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as the re s u l t of the.work of Peel's Min i s t r y , and finished w i t h 
a peroration by which he d e f i n i t e l y ranged himself w i t h the 
Free Traders: "For my own part^ I confess that I s h a l l ever 
review with humble s a t i s f a c t i o n and thankfulness the sh&re which 
i t has been my l o t to take i n the several measures of which i t 
has been my p r i v i l e g e to bring the re s u l t s before the House. 
I s h a l l derive a yet higher g r a t i f i c a t i o n , i f the eff e c t of the 
observation of the past s h a l l be to impress upon Parliament for 
the future t h i s important lesson - that i f we, w i t h cautious 
at t e n t i o n to e x i s t i n g i n t e r e s t s , steadily and judiciously, 1 but 
yet progressively, reduce those burdens which more immediately 
press upon the industry and comforts of the population,-we s h a l l 
adopt the course the most conducive to Indiv i d u a l welfare; and 
s h a l l , at the same time, place on a sure and s o l i d foundation, 
not merely the f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t s , but the general prosperity 
and happiness of a l l classes w i t h i n t h i s mighty Empire." 
Of the purely administrative problems which Goulburn 
encountered during his second period as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, the most Important were connected w i t h frauds. 
Early i n 1843 he acquainted the House of Commons that public 
securities had been forged i n considerable quantities. This 
had been due to the breach of confidence by a public o f f i c e r , 
who had since been arrested. The forgery of Exchequer B i l l s , 
and'cBrer handling to prevent t h e i r presentation at the Exchequer 
Office had continued for f i v e years. Thus to re-establish 
public c r e d i t Goulburn resorted to a somewhat cumbrous, but 
probably essential method: &11 expheaa@r B i l l s were called i n , 
and, i f found genuine, they were to be reissued* He also 
explained that the Government did not intend to compensate holders 
of forged B i l l s , since that would encourage fraud* As the whole 
transaction would have been Impossible without a c e r t a i n degree of 
complicity of some people i n the City, he moved f o r the establish-
ment of a committee of enquiry i n t o the f o r g e r i e s . * 2 6 9 * The 
report o f the Committee had the somewhat unexpected r e s u l t of 
softening the Governmenti's heart on the question of compensation. 
This was granted not only t o the holders of £187,000 worth of 
stock who were e n t i r e l y exculpated by the Committee, but t o two 
groups of holders to whom some degree of suspicion attached., 
Only the fourth group o f holders * who were stigmatised as g u i l t y 
of at. least a gross lack of caution i f not more, were t o be 
depriyed of compensation. Thus j i n f a c t # the Government dec ide4 
to honour £$63*000 out of the t o t a l of £337,000 of forged 
E&ohequer B i l l s I The House accepted the new plan a f t e r a debate 
without d i v i s i o n , * 2 7 0 * 
Further, there had been grave frauds i n the Customs 
Departments, This was a very d i f f i c u l t problem, f o r prevention 
of t h e i r recurrence was far. l e s s easy t o secure than i n the case 
of the Exchequer B i l l s . I t appears that the i r r e g u l a r i t i e s had 
ooourred c h i e f l y as the r e s u l t o f inadequate checks on the Outdoor 
Department* This, Peel suggested, shewed gross negligence on the 
part of the superior o f f i c e r s of the Board of Customs* i n 
inquiry was i n s t i t u t e d , presided oyer by Lord Granville Somerset. 
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I t s d i f f i c u l t i e s were enhanoed* because the o r i g i n a l information 
had been supplied by a man of notorious character and i t wag not 
easy to procure confirmatory evidence. The f i r a t objects of 
separating the innocent from the g u i l t y were achieved, though 
the inquiry was impeded by the d i l a t o r y Mr. Dean, the head of the 
Customs Department. The f i n a l report on how to ensure 
future prevention was not submitted u n t i l 3 year a l a t e r . Uor 
was i t s content very revolutionary. I t was propoaed to leave 
the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the Board off Customs unchanged. There was, 
to be a Chairman, h i s deputy, and seven j u n i o r s . The Juniors, 
however, were i n future to be responsible f o r a aeparate department 
each. That waa an attempt t o a l t e r the pernicious system, 
uniformly condemned by the Commissioners of Inquiry, whereby there 
was p r a c t i c a l l y no contact between the Board and the Outdoor 
Department, and thus p r a c t i c a l l y no supervision of the a c t i v i t i e s 
" • • • ' (272) of the l a t t e r nor check on the honesty of individuals* 
Such was the utmoat. l i m i t ; of ingenuity for devices; to prevent 
future Customa fraudai 
A^flong the commercial a o t i v i t i e a of the time, which had a 
bearing on Government f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y , the moat important was 
the continued public indulgence i n railway speculation. The 
unreasonable proportion which i t had assumed may be gauged by 
Goulburn»s estimate that the c a p i t a l required t o complete the 
l i n e s , either begun or projected, would have s u f f i c e d to pay o f f 
the National Debt. Such a atate Of a f f a i r s n a t u r a l l y alarmed 
the Governor Of the Bank of England. He approached Peel, who 
asked Gou$burn to draw up a memorandum* warning the public of 
the facta known about domestic and foreign railwayinvestment. 
The Government could not i n t e r f e r e d i r e c t l y , but Lord Canning 
would bo able t o secure the i n s e r t i o n of such a memorandum i n 
"The Timea." Goulburn prepared the atatement t o Peel»s en t i r e 
s a t i s f a c t i o n , for i t would, not create panic, but reaaonable 
caution. unfortunately, i t f a i l e d i n e f f e c t t o produce 
a u f f i o i e n t of auoh caution* 
I t i s not to bo expected th a t foreign polioy intruded very 
frequently i n t o the correspondence of a 19th century Chancellor 
of the Exchequer. One of these instances i s , however, worth 
recording. The Oregon boundary negotiations i n the U.S.A. were 
t i e d up wi t h commercial negotiations. General Greene called 
on Goulburn ana assigned two main reasons f o r the» d i f f i c u l t i e s 
encountered. One was the state of parties i n the U.S.A., ores? 
which, of oourae., the B r i t i a h Government had no con t r o l * 
The other, however, waa remediable. He alleged that Fox, the 
B r i t i s h repreaentative waa incompetent for the e f f i c i e n t conduct 
of the negotlationa since he spent the greater part of the day 
i n b e d j * 2 7 4 ) 
Another matter related to foreign a f f a i r a , w i t h which 
Goulburn was called upon to deal, waa a hardy annual of 
parliamentary debates. Ever since Napoleonic VJars some member* 
had urged the claims o f the Danes i n respect of shipping seized 
from them i n the war o f ; 1807^ V I t is perhaps to the cr e d i t of 
the p e r t i n a c i t y of,these members that they a t i l l preaaed;their 
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case i n the 18409. Several times Goulburn had to defend the 
Government's r e f u s a l to grant further compensation. Be maintained 
that such compensation was not warranted by the accepted ideas of 
naval w a r f a r e . * 2 7 5 * 
Among minor f i n a n c i a l questions the following are of some 
i n t e r e s t . Snoouraged, perhaps> by the Income Tax proposal.,' 
Mr. Elphlnstone suggested m the House of Commons that a committee 
should inquire i n t o the d e s i r a b i l i t y of death duties on landed 
property. This suggestion Goulburn, with the support of the 
House, turned down out of hand. * 2 7 ^ _ since savings Banks offered 
a high rate of in t e r e s t they had been used, or rather abused, by 
wealthy people, who were not the r e a l object of suoh establishments. 
He proposed, therefore, to reduce the maximum annual investment 
from £30 to £20, and the maximum t o t a l holding from £150 to £130• 
I t inay be worth mentioning that t h i s was one of the frpo occasions 
when; Hume gave his unqualified support to Goulburn.: The 
other occasion was Goulburn ,s l a s t budget speech, i n which he had 
confessed himself so vigorously to be a d i s c i p l e of Free Trade. 
I n surveying the work of Goulburn at the Exchequer, the 
contrast between the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of a Chancellor i n the 1940s 
and t h i s Chancellor c f the. 1840s becomes very s t r i k i n g * On the 
most prominent issues - income Tax, Free Trade^ the Bank Charter, 
the Corn Laws - the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for i n i t i a t i n g and f o r u l t i m a t e l y 
adopting policy appears to have been out of his hands altogether. 
Rather Goulburn seems to have f i l l e d the post of the modern C i v i l 
Servant,: drawing up memoranda and g i v i n g effect to a l i n e of 
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polic y determined upon "by the Prime Minister. Even on less 
important issues, e.g. the Customs frauds and the conversion of 
3 s j $ , the correspondence seems to suggest t h a t , though i n i t i a l l y 
a suggestion may have come from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the decision rested with the Premier. 
I t i s , of course, w e l l to remember that through the 19th century 
"F i r a t Lord of the Treaaury" waa not an outdated t i t l e but an 
exact desclption of some of the work the Prime Minister had to 
undertake* Even allowing f o r t h i s difference between 19th and 
20th century practice, the conclusion that Peel dominated the 
work of his f i n a n c i a l minister quite exceptionally appeara hard 
to avoid, eapecially i f Goulburn's "habitual deference" to the 
auperiority of Peel's judgment and his comparatively independent 
l i n e of procedure as Chancellor of the Exchequer under Wellington 
are borne i n mind. Yet his work as the administrator executing 
the p o l i c y decisions of another was f a r more d i f f i c u l t than that 
of the modern C i v i l Servant, for he had to defend that policy 
p u b l i c l y i n Parliament as though i t waa hia own. I t i a , 
however, f a i r to add that usually he had by that time become 
convinced of the wiadom of the p o l i c y himself, and equally i t 
ia true that Peel, the originator of the p o l i c y , waa almost 
alwaya there to take part of that parliamentary burden, at leaat, 
o f f h is shoulders. I t may, nonetheless, not be altogether 
f a n c i f u l to suggest that t h i s exceptional re l a t i o n s h i p between 
Prime Miniater and Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1841-6 had 
some bearing on the development of the modern conception of 
c o l l e c t i v e cabinet r e s p o n s i b i l i t y * 
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(k) Retirement, 1846-56 
The r e s i g n a t i o n of P e e l , consequent on h i s defeat over the 
I r i s h Coercion B i l l , meant, for the older members of h i s 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n at l e a s t , the abandonment of any hopes of r e g a i n i n g 
o f f i c e . Both P e e l and Goulburn r e a l i s e d t h a t they had j o i n e d 
the ranks of r e t i r e d statesmen, though at f i r s t at any r a t e , they 
must have attached a d i f f e r e n t d e f i n i t i o n to the word " r e t i r e d . " 
Goulburn r a t h e r n a t u r a l l y resumed h i s work as party o r g a n i s e r , 
though i t was a smaller party he had to manage now, w h i l e P e e l 
r e t i r e d from the p o l i t i c a l scene even more e f f e c t i v e l y than he 
had done i n 1835. Goulburn attended Parliament " o c c a s i o n a l l y , " 
even i n August. For i n s t a n c e he thought " i t r i g h t to support 
the vote for Buckingham P a l a c e , " and he reported that the 
Government, i n d i f f i c u l t i e s on account of the h o l i d a y season, 
had only been saved by P e e l i t e support on I r i s h b u s i n e s s . He 
was at times consulted by members of the new Government, to whom 
he adopted a somewhat m a g i s t e r i a l a t t i t u d e i n h i s advice, e.g. 
adding a warning that the I r i s h poor ought not to be kept 
permanently by the p u b l i c purse, a f t e r having agreed w i t h R u s s e l l 
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that a p u b l i c works programme was e s s e n t i a l . I n December, 
1846 he warned P e e l that u n l e s s they took immediate steps to 
consider t h e i r future p o l i c y there was some danger that t h e i r 
f o l l o w e r s would accept the l e a d of the popular S t a n l e y . I n f a c t , 
d e s p i t e the unpopularity of Bentinck and D i s r a e l i , that would 
almost c e r t a i n l y take p l a c e i f Stanley dropped p r o t e c t i o n . 
Goulburn f e l t that instead of a party of opposition Peelt*S 
followers should be* a party .:of.oWer^attion,. united; f o r the good 
of the country, supporting the ideas of the Government Or the 
Opposition,whichever, weire the better* Pool r e p l i e d rather 
despondently that i t was most d i f f i c u l t to hold together a party 
which had no prospect of ^ porter, b,ut; Goulburn f e l t that such we,s 
the only course open to them, since they agreed with neither- 3lde» 
The s i t u a t i o n of the Peelites was c e r t a i n l y most d i f f i c u l t . 
Goulburn 1s fears of a union with Stanley must have been rather 
exaggerated, f o r the protraoted debate on the Corn Law question 
had cut top deeply to allow f o r so speedy a rebridglng of the gap. 
On the other hand, the p o s s i b i l i t y of an ultimate r e c o n c i l i a t i o n 
could not be excluded. As regarded the Government there was some 
degree of oo-operation and consultation, but i t could never be a 
c o r d i a l one so f a r as Goulburn was concerned. His opinion of 
Russell has already been described i n connection w i t h the Reforia 
B i l l . Hor did he esteem h i s former colleague Palmerston more 
highly, for his foreign policy deemed to Consist of the "oreation 
of new Constitutions f o r a l l the World11 and of being "uniformly 
impertinent to Austria? on that account.* 2® 0* m i848 he c l e a r l y 
outlined his dilemma: "There was never a f a i r e r opportunity for : 
attack r Lord Grey*e Colonial Policy, as evinced i n the case of 
Vancouver Island and i n the r e l i e f of the West Indies; ' the 
management of the Expenditure and the means of Meeting i t - the 
f a i l u r e of a l l the promises made at the commencement of the 
session would a l l furnish excellent topics for animadversion -
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But our present anomalous p o s i t i o n 1 o f fearing to turn out a 
Government of which we cannot'approve deprives as of a l l means 
of useful c o n t r o l , and we must look to the strong expression of 
f e e l i n g i n the Country as the only remedy f o r what i s undoubted!,* 
a great e v i l , v i s . a weak Government kept i n power, not by t h e i r own 
merit but by the d i v i s i o n of t h e i r opponents."f 2*^ He was 
confronted i n fact by a l l the d i f f i c u l t i e s of a middle party -
no prospect of power, the danger of defection to the r i g h t or 
the l e f t , lack of a clear-cut p o l i c y . Then, to crown these 
misfortunes, the person who could have welded together the party 
by his influence had r e t i r e d from the stage and only put i n very 
occasional appearances. PeeUs absence was a subject on which 
Goulburn often ahowed some i r r i t a t i o n i n his correspondence w i t h 
Ripon. 
Under these oiroumatanoes, Goulburn, while he continued to 
attend the House f a i r l y r e g u l a r l y , often preferred not to voioe 
hia views on matters o f moment. Such, f o r instance, was the 
caae i n the 1847 budget debate. Thua, though he did not apeak 
r a r e l y , there are only two outatanding apeeohes on p o l i t i c a l . a«<( 
economic matters atanding to hia credit a f t e r hia resignation. 
One was a heated attack on the Government - i n support of a 
motion propoaed by Bentincki - f o r i t s f a i l u r e t o give the 
V/est-Indies the apeoial consideration t o whioh t h e i r diatreaaed 
(28$) 
condition e n t i t l e d them. The other waa an act of poetic 
j u s t i c e , an attack on Diaraeli'a f i r a t budget. He oppoaed that 
budget, he maintained, not fac t i o u a l y , but becauae i t f a i l e d to 
Observe the p r i n c i p l e which he had upheld "both i n and out of 
o f f i c e , the p r i n c i p l e of surplus revenue.Disraeli waa fostering 
Free Trade without the conditions making freer trade poaaible, 
for the calculated surplus was ao small that i t could he upset 
(883) 
by the least miscalculation and be transformed i n t o a deficiency. 
The Stanley Government f e l l on the adjourned budget debate three 
days l a t e r . 
(284) 
In 1850 the death of Sir Robert Peel made the task of 
keeping hia frienda together i n one party even more d i f f i c u l t , 
and more and more they d r i f t e d , according to i n c l i n a t i o n , either 
back into the Conaervative ranks, or i n t o ever closer union w i t h 
the Whiga. Goulburn might have been thought more l i k e l y to 
belong to the. former group. When, howevqr, Lord mionborougk 
t r i e d to persuade him to take o f f i c e under Stanley, the unexpected 
r e s u l t was that he persuaded Bllenborough, who had already 
|ppc\ 
accepted, to rescind his decision. Instead, when Gladstone 
became Chancellor of the Exchequer under Aberdeen i n 1852, 
Goulburn gave him c o n f i d e n t i a l advice on many of the problems ' 
whioh he encountered. Even more i n t e r e s t i n g , and to some extent' 
explanatory of hia support of Whig adminiatrationa i a the l e t t e r , 
sent to Gladatone on 5th February, 1855: " I have juat learned on 
a u f f i c i e n t authority that you and your Peelite colleaguea i n the 
l a t e Cabinet are diapoaed to decline forming a part of Lord 
Palmerston'a administration. I hope that such a decision has 
not been come to...••.What is to be said f o r the rest of hia 
(Aberdeen'a) party i f they decline I cannot understand.....They 
decline I n a moment of great d i f f i c u l t y to combine w i t h any other 
.«.. 
party..,.,to obviate the danger of a weak Government*•.,«What 
w i l l b# the e f f e c t on our Foreign Relations i f Palmerston at the 
heaid of a Cabinet which before entered into h i t vie$9 have, 
uncontrolled dominion? What become of the Alliance with 1 
Austria especially?" The warning remained unheeded^' but 
nothing could show the di s i n t e g r a t i o n of the Peelite group as a 
separate party more c l e a r l y than that Goulburn should urge them 
to i d e n t i f y themselves w i t h the Whigs, however machiavellian 
h i s motives for such advice may have been. 
I n addition to his worries about public business,' Goulbum 
had many private troubles during h i s years of retirement, which 
perforce occupied much of hi s attention* The growing commercial 
depression i n the West^Indles so diminished his income that i n 
1848 he was forced to l e t h i s estate at Betohworth - muoh to his 
regret* Moreover, the health of his wife and of his eldest 
son often proved great sources of anxiety, and on several 
(2861 
occasions necessitated prolonged residence at Brighton. ; 
F i n a l l y , his own health must haye be He was not? a 
man to complain easily or frequently, but from about 1849 the 
references to h i s having to stay i n bed, or- to h i s unsatisfactory 
state of health i n general, increase gradually. ' Proof pf 
t h i s deterioration can be found by anyone who reads his l e t t e r s * 
His handwriting, while i t remained as always clear add l e g i b l e , 
was beginning to show the unmistakable signs of o l d age. 
nature of h i s i l l n e s s i s not referred to i n h i s correspondence, 
or i n his obituary notice i n "The Times," but we know that he 
died on 12th January^ 1856* 
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(1) Conclusion 
I t w i l l now be possible to attempt an answer to the questions 
of what were the principles guiding Goulburn's actions^ There 
oan he no doubt at a l l that the principles which Goulburn himself 
would have placed f i r s t were religious ones* His devotion to 
the Church of England as the Established Church is evident 
throughout his po l i t i ca l career* He lived at a time when the 
tradition of that Church was attacked both from without and within, 
and he sought to defend i t against a l l these attacks to the heat 
of his ab i l i t y . There was the attaok from the ohampions of 
Boman^ Cat ho l i e emancipation* The whole of his work in Ireland 
can be seen as part of his struggle to defend the privileged 
position of Anglicanism from this attack. Then, there was the 
attaok from within - the Oxford movement, or as Goulburn preferred 
to oall i t Puseyisra. His references to that subject i n hia 
correspondence with Feel show almost a trace of Pharisaical 
superiority. Of course, that sort of thing could not have 
happened in Cambridge! Yet his advice on eaolesiastioal 
patronage was oompaxatively f r Early in Peel's 
Second administration an appointment had" to be made to a vacant 
oanonry at Christohuroh. Goulburn realised that the heated 
state of parties in Oxford meant that every possible Professor 
of Divinity was in some way involved in the Pusey controversy* 
He suggested, therefore, that in order to f ind a sincere Christian 
of neither extrerne, more importanoe should be attached to Pastoral 
Divinity than to Bibl ical criticism, especially since the latter 
163. 
had given rise to the "present errors^" , Later he wrote 
again to suggest Wllberforoe, the Archdeacon of Surxty of whom 
his olerioal son had given him an "excellent aooount." 
The thi rd attack, against which he t r ied to guard the 
Church, was more directly connected with his pol i t ica l career. 
For his anxiety to keep the training-grounds of the Anglican 
Church, the Universities, free from the statin of pollution by 
Son-Conformity undoubtedly helped him in his attempts to he 
allowed to represent Cambridge University in the House of Commons* 
He was, in fact, no more kindly inclined to Dissenters than to 
Roman-Catholics* He attributed the heginning of the attack on 
the exclusive oharaoter of the University to Lord John Russell, 
whose "eduoation and subsequent associations were not such as to 
encourage friendly feelings either to the Church or the universities. 
Sent at a most c r i t i c a l period of his l i f e to Edinburgh,- he became 
early impregnated with what was then the prevalent dogma of those 
to whom education was entrusted* The general tone of the leading 
men of that day was to deprecate the.English Universities, to 
denounce them as depositories of Bigotry and'intolerance, and as 
undeserving of countenance or support eithey as places of 
learning or Morals«H *Thus the Qhig Government of the 1820s 
supported a measure to admit Dissenters to the honours and 
emoluments of the Universities." "It was happily rejected by 
the House of Lords but other measures of a similar nature were 
threatened. •'....Such being the state of a f fa i r s , I (Goulburn) 
addressed myself to the Duke of Wellington, the chancellor of 
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Oxford, and I suggested to him whether i t mi^ht not he advisable 
to press upon the university the propriety of themselves oorreoting 
those anomalies which were made the pretext for hostile attaok. 
He concurred entirely in my suggestion," and the reforms from 
within were carried out, though "progress was more slow than 
oould have been wished.* The happy result of their completion 
was that thenceforth "the attacks were limited to annual motions 
by persons of l i t t l e weight or authority, and though supported by 
leading members of the Whig party and by Dissenters, who desired 
to obtain the possession and endowments appropriated by the 
original donons B p e o l a l l y to the use of the Established Church, 
produced l i t t l e effect on public opinion or on the decision of 
(289) 
Parliament." I t was apparently as a result of these 
activit ies that Goulburn was awarded the degree of D.C.L. by 
Oxford University in 1834. We may add t h a t Goulburn very 
regularly opposed the "annual motions" fo r the abolition of oaths 
in the Universities.* 2 9 0* 
I t may be objected that the evidence so far points to a 
rel igion, merely formal and cold, and hardly to be described as the 
main guiding principle of a man«s l i f e . That, however, would be 
to judge the 19th century by the standards of the 20th, for I t is 
certainly true that few truly religious Protestants of to-day 
would be so obstinate in upholding the privileges of their own 
Church, or indeed a particular group within that Church. 
Fortunately, however, a document is preserved which shows beyond 
douht that his religious f a i t h was far from formalistio* 
Gladstone had asked him to oanvaag Cambridge for subscriptions 
to the Rational Society schools* To a l i s t of people wi l l ing 
to subscribe Goulburn added some comments on the work of the 
society, in the course of which the following significant 
remarks ocowj "My own fear witjh regard; to the national 
School system jias: always been lest i t should think i t s work 
done When the children are ins^udted in the forms and externals 
of religion while i t has no Influence upon their heart and 
life«**^?M One other point may ^ mentioned* When his son, 
who had been destined for a parser in the Church, died* •& subsorip 
t ion was organised to provide the hamlet of Brockham Gr^ en in 
Goulburn? s parish of Betohwortfc with i t s own church* This 
Church s t i l l stands to-day, a memorial to Goulburn's son and 
to his own devotion to the Church* /, 
Onoe the paramountoy, which Goulburn attached to his 
religious beliefs, is established i t : becomes possible to explain 
an otherwise rather baff l ing problem* Vifhy did Goulburn become 
a Tory]?. He certainly did not belong to the landed interest 
which formed the backbone of that party. Dor did he belong to 
an old established po l i t i ca l family, which would have made him 
a Whig or a Tory almost against his w i l l . .On the contrary, he 
belonged to a family of "nouveaux r iches,° which had made i t s 
iffqrtunes by commercial enterprise, and had just fai led to make 
i t s e l f completely respectable by marriage with an ^|>6verished 
branch of the aristocracy* A l l those were factors which ought 
to have led him to the Shigs. But here is an instance which 
illustrates that the simple classification of Tories as 
agriculturalists, and IJhigs as commercial and industrial 
entrepreneurs is far too fac i le . Quite apart from the fact 
that many of the aristocratic Whig leaders belonged to old 
established landed families, there was many another factor which 
determined a poli t ician's allegiance at the beginning of the 
19th century. In Goulburn's case i t was most probably religion 
which was the decisive influence. The Whigs were already 
tainted by their more friendly inclination to non-Conformist and 
Roman-Catholic claims* Grey had already been responsible for 
sponsoring schemes of parliamentary reforms which, while less 
extreme, tended in the same direction as the democratic aspirations 
of Dissenters lltee Priestley and Price. Burke seemed to have 
shown the close interconnection between changes in State and 
Church. For anyone who was an uncompromising Anglican the 
po l i t i ca l atmosphere of the f i r s t decade of the 19th century 
l e f t but l i t t l e choice. He had to be a Tory in pol i t ics . 
The events, which occurred during his formative years, 
remained a dominant influence on his po l i t i c a l thinking throughout 
l i f e . Commenting on the po l i t i ca l situation in Europe, and 
especially the thrdatening upheavals in I ta ly in 1847 he wrote: 
"Having a l l my l i f e had a fearful reoolieetion of what I saw in 
my youth of the French Revolution I have a perfect horror of 
revolutionary propagandlsm and i f I had to choose between 
encouraging and resisting such a system my voice would be for 
resistance."^^2^ Again some years later he could write: 
"As my only cause of alarm for this Country ia the undue growth 
of the Democratic powers, I am certainly not without anxiety, 
for the future.'* nor was this dislike of democratio 
principles oonfined to foreign oountries, Hia aversion to the 
democratic Anti*Corn-Law-League has been referred to already* 
in fact the notion that the w i l l of the people ought to be 
carried out by the Government,^  or that indeed the people had a 
w i l l , never influenced his po l i t i ca l thought or action at a l l* 
Instead throughout hia l i f e he stood for an older inter-
pretation of the Bri t ish Constitution. The King's Government 
was t ruly the King's* Hence he would always support votes for 
royal palaces* and set his face against a l l but minor alterations 
in the Civi l List* Thus, too* he f e l t that no necessity for the 
Ministers 1 resignation existed merely because they had been 
defeated, but only when successive defeats made i t impossible 
for the King's Government to be carried on. In fact he suggested 
resignation when despite the absence of hostile votes, the 
parliamentary oppositipn made i t almost impossible for business, 
to be executed .effectively. ^ 8 9 4? ' T h i e , too, was the reason why 
he advised Gladstone to Join Palmers top* a projected Government in 
1852* At a moment of danger personal opinion must take second 
place to pubiio duty to the Sovereign. 
This loyalty to the Grown -was perhaps one. of the reasons for 
a parallel loyalty to his po l i t i ca l leaders* His allegiance to 
Peel and the Duke of Wellington remained unswerving. This la id 
him open to the accusation of inconsistency* He was, for 
instance, described by Mr-. Osborne, M.P. for Middlesex, ae "one 
.... • ,% . . . . , 16S. ' 
who has befcn t ied l ike a t in-ket t le to the t a i l of the right 
honourable Member for Taraworthj Q'Q that in the several changes 
of the right honourable Baronet, as he runs from oh© side of the 
House to the other, we always hear the t in-kett le ra t t l ing behind 
h l m . " ^ 9 ^ i t must, however," have been very d i f f i c u l t for anyone, 
who was as closely asso elated with Peel as Goulburn, and who 
shared naturally many, i f not most of his views, not to succumb 
to the spell of that outstandingly b r i l l i an t and upright man on 
the few oooasio.ns when there was i n i t i a l disagreement. How close 
that association was is indicated by the fact that *ken died, 
with the exception of the Prime Minister,. Goulburn was the f i r s t 
person to pay his tribute to the dead statesman in the House of 
Commons. He claimed that he had been peel's intimate friend for 
for ty years, and i t was he who revealed that Peel in his w i l l 
had asked for a private interment at Drayton Parish, Church, and 
thus declined the state funeral Russell had offered. 
Throughout his career, Goulburn almost always held offices which 
Peel had held before him, or worked under his direction. Thus a 
tacit understanding between the two had soon grown up and was 
acknowledged by Goulburn when he wrote to Peel from Ireland about 
£he re-arrangements necessitated by Castlereagh's death; " I t haa 
given me particular satisfaction inasmuch as i t has confirmed my 
predictions as to what would be your line of conduct on the 
occasion and has given me an additional reason for thinking that 
you always do r i g h t * U n d e r those circumstances I t was 
only natural that Goulburn should develop a "habitual deference" 
169. . 
to Pool's Judgments and follow him even where his f i r s t 
inclination would have been to move in a different direction* 
Another characteristic of Goulburn*s conduct in off ice 
requires emphasis. This was the absence Of the corrupt use of 
patronage* That probity of conduct was perhaps inspired by 
Peel, but i t is significant of GouTburn's high moral standing 
that i t was to him that Gladstone sent an inquiry on accepting 
the Vioe*»Bresidenoy of the Board of Trade in 1841* Ought he 
therefore to resign the interest he held in a Stai'fordshire 
iron works?^ 9 8^ Hot only was there no corrupt use of patronage 
under Peel's administration, but there was even no attraction of 
aspirants by half promises of future consideration* "This is 
the course I am resolved to pursue with respect to a l l Honours, 
i f possible to a l l Offices, to say not a word either specific or 
general, u n t i l the period of appointment is actually a r r ived ."^ 3 9 9 
These words of Peel were equally descriptive of Goulburn's 
attitude, and anyone, who has looked at the correspondence of a 
19th century statesman and knows how large a proportion of i t is 
tfcken up with requests for honours, offices or pensions, w i l l 
appreciate how d i f f i c u l t i t was to pursue the course outlined 
by Peel. 
Thus we obtain a picture of this Peelite which is very 
different from the conventional assumption that peelites were 
Liberals In a l l but name. That sort of generalisation la in 
fact most destructive of true historical understanding, and i f 
nothing else be gained by a detailed study of Gbulburnys po l i t i ca l 
•• 170. 
oareerf ' i t serves at> least as.: a renewed proof that historical 
truth can never he reached by praconoeivea .claissifi cation, but 
only by Entering fuller -iaitpi the \ i i f e< end outlook of the actors 
on the stage o f History. 
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NOTES 
(1) I am greatly indebted to Colonel E. H. Gonlburn, D.S.Q., 
of Betohworth House, Betchworth, Surrey, who has a large 
collection of letters and other documents relating to the 
Rt. Hon. Henry Goulburn in his possession, and who has placed 
a l l these at my disposal for the purpose of this thesis. 
(2) A l l quotations are reproduced exactly from the original 
documents with regard to spelling eto* The only alterations 
I have made are that I have written out a l l abbreviations in 
f u l l , and that I have added a minimum of punctuation, where 
that was neoessary to avert the danger of distortion of meaning. 
(3) A l l letters and handwritten memoranda referred to in 
the footnotes are to be found i n the Additional Documents in the 
Brit ish Museum, unless otherwise stated. The only exception 
to this rule is Goulburnfs autobiography - a fragment dealing 
chiefly with his l i f e and career up to 1822 - which is part of 
the Goulburn Manuscripts at Betohworth. Other parts of these 
Goulburn Manuscripts are indicated by (G.M.). 
(4) The most important of the Additional Manuscripts are 
the following: 
(a) Peel Papers, Add Mas. 40,328 - 40,333. 
(b) Gladstone Papers, Add. Mss. 44,162* 




(1) Of *Times« Obituary Notice. 14th January, 1856. 
(a) Of Correspondence with Gladstone, Eipon and Bonham, passim. 
(3) qf Queen Viotoria^e l ^ t e t s . 87th February, 1051* 
Memorandum by Prince Albert* 
(b) Background^ Childhood. Eduoation. 
(4) This' section is exclusi^iy based on the fragments of 
Gouibuws autobiographical stoatoh« A l l quotations 
aae taken from these memoirs. 
(5) She was not only a very beautiful wbmatt,; but also very 
oharming in her mannersAS a result she received 
the attention of many members of fashionable society, 
including the Prince of Wales,; but Goulburn is 
concerned to point out her absolutely virtuous 
• conduct both before and after her marriage,-
(6 > This school contained about. 30-40 boys s^ome of 
aristocratic and a l l of r.espeotabie .parentage," 
• (7) The f i n a l ne^ is sometimes omitted* -
O) Of isectlon (d). ; : •./- ; 
(c) Election to Parliament 
(9) once again a l l quotations are taken from his memoirs? 
(10) Mr, Perceval was a personal friend of the Goulburns* 
and had helped them considerably in the Chancery 
proceedings. ^ 
(11) Later her naiaei is given as Irwin* % 
(IE) in a number of oases blanks are l e f t in the memoirs 
, for dates or exact figures to be f i l l e d in after 
verification* This is one of many proofs of 
Gbulburn's scrupulous regard for accuracy* 
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(o^ Bleotlon to Parliament (flontd.) 
(13) Later Speaker of the House of Commons. 
(14) Later Viscount Goderich and Marquis of Rlpon. 
(15) Thought, at the time, to be a man "with a future." 
His early promise was, however, not realised. . 
He was offered the Post of Chancellor of the 
Exohe<juer by Perceval in 1810, but declined the 
Office. 
(16) Later Lord Fitzgerald. 
(17) Had attained ministerial off ice by 1810, when he 
became Secretary to the Admiralty. 
(18) Of the House of Commons. 
(1?) For f i r s t recorded speech see section (d). 
(d) Junior Minister, 1810-31. 
(20) Unless otherwise stated, quotations are taken from 
the memoirs. ' - -
(21) I t was usual for parliament to be prorogued in July 
and not to reassemble u n t i l January or February. 
Thus a prolonged tour of this nature did not 
interfere with the conscientious performance of 
his duties as a Member of Parliament. 
(22) Lord Harrow&*y*s brother. 
(23) Goulburn's companion in off ice was Mr. (afterwards 
Sir J.) Birkett . 
(84) Though the Hansard, for these years is no absolute 
guide for a l l that was said in Parliament, 
ministerial contributions to debate were almost 
invariably printed i n the "Parliamentary Debates." 
(25) 6th March, 1812. 
(26) Cf. Correspondence with Peel, Gladstone, and Ripon. Passim. 
(27) Col. Bunbury was in charge of the war branch. 
Goulburn writes, * I knew no more of what was 
going on in the war branch than any stranger, 
unless during the absence Of my Colleagues." 
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(d) Junior Minister, 1810-31. 
(28) Cf. Hansard, relevant volumes. 
(29) Cf. "Peel and the Conservative Party." 
(30) Cf. Section (J). 
(31) Cf. Correspondence with Lord Ripon Add Mss. 
(32) I t "became law on 13th Marfih, 1807. 
(33) Cf. Hansard, 22nd Apr i l , 1818. 
(34) Cf. Hansard, 8th June, 1819* 
(35) That for War and Colonies. 
(36) Cf. Hansard, 3rd Apr i l , 1816. 
(37) There is , however, no evidence that he also looked 
after the war "branch of the o f f ice . 
(38) Cf. Hansard 26th February, 1821, 7th June, 1821, etc.etc. 
(e) Chief Secretary for Ireland 
(39) Cf. Goulburn^ autobiography. 
(40) Henry Hobhouse Diary, 28th November, 1821. 
(41) ib id . 15th December, 1821. 
(42) Cf. GoulburnTs autobiography. 
(43) This correspondence, marked "private," was of course l«*<j€ly 
• {{•etallaafgely- or semi-official correspondence, which 
was "private" only in the sense that i t was not 
intended to be public, e.g. i t would not be 
submitted to parliamentary scrutiny, should one 
of the frequent demands that certain o f f i c i a l 
correspondence should be laid before the House 
succeed. 
(44) The dependence on the Home Office is il lustrated by 
the fact that I r ish papers are catalogued as part 
of the Home Office papers at the Public Record 
Office. 
(45) Henry Hobhouse Diary, 15th December, 1821. 
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(e) Chief Secretary for Ireland. (Conta.) 
(46) Goulburn's autobiography. 
(47) Hansard, Slat April* 1625, Speech on the second 
reading of Sir F. Burdett's Roman Catholic 
Relief . B i l l . This is Goulburn1 s moat consistent 
argument, against emancipation. . 
(48) Spencer Walpole, History of England from the 
Conclusion, of the Gr eat ^ Vol. I I , p*220. 
(49) Related by Hobhbuse - quoted aboveV 
(50) Four pages o£..foolsoap in his autobiography, as well 
as stray references: in his early letters to peel. 
(51) Home Office: Papers, Public Record Qffice. J (H> / • 
(52) Goulburn's autobiography^ 
(53) Brit ish Museum, Additional Manuscripts 40,322 « 40*333 
and 37,298 f f . 167-3a4{ 371299^301; 37,302 ff»l<*320j 
37,303 f f .187-2561 37|304 f f . 99-120 anft ff,137*247; 
. / •  ;' 37,305 f f ,13,33*96. 
(54) Bf. Huskies on* s refusal to accept the I r i sh 
Secretaryship (above). ' ; ' . 
(55) Letters from Goulburn to Peelv 6th January, 16:22 and 
7th January,' 1822 (Add Hsslj Goulburn'a Autobiography. 
(55a) A lat ter from.Goulburn to Peel,- 25th January, 1822, 
suggests that bankruptcy was another reason, 
( l l Gwynn suggests that SaU-Ti©, had aspired to 
the Lord^LieUtenanoy. 
(56) Even.in this case several people had informed Goulburn 
of their desire to f i l l the post of Solicitor-General. 
(57) Cf. Goulburn's autobiography. 
(58) Gf. Goulburn's autobiography. ^ 
(59) Letter to Peel^ 30th January, 1822. > 
(60) Letters to Peel* 28th and 30th January, 1822. 
(61) Goulburn's, brother was the governor of Hew South 
VfaXe/s * but i t was,, of course, at tha time the 
normal destination of convicts sentenced to 
' transportation. 
(o) Chief Secretary for upland jcontdj* ) 
(53) Of. <&u&b^rtt,a a#phiogi;aphy-
163) Hansard 13th" June, l8&£. 
164) In his autoMogr aphy he states that i t f ai led 
\ • Tto producei »s^.^ei^i^l^*o^ie$it and was in 
fact Altogether inoperative.1* 
. (65) 3 Geo. IV 0.185* 
' - ' V . . f - ,' • . 
(66) Hansard, i3th june^ ' 
(67) Hume's motion on lithea and Ghwoh Establishment in 
irelandV Hansard ;^ 19th June, 1823. 
(68) Cf. Better from Peel to Goulburn, 5th Sept ember ^  1822, 
and the reply 9th;. September^  1822* 
(69) "&n Sot for the Appointment of Constables, and to 
secure the effectual performance of the duties 
of their off ice and :fo,r the appointment of 
Magistrates in Ireland in certain eases*" . 
. . 3 Geo. i f , oil63. • 
(70} Cf. Goulburn's autobiography* ; 
(71) m his autobiography. • later he describes them as 
: "entirely inefficient, a^  
(7.S) Of* Hansard, 7th June, 1822* 2nd reading, of I r i sh 
; Constables B i l l , Goulburn*s speech. 
(73) In his autobiography*it is well to remember that 
Goulburn rarely, i f ever, sought credit 1 for himself 
where i t was not due. 
(74) Debate on the second reading. Cf* Hansard 7 th June,1822• 
(75) Cf.Goulburn's autobiography. 
(76) Cf* e.g* letter by Sir O'Brien to Peel, enclosed wH?h 
a letter from Peel to.Goulburn, 28th March, 1882. 
i 77) Letter to Lord v/eiiesiey, 2nd Apr i l , I8g2> 78) Letter from Goulburh to Y/ellesley 13th Apr i l , 1822, 
7*9jj Statement i n reply to Sir E. O'Brien, Hansard.1: 
• 29th Aprli> 1822. 
178. 
(e) Chief Secretary for Ireland (Contd*) 
(80) Of.Letters from Goulhurn to Peel (a) undated ( A p r i l , 
182E)9 (b) 4th May, 1823* 
(81) Of. Han sard 16th May, 1822, 
{82) 5 Geo. IV, of34. „. ' 
•. (83) Letter from Goulburn to Peel, tuidated (May I82fc)» 
(84) Letter from Goulburn jbo Peel;; 11th July, 1822 and reply* 
(85) Letter from Gou$burn to ;-?PeeV 16 th Sept ember, 1822. 
(86) Letters from Gpulburn to Peel, 2nd November ,i 188a, 
(87) Letter ijp Peel,; 4th ll^emb^r, 1Q88. 
(88) Letter from. Goulpurn to; Pepl, 15th December, 1822, 
(§91 Letter from Goulburn to Peel^ 21st December, 1822• 
(90) Of* Peel Goulburn correspondence, 26th January* 1822 * . 3rd January^ 1823. V'.' 
; (91) Letter to Pepl^ 22nd January, 1823, ...: ^ '.-y,^ 
(9£) Letter to pp^l, 22nd January, 1823. 
(93) On 9th julyy 1822 Goulbprn wrote to Welles!ey who 
had c r i t i c i s e d the b i l l aa ineffective: * l so ' 
perfeotly concur with your Excellency as to the 
',' measure, i t s e l f that I should .have l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y 
i n abandoning, i t for the present Session,- did I 
not think that the character of the Government 
having onee proposed i t Was involved i n carrying 
i t through." ." .-^ : - • 
(94) Letter to Pepi^; 16 th October, 1822• 
(95) Letter from Peel to Goulburn, 27th November, 1822, 
$96) Letter to Peel, 18th November, 1822, 
(97) Letter to Pepl,> 31st March, 1823, 
(98) Of,Hansard, 16th May, 1823. 
(99) Of, le'ttor to T.7pllesley,( 7th June, 1823, i n which 
Goulburn states that the compulsory clause i n 
the B i l l had to be dropped due tp opposition. 
179. 
(e) Chief Secretary for Ireland (Contd.) 
(100) Of. Hansard 6th March, 1823. 
(101) Of. Correspondence of Goulburn and Peel, 7th and 
11th December, 1822t 21st January, 1823. 
(102) Of. Correspondence of Goulburn and Peel, 18th November, 
1st and 7th December, 1822. 
(103) 4 Geo, IV 0.99. 19th July, 1823. 
(104) Fewer i f necessary. 
(105) Letter to Peel, 21st January, 1823. 
(106) l e t t e r to Peel, 1st December, 1822. 
(107) 7th June, 1823. 
(108) Cf. Hansard, 9th March, 1824. 
(109) Cf. Hansard, 16th February, 1826. 
(110) The success of the Act was probably largely due to the conversion of the majority of the clergy. On 1st September, 1823, Goulbum informed Peel that, i n general, the clergy favoured the measure. At the same time he stated that he only refused applications which were l i k e l y to end i n fai l u r e i n order not the cheok "the ardour" for composition. 
(111) 10th September, 1822. 
(112) Letter from Goulburn to Peel, undated, probably 
September, 1823. 
(113) Letter from Goulburn to Peel, 4th November, 1822. 
(114) Letter from Goulburn to Mr. G. Davison, November, 1822. 
(115) Enclosed with a l e t t e r from Goulburn to Peel, 17th June, 1823. The description of the Orangemen as a secret, and thus unlawful sooiety, with the object of defending the Law and the Constitution was the usual line of defence adopted by their apologists. Cf.Hansard 5th March, 1823t Goulburn's speech i n reply to Abercromby*s motion. 
(116) Letter to Peel, 16th September, 1823. 
(118) Letter,to Jellesley, 5th May, 1823. 
180.' 
(e) Chief Secretary for Ireland (bontd.) 
(118) Letter to Peel, 15th November, 1823. 
(119) Letters to Peel, 23rd September and 3rd October, 1883. 
(120) Letters to Goulburn, 13th and 14th November, 1823. 
(121) Letter to Peel, 16th November, 1823. 
(123) Letter to Goulburn, 6th December, 1824. 
(123) Letter to Y/ellesley, 20th February, 1823, 
(124) Cf.Hansard 21st A p r i l , 1826, debate on I r i s h 
Estimates. 
(125> These reports are to be found i n the Home Office 
papers at the Public Record Office. (H.0.100/213) 
(126) Letter to Jellesley, 26th March, 1824. 
(127) Letter from Peel to Goulburn, and reply, 14th and 
16th A p r i l , 1824. 
(128) Catholic Association Debates, 29th May, 1824. 
(129) Cf. e.g. Letters from Goulburn to Peel, 27th July 
and 31st August, 1824. 
(130) Letter to Peel, 27th October, 1824, and reply 
6th November, 1824. 
(131) Letter to Peel, 26th November, 1824. 
(132) Letter from Goulburn to Peel, 10th November, and 
reply 18th November, 1824. 
(133) Letter to Peel, 17th December, 1824. 
(134) Catholic Association Debates, 10th November, 1824. 
(135) Letter to Peel, 20th December, 1824. 
(136) Letter to Peel, 22nd December, 1924. 
(137) Letters to Peel, 1st and 5th January, 1825. 
(138) Letters to Peel, 5th and 16th January, 1825. 
(139) Cf. Hansard, 3rd February, 1825. 
(Q) Chief Secretary for Ireland (Cbntd.) 
(140) 'Cf* HanearcL,' 10th, 15th and 35th February, 1835. 
(141) Of. peel-Goulburn correspondence preparatory to 
' the B i l l , paasim. 
(1«2} 6 Geo. IV, 0.4. 9th March, 1835. 
(143) t7opdwardt "The Age of Reform'1 p. 338. 
(144) Letter to Peel^i 22nd July, 1825* 
(145) Letter from Goulburn tft Peel,; 80th Depember^ 1836> 
$146) ,/oodnard, "The Age, of Reform," p*S£$. 
(147) Letter to Goulburri, undatedy probably November j 1823. 
(148) Letter to Peel, 5th July, 1824. 
(149) Letters to Welle slPyj* 13th and 21st May» 1824.. 
(150) Letter from Goulburn to PeeM 2nd January,. and reply, 
' 6th January, 1836* :' 
_ (151) Of. Hansard, 4th March1823. 
(1&3) 5 Geo, IV, XQZ4>* 
(153) Of. Hansard, 23nd February, 1825. 
•• (1541 7 Geo* IV,4 o,73. 31$$ May, 1826* 
(155) Letters Peel to GoulpWii, 7tn December^ 1823, and •; Goulburh to Peel,' 2nd January, 1824. . . ' '/'•/... 
(156) Letters to Peel; 8th November and 15th December, 1,824 
(157) I t ia not clear whether this term denotes a strike 
or a look-out j ' \ < . 
U58) f e t t e r to Peel; 25th Ju.3^ ; 1826. 
(159) Letter to 'Jellesieyy 14th Apriii, 1827* 
. 102, . 
it) Ohanoellor of the Egoheckuer 
(160) Of. Peel's HemOIrs (edited by Stanhope gad Oardwell) 
Part 1, p,15, 
(161) Of, D. Gwynn - Daniel O'Connell, pp*l?S f f * 
(163) Of. Hansard, 21st i p r i l ^ 1885, Sir F . Burdett's 
Oatholio Relief B i l l j ; Second Beading* 
(163) Of* Hansard, 12th May, 1828w 
(164) Of, Hanf£*p^?lL£&h^^ '... 
(165) Of* Hansard,' 17th March, 182$* 
(105A) Of, Goulburn's; autobiography* : :" ; 
(166) I t was a question on which he f e l t so strongly that f' 
in the 1886. election he> haeU unsuccessfully, 
contestedydambridge University on that issu,e i n 
opposition to a>; fellow-member of tto*'. Government, 
Palmer at on.; • ' • ' i ; ^ ' ; v v «^:":, 
(167) Of. Y/eliington ~ Gotiiburn correspondence; G*M# 
(168) Of . Woodward - 2fhe ^ ge^o£ Reform, cpp*73,74i Huskisson*s resignation i n 1820 was not connected with • . , 
• • '•' financl^'.policy^ .. .v;.,;;.- r. .••„>•••. 
(168) Of. Hansard, 15th February, 1828* .' 
. >|l70) Only approximate figures are given here. v\;v 
.' (171) Of, Hansard, l l t h July, 1828. 1..• 
(£72) 9 Geo, IV, 0* 90^ and 10 Geo• IV, 0.27, 
(173) Of. Hansard,' l l t h July, 1828. 
(174) Of. Hansiard; 8th May, 1829* ' ' 
' (175) Of* Hansard, 4th February, 1830, 
(J76) Of* Hansard*; 12th May, 1829, 
(177) Of, Hansard* 15th and 19th February, 1830, 
(178) Of* Haaaai?d,: 23rd February, 1830* 
(179) Gf* Hansard, 15th March, 1830. 
183. 
(£) Chancellor of the I&cheguer (Centa,} 
(180) Cf. Hansard, 26th March, 1830. 
(181) Cf. Hansard, 19th, 22nd and 25th March, 1830. 
(182) Cf. Hansard, 3rd June, 1828. • 
(183) Cf. Hansard, 4th February, 1830. 
(184) Letter from Peel to Goulburn, 6th December, 1830. 
. (185) Of. Hansard, 8th July, 1838. 
(186) Ridley Commission on the C i v i l Service, Second 
Report, Sir H. Maxwell's evidence. 
(187) i t might be added that in 1888 such sinecures etc* 
as were s t i l l granted were no longer shown on 
the same account as C i v i l Service Superannuation, 
since the C i v i l List and the C i v i l Estimates had 
meanwhile been separated,. 
(188) Cf.. Hansard, 13th May, 1830. 
(189) Cf. TJoodward - The Age of Uefor^p./S* 
(190) Letter to Peel, probably June, 1830. 
(191) Cf. Hansard, 2nd November, 1830. 
(192) Cf. Hansard, 12th Hovember, 1830. 
(193) Letter to Goulburn, 8th October, 1836 (G.M.) 
(g) In Opposition. 1830^34. 
(194) Cf. Goulburn's autobiography* "Principle" here refers to attachment to the Established Church and the constitution of the Universities* 
(195) Cf. Hansard, 9th March, 1831. 
(196) Cf. Hansard, 26th March, 1832. 
(197) Letter to Peel, December, 1831. 
(198) Letter to Peel,,28th December, 1831, 
(g) I n Opposition. 1830*34. 
(199) e.g. the provision by v/hi oh the amount of pensions 
the King oould grant were halved. (£70^000). 
($00) Of. Hansard,-4th February and 13th A p r i l , 1831. 
(201) Of. Hansard, budget debates, 11th and 14th February, 1831*; 
Cf. Hansard^ 3rd Octoberm 1831. 
Cf. Hansard, 7th October, 1831* Tate Sfc^t Indies were 
suffering from the results of a hurricane. 
£100;pOQ r e l i e f was granted i n Februarys 1832. 
(204) Letter to Peel,: 5th Hovember,- 1832, 
1205) l e t t e r to Peel, 12th December, 1833. $he noun used i n connect ion with thp ad|eetive "oonservat ive" was. not "oonservat ism" but "conservation" as i s shown by a l e t t e r sent three weeks previously. 
(206) Of. Hansard, 12th Februaryf 14th March and 13th Jfey,1833. 
Of. Hansard, 30tn May, 1833. . • 
Lettpr to Peel, 27th Hovember,' 1633. 
Cf. Hansard; 25th July; 1834. 
(h) Home Secretary. 1834*5. 
(310) Letter to Peel, 8th Deoember, 1834. 
(211) ttn Melbourne's short*-lived f i r s t administration 
Ti scouht Duneannon was Home Secretary* 
(212) Of. Hansard^ 24th February, 1835^ 
(213:) Letters from Peel to Goulburn, 31st Deoember, 1834 
and l e t January, 1835, and reply 3ttd January, 1835. 
Gregson ap£epted' the appointment despite hla 
ori&inaX refusal* v ':^ ' 
(232 A) Only 5 b i l l 3 , reoe ived the Hoyal Assent hef or e the f a l l 
-.•;.\' of the Government. 
(214) Cf• Hansard, 25th February and 2nd A p r i l , 1835. 
' (215) y/oodward i r Ihe.Age of aefprm;p*97. { • 
'•• -leg,.' 
(1) i n Opposition, 1835*41 . , < 
(316) Letter to Peel, 6th A p r i l , 1830* 
(217) Letter to Peel; 20ti i !Aususti 1635. - :. ] ':; 
(318) Letter to Peel,,11th August, 1835* 
(219) Letter to Peel; 31st December; :1835* 
(230) Letter to Peel^, 2na Septemberj 1837* 
(221) Letters to ?eei£2n^ 
Hbyember, 1839* 
(223) Of. Letter from Goulburn to Peel, 3oth December, 1839. 
{%%Z) Of* Hansard,^ 87th May, 1839, 1 
(224) 0** Hansard, 6th June, 183&, 
(230) Of .Hansard,' 19th A p r i l , 1839* 
(2.26) Cf,.:H.anQard^  29th June* 1839, . 
• (237) . Of • Hansardy £7th January, 1840, '.;;.. ./ 
(228) 0*V.;jiain9^i^ 
(239) Of . Hansard;. 30th A ^ r i l , 1841. ' • 
'• (230) Ofi Hansard^ J3th February, 1836. ; ,' >•••; 
(331) :0f<: :%^a&mr m$%, # i i y ; 1§?8« Ashley was to be 
the To3?y nominee for taking over the • 
V; queen's honseliold duri*ig the "Bedchamber Crisis," 
(233) Of* Hansard; 14th July, %1&40* 
(,1) Chancellor o£ the Bxohectuer . i841»6* 
(333) "The Times^ . 
(234) Of. Hansard, 26th August and "The Times," 
38th Attgast; I8^u; ; 
(235) "The Times," 3hd September^ 1841, leading a r t i o l e * 
(336) Of. the correspondence!referred to i n the following 
paragraphs, • ' ' 
186. 
(J) Chancellor of the Exch.egu.er 1841-6 
(837) Letter to Peel, 20th November, 1839. 
(238) Letter to Goulburn, 20th October, 1841. 
(239) Letter to Peel, 22nd July, 1841. 
(340) The last year of Income Tax collections, and hence 
the last year for which figures of the national 
income were available. 
(241) Anticipated d e f i c i t £1^-2 million* 
(242) Woodward- The Age of Reform, p.106. 
(243) Of. Hansard, 11th March, 1842. Moreover, Goulburn 
was convalescing from illness# 
(244) Letter to Peel, 17th November, 1842. The fears had 
been expressed by the Governor of the Bank of 
England* 
(245) Letter to Goulburn, 23rd July, 1842. 
(246) Letter to Peel, 6th A p r i l , 1844. 
(247) Letter to Goulburn, 8th A p r i l , 1844* 
(248) Memorandum to Peel, undated, December, 1844* 
(249) Letter to Peel, 20th November, 1839. 
(250f Letter to Peel, 17th November, 1842. 
(-51) Letter to Gladstone, 5th May, 1854. 
(252) Cf. Hansard, 20th May and 13th June, 1844. 
(253) Cf• Letter from Peel to Goulburn of that date. 
(254) 7 and 8 Vic*, o*32* 19th July, 1844* 
(255) In Sir Robert Peel«s Memoirs. 
(256) Letter to Peel, 23rd October, 1843* 
(257) Letters to Peel, 11th and 13th November, 1845. 
(258) Letter from Goulburn to Peel, 12th November, 1845* 
(259) Letter to Peel, dated "Sunday morning," probably 
30th November, 1845. 
< . 187. 
' , • * 
U l Chancellor of the Exoheoja.e? 1841~6 (dontd*) 
C860) It-"is: Interesting --1^-i't^&-tn^t'^Pe^:8./ii^a0are 
actually contemplateet such a gradual reduction 
wliioh would not become f u l l y effective u n t i l 1849* The operattibn of a l l Corn Duties w$9, 
however, i n practice: suspended u n t i l 1st Majfehy 
1848. $ & 2 6 f h JUiie, 1846. 
V: (2^1) Of, Hansard;: 2*ta February, 1846. 
(262) Woodward ^  The Jge ,of ^ 
(263) Of. Sir S. Horthoote * 30 years of finanoial policy 
p*36. 
(364) Of. Hansard, 8th May, 1843; 
(265) 0f. Hansard, 29th A p r i l , 1844* 
(266) Of* Hansard, 8th M$eoh, 1844;1 and Dorthoote «-
20 years of financial policy pp*53 f f * 
(2§7) Letter to GOulbiurn,, 27 th Deoember; 1845. 
(368) Of* Ha^wd,: 29th May^  1846. 
(369) Cf, Haiisftf^ 
(270) Of* Hansardj, 13th February!, 1843. . 
(271) Of, Peel - Gpulburn correspondence, October, 1842. 
(373) Enclosures to Gouiburn's l e t t e r to Peel%* 4th October, 
:: : 1844* :': . 
(273) Cf. Peel-Goulburn correspondence, 31st-2fth August,1845• 
(274) Letter from Goulburn to Peel; ,29th August,, 1843. 
(375) Of. e.g. Hansard,; 20th June, 1843. 
(376) Of. Hansard; 26th A p r i l , 1842. 
' (277) Of. Hansard,* 2nd May;, 1844*. 
(k) Retirement ; . 
(3?8) Letters to Peel, 13th: August; 1846. 
f. 188. 
(k) Retirement (Oontd*) 
(279) Letters to Peel, 19th and 24th December, 1846. 
(280) Letter to Ripon, 12th September, 1849, 
(881) Letter to Rlpony 24th August,- 1848* 
(283) Of* Hansard^ 4th February, 1847• 
(383) Of. Hansard^ 13th December, 1852* 
(284) Goulburn':was one ot the few friends present at the 
funeral, and was on© of the executors of Peel's w i l l , 
(285) Queen Vietoriai's l e t t e r s . Memorandum by Prince 
Albert, 27th February,' 1861. 
(386) Of. correspondence with Ripon, B r i t i s h Museum, 
Additional Manuscript s 40,877. 
(387) Of« e,g., correspondence with Gladstone (G.M.). 
(1) Oonolusion 
(388) Of, l e t t e r to Peel, 1st December,. i841. •_"'/....•.. 
(289) C^ . Gtoulb 
. . (290), Of. e.g, Hansard' 25th May; 1843. 
(893) Letter, to Peel, ?rd October * 1847., . 
(293) Letter to Rippn, 18th January, 1850. 
(294) Of. Letter to Peel^ June, 1830. /.-.'<': 
(295) Of. Hansard, 39th A p r i l , 1850. / ' 
\y (296) Of r.Hansard,. 4th y'r--j\r 
(397) Letter 1 to peel, 16th September; 1S38, 
(298) Letter to Goulburn, 1st September, 1841 (G.M.). 
(399) Letter to Goulburn, 2nd January ^ 1835,. 
